Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

390. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, December 31, 1963.

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this morning, at his request, to tell me that he had been thinking about our recent conversation¹ and had some ideas which he wished to share with me as a result. He reminded me that we had discussed in a non-committal way the possibility that at some time in the future there might be a meeting between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, and he said that he now wished to give me his own further reflections on this matter. He then drew out of his pocket two sheets of handwriting and read a statement which I summarize below.

The Ambassador said that on reflection he believed it would add to the possibility of mutual understanding, and would therefore be useful, if the President and Chairman Khrushchev could hold a meeting. Such a meeting would allow them to become more closely acquainted and this acquaintanceship could be of positive importance because of the responsibilities which they carry as the leaders of the two greatest powers in the world. The Ambassador believed that such a meeting would be useful if it merely resulted in a better acquaintance between these two world leaders. The Ambassador expressed his opinion that in this respect the meeting in Vienna could now be seen, with the passage of time, to have had real value.

The Ambassador said that of course it would be even better if such a meeting could have concrete results. We were both familiar of course with the range of the problems before us and they could all be discussed, and the Soviet Government would welcome solutions even to the largest problems, but if the United States did not think that the time was right for such larger settlements, which was his impression, then perhaps there could be study of one or more similar matters which might be more ready for settlement.

The Ambassador thought it would be helpful to know whether the U.S. thought there were such problems, and what they might be, and what American proposal for agreement there might be. He was sure that any suggestions would be carefully studied in Moscow.

The Ambassador repeated his view that with or without specific agreements a meeting would be useful. He said that he well understood that such a meeting could not well take place after June or July because of the election in the United States.

Finally, the Ambassador said that in his view it was an open question as to who should take the initiative, and he said he was confident that if it were felt more convenient by the U.S. the initiative could easily be taken by Moscow.

I told the Ambassador that I was very much interested in his reflections and would engage in some reflection of my own and would communicate with him reasonably soon. I told him that one thought which did occur to me was that if there were to be any meeting in which no agreements were likely to be registered, it would be important not to create false hopes on either side. The Ambassador responded by saying that he thought it would be possible and desirable, in the event that such a meeting was held, that there should be an understanding between the governments as to their own view of its purpose and meaning, and that this view should then be communicated to the press.

In order to avoid giving the impression that I thought no agreements were possible, I added that I thought it would be very useful for both sides to review the possibilities for both small and large agreements. I said that I thought the Ambassador should understand that the U.S. was in fact ready for even the largest kinds of agreements, and regretted that on larger issues the Soviet Government still seemed to be urging solutions which did not seem workable to us. The Ambassador grinned, and we then turned to a discussion of the New Year, which is being celebrated in an imaginative way at the Soviet Embassy; the party begins at midnight Moscow time and continues until midnight American time.²

McGeorge Bundy ³

0. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files. Secret.
1. Document 388.
2. Dobrynin states in In Confidence, p. 117, that he met with Bundy in December and Bundy “expressed an interest in a summit meeting provided it would lead to some kind of agreement lest a failure endanger Johnsonʼs election campaign the next year.” Khrushchev and Mikoyan were interested, according to Dobrynin, “but Gromyko was not, fearing Khrushchev might be carried away and ruin relations from the start without careful advance preparation.”
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.