174. Editorial Note
The Committee of Principals met with President Kennedy in the Cabinet Room of the White House on April 12, 1962, from 5 to 6 p.m. Glenn Seaborg wrote the following summary of the discussion on disarmament:
“Rusk explained the reduction by category in comparison to reduction by type. He emphasized the key role of production in the decision between the two. He says that if production is not small, we would have a modernization program rather than a disarmament program. Foster said he thought there was more flexibility in reduction by category, and said he wanted the DOD to be sure that they saw the implications of reduction by type with small replacements. Rusk said he thought about 5% per year of production might be negotiable while Foster said it might be only 3%. The President decided to go ahead with reduction by types.
[Page 437]“Rusk again asked whether DOD understood the figures, and McNaughton answered in the affirmative. McNaughton said they want production by type so as to keep the plants warm, that is, keep them in good condition. The President pointed out that this presents a real problem from the standpoint of public relations in the disarmament negotiations. He wanted to know how we could explain the reason for keeping our plants warm. Wiesner said we needed to protect ourselves until we are sure of disarmament.
“The President asked if they agreed to inspection from the beginning, could we forego this. Kaysen said the explanation should be along the lines of saying that it is an honest plan and that the Soviet plan is not honest; that it is a complicated problem not to be solved by a radical change, and that serious people should think about starting cautiously. Wiesner also mentioned the need for economic turn-around time.
“The President then said OK, but we can back off from this insist-ence on production if we can get inspection from the very beginning and, of course, the success of our negotiating such a position depends on our skill in handling it. Rusk said the DOD must agree that the production should be low and McNaughton said they do so agree, and they can work out suitable language.
“Next, the question of the reduction of launch pads was considered. The representatives of the Chiefs of Staff said that the Chiefs can’t agree to this because they haven’t had enough time to study it. McNaughton said that he and McNamara and Gilpatric feel this should be included and that they see no defect in the argument for putting it into effect from the beginning. The representative of the Chiefs said it could be put in later, and Rusk pointed out it could also be put in at the beginning and dropped later.
“McNamara and Lemnitzer, who entered the meeting at this stage, both agreed that the reduction in launch pads should be put in the treaty from the beginning.
“The next question involved the reduction in reserve armament and Rusk suggested that it should not be in the treaty.
“The President asked who was going over to Geneva and was told that Foster and McNaughton were.
“Kaysen pointed out the problem of accepting jurisdiction of the international court under the treaty. Lemnitzer objected to the inclusion of the principle of zonal inspection in such definite language, and McNamara suggested that the language in the last sentence of page 27 of the April 12 draft could be made more conditional by including the phrase, ‘for example.’ The President said that the more he looks at this problem, the more complicated it seems to be and, therefore, he appreciates the efforts of Foster, Fisher, McNaughton and the others who have worked on it.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 26, Supplement, pages 128-130)
[Page 438]The meeting then turned to preparations for the upcoming U.S. nuclear tests, the discussion of which Seaborg also summarized in his journal. (ibid., pages 130-131)