100. Editorial Note
During the White House daily staff meeting on November 22, 1961, there was discussion of a Principals’ meeting to be held later that day. Colonel Ewell’s memorandum of the meeting reads in part: “Bromley Smith asked whether the principals will be aware of the new test analysis. Bundy said he thought so as Wiesner and Brown will be among the principals and they have heard it. Smith again raised the question as to whether the delegation should be instructed to seek agreement or not. Bundy felt that the proper line was that if we could get a decent treaty we should. Smith said that he doubted that this was wise in view of the fact that the Bethe Report (which I had never heard of) concluded that the Russians have done things in their tests which we can’t do. Bundy responded with the [Page 237] traditional line that these were just improvements in degree and that the Russians had done nothing that indicated a real breakthrough. He still feels that the decision about testing is a political one rather than a technical one. Smith, much to my surprise, returned to the tack with the thought that, even if we are going to sign an agreement regardless, we should take a much harder initial position than before, that there is no reason for us to act as though the Russians had done nothing since the negotiations had been broken off. Whether Smith’s line of thought will have any influence or not I couldn’t detect. Bundy has always been primarily an exponent of agreement regardless, and I doubt if he would change his philosophical set based on actual developments. As to this Bethe Report, I gather that they concluded that the Russians had achieved a lot more than Scoville’s initial appreciation indicated.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61) Regarding the Principals’ meeting, see Document 101. The draft Bethe Report is Document 96.