Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

1. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 4-61

Washington, January 17, 1961.

PROBABLE SHORT-TERM REACTIONS TO U.S. RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

The Problem

To estimate the major probable short-term reactions to US resumption of a program of nuclear explosions for purposes of weapons development, or improvement of detection techniques, or peaceful applications.¹

Assumptions

We assume in this estimate that the US unilaterally resumes nuclear tests, but not until some time after the reconvening of the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban.² We further assume that the US announces that its explosions will be limited to underground or extra-atmospheric detonations and states their purpose to be weapons development, or improvement of detection techniques, or peaceful applications.³

The Estimate⁴

Introduction

1. World opinion tends to recoil from nuclear weapons, submerging logical consideration of the subject in an emotional reaction of dismay. This attitude, cultivated although not created by Communist propaganda, regarded the test explosions conducted by the US, the UK, and the USSR up to the fall of 1958 as an important part of the East-West arms race which in turn was likely to culminate in a general nuclear holocaust. Lively fears of health hazards resulting from fallout associated with these tests aggravated this reaction. Thus the unilateral undertakings of the three powers in the fall of 1958 to suspend testing were greeted with universal relief. Similarly, the Geneva negotiations aimed at making this suspension permanent have been viewed as inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and as a hopeful portent of disarmament, relaxation of tensions, and peace.⁵

2. Between the present time and the date of any US announcement of resumption of a program of nuclear explosions, several factors might act to alter these attitudes. The stage reached in the Geneva negotiations, and the opinions formed concerning the merits of each side’s position, is one such factor. Another is any program which the US might develop to inform world opinion about the various purposes and characteristics of different kinds of test programs. A third is the general world picture of Soviet behavior in international affairs during this period.

Reactions in the Non-Communist World ⁶

3. Given present attitudes, a new US program of nuclear explosions would be regarded by most peoples and many governments as likely to lead the USSR to resume testing; they would fear that the East-West arms race had begun to accelerate and was once more heading towards war. No matter how conducted, renewed US testing would also stimulate fears concerning health dangers from fallout. The US would be severely criticized in many quarters; there would be a tendency on the part of some to regard US policy as insufficiently dedicated to peace. A resolution calling for cessation of nuclear explosions would win widespread support in the UN, and its adoption would be almost certain if the tests were announced as being for weapons development.

4. Adverse reactions could be mitigated in several ways. Insofar as international opinion could be persuaded that the US had earnestly sought agreement in the Geneva talks but had been rebuffed by Soviet unreasonableness, renewed testing would be met with greater understanding. Also, to the extent that the program could be convincingly presented as designed to improve the prospects for test detection and, ultimately, an agreed ban, or to serve other nonmilitary purposes, it would draw less criticism. A very short test series, for example, with Soviet and other observers invited, would dilute some of the negative reaction.

5. It must be recognized, however, that because of the complex technical issues involved, a clear-cut and credible justification on these or other grounds would be very difficult to convey to world opinion. Such attempts at justification would have a greater influence on opinion already aligned with the US than on neutralists, less educated populations, and newer states. In general, however, these explanations would not go far toward neutralizing the critical popular reaction, which would spring in large part from emotional attitudes not readily accessible to rational argumentation. In the minds of many, for example, fallout is so closely associated with any kind of nuclear explosion that large segments of opinion would be impervious to the fact that underground detonations carry no dangers of this sort.⁷

6. Reactions would vary among different countries and areas, as well as in accordance with what were believed to be the purposes of the US program. Some NATO governments would approve, particularly those which would welcome an improved American nuclear capability. France would also be glad to have criticism deflected from its own nuclear weapons program. Most West European governments would probably take a public position which, while deploring further explosions, sought to quiet adverse reaction by sympathetically noting the considerations which had prompted the US to take this step. In taking this stand, some of these governments would find it hard to allay the anxieties of their public. The task of justification would be especially difficult in Great Britain, where the issue would be seized upon by the popular press and large segments of the Labor Party. The Canadian Government would oppose any tests which it believed had military purposes.

7. In Japan, opposition would probably be so intense as to produce anti-American demonstrations and a formal protest by the government as well. Some other Asian nations, particularly India and Indonesia, would be highly critical. However, Asian governments closely aligned with the US would be inclined to accept the US action and might be induced to approve it publicly.⁸ Renewed testing would be very unfavorably received in Africa and the Arab states, and it would be particularly exploited by governments already critical in varying degrees toward the US. The Latin American governments would not regard the issue as of primary importance to themselves; their positions would vary in accordance with what they judged to be expedient in terms of other interests; most could probably be induced to support the US position.

8. US resumption of nuclear testing, particularly for weapons purposes, would tend to weaken one of the inhibitions upon other Free World countries considering independent development of a nuclear weapons capability. This inhibition would not be completely removed, however, and other military, political, and economic considerations affecting this decision would continue to exist. Thus, while renewed US tests would tend to revive this question in Sweden and elsewhere, they are not likely, in and of themselves, to be decisive factors. However, if these countries were confronted by a situation in which both the US and the USSR had launched extensive test series, the chances that they would embark on independent nuclear weapons programs would rise.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Reactions

9. No matter what purposes the US announced or what safeguards it offered in embarking on a unilateral program, Bloc spokesmen would charge, as part of a major propaganda campaign, that the explosions were in fact for military purposes. Almost certainly the USSR would reject any invitation to observe the explosions and would withdraw its negotiators from Geneva. It would almost certainly call for a special session of the General Assembly to condemn the US, demand abandonment of the planned tests, and insist on speedy conclusion of an agreed ban.

10. The USSR would reaffirm its public position that US nuclear explosions of any type freed the USSR to resume testing. However, Moscow probably would refrain from overt testing for an initial period, lest it compromise its diplomatic and propaganda efforts to indict the US. We estimate that the USSR has technical incentives to conduct nuclear tests, chiefly in order to increase the yield-to-mass ratio of its weapons, to make them more efficient in the use of fissionable material, to develop improved low-yield weapons for tactical and air defense purposes, and to obtain very-high-altitude effects data for antimissile applications. These incentives probably would continue to exist whether or not the USSR had conducted clandestine tests since 1958. The Soviets might consider that they could improve their relative military position if both sides resumed overt testing, and in any event the incentives would grow stronger as the US conducted additional tests. Thus we believe that, if the US resumed, the USSR would in time follow suit.

11. Soviet representatives have on several occasions expressed the view that the USSR would be quick to undertake testing in the atmosphere if the US should resume testing of any sort. We believe that the Soviets would delay a decision on atmospheric testing pending an assessment of reactions to US testing, the success of their anti-American charges, and other developing factors. It is possible that, on the basis of this assessment, they would limit themselves to tests underground or in space in order to avoid the charge of contaminating the atmosphere. Indeed, they might even conduct tests underground or in space without public acknowledgment, calculating that this would enable them to maximize their political gains and that, in the event of exposure, the excuse of prior US testing would neutralize most of the opprobrium.

12. We believe that Communist China has for some time been pressing the USSR for considerably greater assistance in the attainment of a nuclear capability than the USSR has been willing to grant. In justifying its position, the USSR may have been arguing the net advantages to the Bloc of an agreed test ban. If so, resumed US testing would undermine this argument. In any event, the Chinese Communists would probably exploit such a US resumption and any subsequent Soviet testing to renew and step up their pressures for aid, and it would be more difficult for the USSR to maintain its position. Since the Soviet leaders have other strong reasons for resisting Chinese demands, we believe that renewed US tests probably would not substantially alter the Soviet attitude.

13. The Soviet leaders, and particularly Khrushchev, are eager to assess the attitudes and policies of the incoming US Administration on such matters as defense, disarmament, and East-West negotiations. They will look upon the US attitude toward testing as one of the major indicators in such an assessment.⁹ Their general conclusions concerning the new Administration, however, will be based not only upon this matter, but upon the stance which the US adopts on general disarmament issues and the entire range of foreign policy issues.

STATEMENTS OF NONCONCURRENCE

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur with the estimate as written even with the assumptions as stated in the text. He believes the estimate overplays the negative reactions to the US resumption of nuclear testing and fails to reflect the following:

• That the US resumption of nuclear weapons testing is inseparably related to the conditions under which testing is to be resumed.
• That the unfavorable reaction by most people and many governments at the outset of nuclear testing would lessen with time following a comprehensive diplomatic and information program.
• That most pro-US governments would approve or at least remain aligned with the US should we resume testing.
• That the Soviets are likely to conclude from US unilateral testing that the US could no longer be ensnared in inconclusive negotiations and Soviet stalling techniques.

The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcurs in this entire estimate. He considers the estimate to be erroneous in the following major aspects:

a. It imputes an exaggerated importance to a nebulously defined “world opinion” as a factor in reaching a major US policy decision vis-à-vis nuclear testing.

b. It credits too little effectiveness to possible US programs to acquaint “world opinion” with non-fallout facts associated with the types of nuclear testing assumed.

c. It denigrates the capability of pro-Western governments to recognize the nuclear testing facts as well as their courage and ability to guide public opinion in their nations.

d. It fails to examine the full scale of pressures on the USSR which would come about if the US resumed testing. While one result might be renewed USSR testing—as this estimate states—another possibility would be that the Soviets would feel compelled to accept the US position on controls for verification of test suspensions. A good case can be made for this as an outcome—but it is completely neglected in this document.

The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, considers that the suggestions summed up in a through c above are unsupported by the evidence available; that they mistakenly credit the USSR with invulnerability, in the world political arena, to the very factors to which the US is exaggeratedly viewed as hyper-vulnerable; and that omission of point d is a major gap in the appraisal. He concludes that the estimate should be rejected for policy use because it is one-sided, misleading, and in large measure irrelevant.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on January 17. The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
1. We have not attempted to estimate in this paper the long-term impact of these reactions on US foreign relations, or the exact value to the USSR’s military establishment of resumed Soviet testing in response to the US program. A judgment on the military or scientific value to the US of such a program is beyond the purview of an Intelligence Estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, note that the results of these future Geneva negotiations, the conditions under which the US would make such a decision, and the effect of possible actions which the US could take prior to such resumption of nuclear explosions, cannot now be fully assessed. They consider, for example, that the consequences of a period of intensive probing at the negotiations by the US in an attempt to reach reasonable agreement, and of explanation at the highest level as to the reasons for the contemplated US action, would have an important effect on any reactions and therefore on this estimate. However, appropriate assumptions with respect to these factors cannot now be developed. [Footnote in the source text. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, comprising delegations from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reconvened on March 21.]

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the present Assumption is so stated that it presents to its users an incomplete perspective within which to judge the effects of the probable reactions to resumption of US nuclear testing. He believes that a number of other considerations such as the following are necessary prerequisites to a US resumption of testing:

   (a) That the US resumes nuclear tests only after further negotiations at Geneva have demonstrated the failure of US efforts to obtain an adequate inspection system to safeguard Western security;

   (b) That such resumption of tests is accompanied by a comprehensive information program to acquaint other governments and peoples with US requirements for these tests;

   (c) That the information program also includes a full explanation that such US underground or space detonations would not create fallout hazards;

   (d) That the US program of testing for peaceful application and improvement of detection techniques is fully publicized and that an announced standing offer is made to cease testing upon Soviet acceptance of an effective inspection system. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, nonconcur in the entire estimate. The reasons for their nonconcurrences are set forth on page 5. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that these reactions have been generated as a result of past detonations. They point out, however, that past detonations have been solely for weapons development purposes, many have been of very large yield, and most have been conducted above ground. They therefore, do not believe that future detonations, under different conditions, will necessarily produce such reactions. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, consider the evaluations of reactions presented in this section to be primarily directed toward reactions to resumption of weapons development tests only, and to underestimate the results which would be achieved by a vigorous and intensive program of public information initiated by the President. They consider that this would be particularly true if the US action is the undertaking of detonations for detection improvement and that public reaction would be considerably influenced by world scientific opinion which will understand the basic reasons for such action. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, agree that the factors mentioned in this paragraph must be regarded as serious problems to be faced, but note that world opinion on the need for a seismic detection improvement program and on the fact that underground testing does not involve fallout hazards depends heavily on the manner in which the US initiates any program of nuclear explosions. They therefore consider that the general evaluation contained in this paragraph could be mitigated, as mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4, by certain courses of action open to the US. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this sentence should read: “Government leaders in Asian countries closely aligned with the US would be more inclined to accept the validity of US motivations but, with one or two possible exceptions, they would find it difficult to rally public support.” [Footnote in the source text.]

9. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the following sentence should be inserted at this point:

   “If the Soviet leaders concluded from US unilateral testing that the US was abandoning its interest in a negotiated ban, they would be inclined to infer that, with respect to other East-West issues, negotiations had become a less promising course of action.” [Footnote in the source text.]