Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

141. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• See Attached List¹

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to outline the problem before the Committee. Mr. Foster referred to his memorandum of February 28 to members of the Committee² which detailed the problems for consideration and which centered on the necessity to know where we are going as we attempt to become more precise in the forthcoming negotiations regarding the September 25 Plan,³ particularly the first Stage. ACDA has attempted to focus on the possibilities of reducing the power to destroy while preserving the power to deter. Mr. Foster recalled that ACDA Plan #1⁴ emphasized the exploration of the possibilities of reduction on a parity basis of strategic delivery vehicles which were at the heart of the modern nuclear threat. The February 28th memorandum suggests five alternative bases for effecting reduction in strategic delivery vehicles and also other armaments. He noted that these alternatives had been discussed with the Defense Department.⁵ He would now like to get the views of the Committee on which alternative it might be most useful to pursue in further detail and which might serve as the basis for meaningful bilateral agreement with the Soviets which would avoid the necessity of including China at the early stage. The second major item for consideration was what particular methods of verification and control warranted more exploration. He referred specifically to the ACDA work on zonal inspection and sampling techniques.

At Mr. Foster’s request, Admiral Parker presented a series of charts⁶ illustrating in specific terms the impact on the US and USSR’s strategic delivery vehicles of each of the five approaches, i.e. reduction by types, reduction by categories, reduction by total number of vehicles, reduction by total megatonnage capacity within categories and reduction by total megatonnage delivery capacity.

Secretary McNamara expressed the wish to go back to the more general considerations after viewing the charts presented.

The Secretary inquired whether we have at hand the practical inspection techniques to verify the kind of reductions proposed. Mr. Foster said that we have good capabilities, even unilaterally, to check on aircraft. If we had as well sampling and ground control posts, the capabilities would be excellent. We do not have the same feeling of confidence with regard to inspection of reductions in the missile areas. He noted that there was an inter-departmental committee studying this problem⁷ which is reaching the conclusion that, with specified improvements, a high degree of confidence might be achieved. Dr. Wiesner noted that in the first phase there was little need for any inspection beyond verification of destruction. As the disarmament process got deeper, verification of destruction alone would not suffice. The Secretary said the broad question is whether we move toward proposals involving proportionate reductions or toward parity in reductions. Secretary McNamara said an additional basic question was whether our initial proposals should apply to conventional and nuclear armaments across the board or should be limited to reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles alone. The Department of Defense would not support either limitations related only to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or reductions on a parity basis in the initial stages. If the parity concept is to be applied, Defense would like strategic nuclear reductions tied in with conventional reductions. Therefore, he would like serious attention to be given to proposing reductions, by categories, of all important weapons—both conventional and strategic nuclear. However, he would be willing to consider as a substitute for the proposed reduction of all classes, reduction of certain classes of strategic nuclear vehicles on a proportional basis. Until some of these basic considerations had been decided, he felt it would be unproductive to discuss the details of the five possible approaches outlined in the February 28th memorandum. He noted that the JCS has serious questions on a number of these points and he asked that General Lemnitzer be allowed to comment in due course.

Mr. Foster said that it was easy to speak of across the board reductions but he is much concerned by the sheer magnitude of the problem. That is why ACDA recommended the exploration of the degree of risk which might be involved, in a limited first stage, in dealing with strategic nuclear vehicles alone. Such a proposal would not only be more readily operable, it would be more negotiable. This would also allow us in the meantime to build up our conventional forces, where we are inferior. He noted that there were certain categories of strategic aircraft which would be phased out in any case in the not too distant future. Although there would inevitably be some risk in a first stage such as he was proposing, this may be worth doing because of its greater simplicity with respect to inspection. The numbers presented by Admiral Parker, in his view, indicated that there were some steps we could safely take in this direction even though they would have to be followed by conventional cuts.

The Secretary said he was interested to know whether we can begin to achieve steps in disarmament which are consistent with our security and that of our allies. From this point of view, he questioned whether the problem of administrative difficulty was really relevant. The major question was whether we impaired our security. Mr. Foster indicated his complete agreement with this observation. He was looking for the best of both worlds. In the judgment of many close students the approach that he proposed was a feasible one both from the administrative and security standpoint. This approach would not only result in saving a lot of money but have a significant effect on the possible destructiveness of war should it come.

The Secretary asked whether if we made the kind of reductions in the nuclear field of which Mr. Foster spoke we would have to build up our conventional forces. General Lemnitzer said that it was impossible to identify a precise point at which this would be the case. We were in a bad way at present regarding our conventional strength in Europe in any case. Mr. Foster agreed it was impossible to be precise. A 50% reduction in the nuclear field might indeed force us to build up our conventional armaments.

Secretary McNamara said that a proportionate reduction of 30% would probably not require more of a build-up in conventional forces than will be required anyway. He noted that he was not certain the JCS would not take the same view.

Mr. Rostow inquired whether it would not be easier, if we opted for the sampling or zonal approach to inspection, to reduce on an across-the-board basis. It would be complicated and difficult to restrict the inspection to selected weapons. Mr. Foster said he was not sure this was the case since we intended to concentrate on the big items. Dr. Wiesner agreed that it would be much easier if everything were reduced, since there would be no basis then for excluding certain plants from inspection. He thought that in the first phase it would be possible in the case of all major armaments to rely on initial declarations and upon our own unilateral intelligence capabilities; inspection of declared levels would not be required. He was not sure that it was in our military interest to concentrate only on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

General Lemnitzer said that the JCS’s view was that although the approach limited to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles might be simpler from the standpoint of counting, these should not be separated from other elements of disarmament. The JCS was also worried about omitting China. The JCS view was that nuclear reductions should be linked with conventional reductions. Further they feel it is important to move cautiously and slowly and to have a sure test of the inspection system at an early stage. Anything that limits the inspection process is “phony”. If inspection is limited only to certain categories of weapons it is simpler to spoof.

The Secretary asked what the effect would be on total U.S. security if we were to propose a 30% reduction in all weapon categories across the board. Secretary McNamara observed that the answer to this could not be simple since disarmament cannot be viewed as only an alternative to the status quo—since that will not continue—but to what the situation would be in the future if disarmament did not take place. Without disarmament, the Soviets will continue to close the nuclear gap. This is why he would be willing to support disarmament action which in effect limits the increase in nuclear armaments on both sides. He felt that a 30% reduction would leave us in a stronger position than we would be in if the present situation continues. Mr. Nitze stated that an across-the-board cut of 30% in all armaments would freeze the inferiority of the United States in conventional armaments. He wondered how our allies would react to such a freeze in U.S. conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He noted it was highly unlikely that the allies would do what they might otherwise do to improve their conventional strength position if we adopted a program such as Mr. Foster was referring to. Mr. Foster felt that the need for improving our conventional position was another sound reason for sticking to a first stage which was limited to nuclear vehicles, although the ultimate objective is to deal with all categories of weapons. The major expected Soviet increases would be in this field; the approach he was suggesting would check this increase. Dr. Wiesner raised the question of the possibility of a stand-off with the Soviet Union; namely that the U.S. would reduce proportionately more in the strategic field than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets in turn would reduce proportionately more than the U.S. in the conventional field.

The Secretary inquired how we would establish the basis from which the reductions would begin. Mr. Foster said that we were taking a January 1, 1964 target date for a basis. We would begin on the basis of declarations of strength by either side. As the inspection capabilities increased in the early periods we would improve our possibilities of spotting any cheating in declarations. He felt that not much risk was involved in such an approach. Mr. Amory noted that the quality of our information varies drastically from one category of weapons to another. We could catch any arrant cheating in the declarations in many of the categories right at the beginning (he cited heavy bombers and tanks as an example). Mr. Foster said that we had not viewed verification of the starting level as a requirement. He described the zonal approach to inspection, which he said would probably offer the best opportunity of gradually closing in on the problem while avoiding taking a politically untenable position. Dr. Wiesner said that our unilateral intelligence information was good enough to allow us to rely on initial declarations, particularly in view of the relatively modest size of the first cuts. The Secretary observed that it might be well to have some sort of challenge procedure in the event we suspected that the declarations were substantially incorrect.

With respect to the basic question, the Secretary stated that his view was that we should adopt the proportional rather than the parity concept. He felt also that any significant nuclear cuts should be linked with cuts in the conventional area. Dr. Wiesner raised the problem of production cut-off, noting that the attractive feature of such a cut-off would be the degree it would ease the inspection problem. Secretary McNamara stated that any continuation of production would be within some formula related to the reduction. The Secretary asked for views on the five alternative approaches presented in the paper. Mr. Amory noted that the fifth alternative presented most incredible difficulties from the standpoint of inspection. He favored very much the use of categories. Secretary McNamara noted that Defense would object to approach #3, although it might be the easiest to carry out. Dr. Wiesner felt that approach #1 might be preferable. Secretary McNamara suggested that a combination of #1 and #5 might be examined. Either one could be modified in the direction of the other. He did feel, however, it was unproductive to discuss these details in this meeting and proposed that a sub-committee be established.

Mr. Bundy asked what the basis was of the 30% figure. He did not feel that this was an impressive figure over a three-year period, if the basis for reductions was total megatonnage capacity. Why not, for example, a 20% cut each year? The Secretary preferred the small number in view of our special geographic disadvantage vis-à-vis the USSR. Mr. Rostow said that he was not worried about the propaganda drawbacks in the 10% a year proposal. It had a serious ring to it and would meet the world’s appetite for some kind of a down-turn in the present situation. Mr. Foster said that 30% was quite substantial enough and would meet the pressures we were under for early specifics from our allies. Mr. Fisher noted that this general percentage fitted in with the 2.1 million force level in the first stage of the September 25th Plan.

Mr. Foster inquired whether it was the sense of the meeting that it would be best to work for an across-the-board cut of about 30% over a three year range. If this was the case, we could work out more of the specifics for presentation to the President on Tuesday.⁸

Secretary McNamara said that he could accept this expression of consensus. While he preferred a reduction of all weapons he believed that it would be well to study as an alternative, the plan for proportionate reduction limited to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. He proposed the establishment of a technical sub-committee to consider the five approaches and possible modifications thereof. Mr. Kaysen said that we could substantially improve our position by talking in a more forthcoming way about the follow-on second stage and making clear that we were thinking of a similar or even larger cut in this subsequent stage, assuming the first stage went well. Dr. Wiesner agreed.

Mr. Rostow asked how specific we could be with regard to inspection. Mr. Foster said that we would be in a position to discuss the zonal approach on an informal basis with the Soviets but that we would not be ready with all of the details required for a formal proposal. We could indicate our willingness to explore ways of ensuring that the “intrusion” was proportionate to the disarmament involved.

Secretary McNamara proposed that we agree to pursue three areas of study: (1) the specifics relating to a 30% proportionate reduction in all major weapons categories, conventional and nuclear; (2) a similar reduction limited to specified categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and (3) a sub-committee to study the five approaches and to develop any necessary modifications in them. He said that he considered that such reductions could be accomplished as between the U.S. and USSR, without involving China, although an escape clause of some kind would be necessary and we could not go beyond 30% without China. He said that the sub-committees studying the first and second problems should consider also the kind of formula which might govern cut-off of production in both cases. In answer to a question by Mr. McGhee, Secretary McNamara said that he would not propose exceptions be made in “defensive” weapons. If we were to reduce our ICBM’s he would want to insist that Russian SAM’s be reduced.

Mr. Kaysen said that we need specifics on the inspection problem as well, in view of the central place inspection has had in our disarmament position. He felt we should organize ourselves to present a decision-issue to the President on Tuesday on the zonal inspection approach. We should decide whether this approach is good enough to warrant discussion with the Soviets. Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended the zonal approach as a basis for further study within the United States Government. Mr. Marengo reported on the work of the interagency inspection group which would meet again next Monday. Secretary McNamara said that he was not yet in a position to decide on the specific acceptability of the zonal approach although he could accept, in principle, the concept of inspection being proportionate to the disarmament accomplished. Mr. Kaysen said he had not wanted to imply that we should be pressed to decide on details such as the number of zones, etc.

With respect to transfer of fissionable material from past production, Mr. Amory said that since US-USSR stockpile ratios were on the order of five-to-one, we should be willing to offer to transfer material on at least a two-to-one basis with the Soviets. He suggested we offer to make an initial transfer of 100,000 kilograms to 50,000 from the Soviets. Secretary McNamara noted that the JCS has not yet accepted the idea of a transfer on a one-for-one basis, although he, himself, was quite prepared to accept this. General Lemnitzer said that all of the Chiefs were not yet ready to go along with a one-for-one transfer until they had seen the results of our next series of tests.

Dr. Wiesner said that he thought it was better to make no proposal than a one-for-one proposal since this would be so clearly non-negotiable and would not be taken seriously by the Soviets.⁹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-162. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on March 3. Other accounts of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, and in a memorandum for the record by Kaysen, March 1, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda 2/62-4/62.
1. The attached list of 37 participants is not printed.
2. Not found.
3. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 475-482.
4. ACDA Plan No. 1 is the same as the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see footnote 5, Document 72.
5. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a February 24 ACDA draft (see footnote 1, Document 135) are contained in their memorandum to McNamara, February 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting)
6. Not found.
7. For the report of this committee, July 1962, see Document 207.
8. March 6.
9. Seaborg’s account of this March 1 meeting concluded: “There seemed to be general agreement that inspection to account for planes is quite feasible and that inspection to account for missiles is much more difficult, but probably not impossible. The consensus of the meeting seemed to be that the U.S. policy should be: (1) a proportionate reduction of all nuclear and conventional weapons and that this would include a cut-off of production of fissionable material; or alternatively (2) a proportionate reduction of any strategic nuclear capacity, including cut-off of production of fissionable material; and (3) a choice should be made between the five alternatives described in the memorandum of February 28th to effect 30% reductions, with a general feeling that a combination of alternatives (1) and (5) would be most desirable. It was decided that there would be committees to work on each of these three points and possibly a fourth committee to work on the general inspection problem and its sampling and zonal features.” (Journal, vol. 3, pp. 240-241)