Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

125. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, January 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Developments in connection with Kennedy-Macmillan letter to Khrushchev on Disarmament

In your discussion with Ambassador Ormsby Gore on January 20,¹ it was agreed that we would undertake to prepare a draft letter to Khrushchev regarding a Foreign Ministers meeting on disarmament, that we would study the problem of the desirability of sending a special emissary to deliver the letter and to make certain additional points, and that we would consider specific points which might be considered by the Foreign Ministers when they met.

On January 22, we met with representatives of the British Embassy and gave them a draft of a possible letter to Mr. Khrushchev (see Memo of Conversation attached at Tab A).²

On January 24, the U.K. Embassy stated that Macmillan believed the U.S. draft formed an excellent basis for a message to Khrushchev and suggested several modifications of a minor nature. The text as agreed appears at Tab B. At the same time, the U.K. Embassy gave us for comment a copy of a draft letter to President de Gaulle, advising him of the proposed initiative. (See MemCon of January 24 at Tab C.)³ This letter was approved by the President without change, and was dispatched to General de Gaulle immediately. As yet, no reply has been received by the British from General de Gaulle and the draft letter to Khrushchev is being held in abeyance for possible revision after de Gaulle’s comments are received.

At the meeting on January 24, the U.K. Embassy indicated that they did not feel the idea of a special emissary should be pursued or that specific proposals for an agenda for the Foreign Ministers, who would meet together prior to the opening of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, should be proposed. The UK hoped that the letter to Khrushchev could be delivered by January 31, so that the agreed announcement which appears as Tab D could be issued on February 1.⁴ This timing is now clearly out of the question.

The UK has also given us (Tab E MemCon of January 25)⁵ a series of questions and answers which would serve as guidelines for the UK in dealing with the press. We have several minor comments to make on the suggested questions and answers at the time it is decided to proceed with the message to Khrushchev.

On January 31, Ambassador Ormsby Gore advised us that the UK did not expect a reply from de Gaulle before the end of this week.⁶ In the meantime, London wished to secure U.S. views on what specific points we could propose to Gromyko be taken up by the Foreign Ministers in their meeting prior to the 18-Nation conference. We have expressed the tentative view that it would be best not to suggest specific points of discussion, since there would not appear to be any questions which could be dealt with conclusively in a three-day meeting of this character. It might be better to justify the meeting primarily in terms of its symbolic demonstration of the importance which we attach to the 18-Nation negotiations and, at the most, as giving an opportunity to exchange views in a tentative and exploratory way on areas of inquiry in which our representatives in the 18-Nation group might concentrate. Ambassador Ormsby Gore reported that London was particularly interested in whether we could be prepared to make a “bold” and specific proposal on reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, since this was at the heart of the disarmament problem. We advised Ambassador Ormsby Gore that our studies had not yet proceeded far enough to allow us to anticipate being in a position to make such a proposal even during the early stages of the 18-Nation negotiations, and this was a further reason why we should attempt to keep the Foreign Ministers’ discussion quite general.

Adrian S. Fisher

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-3162. Top Secret.
1. The memorandum of conversation by F.E. Cash of EUR is ibid., 600.0012/1-2062.
2. No attachments were found with this memorandum. The memorandum of conversation by Spiers is ibid., 600.0012/1-2262, to which is attached the draft letter to Khrushchev. For the letter as sent on February 8, which contains only a few changes from the draft of January 22, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 25-26. Khrushchev’s reply of February 10 is ibid., pp. 32-36. See also volume VI, Documents 30 and 31.
3. The memorandum of conversation by Spiers is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1-2462. Attached to it is the draft letter, in which Macmillan invited de Gaulle to join the United States and the United Kingdom in mounting a major initiative on disarmament in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Macmillan sent the letter to de Gaulle on January 28.
4. For the announcement as it appeared on February 8, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 31-32.
5. Not found.
6. President de Gaulle, in his February 6 reply to Macmillan, stated that while France was “entirely favorable” toward any measure that might lead to disarmament, it seemed to him quite hopeless to expect “anything impartial or effective in this realm” from the Committee of Eighteen, since both it and its source, the General Assembly, had “too marked a demagogic and irresponsible character for one to be able to take towards it any other attitude than one of complete reserve.” (The English text is attached to a note from Ormsby Gore to Kennedy, February 6; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy Volume II) According to Spiers’ memorandum of a conversation between Fisher and Lord Hood, also February 6, the French had advised the British that de Gaulle would “allow” France to attend the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee without playing an active role. (Ibid., Central Files, 600.0012/2-662)