Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

389. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, December 23, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Mr. Halabyʼs Trip to Moscow—Status of U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. N. Halaby, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency
• Ambassador Thompson
• Mr. A. Ferguson, Director, Office of Aviation Affairs
• Mr. Jenkins, SOV

Mr. Halaby began his report with reference to the fact that he is faced with a regular monthly press conference and a request for a VOA interview in the near future. Therefore, he desired to receive the Secretaryʼs views and guidance at this time.

Mr. Halaby reported that after discussions with Soviet officials¹ he has found that there are no known insurmountable technical or operational obstacles to the New York-Moscow service which cannot be resolved either by us or by the Soviets. He found to his surprise that the Soviets intend to use the very large and out-dated TU-114 to initiate the service instead of the more modern four-jet Ilyushin-62. Mr. Halaby confirmed that he himself had flown the 114. He found that it has a serious noise problem and poses significant traffic control problems in the high-speed tight Idlewild landing patterns. However, the Soviets indicated to him that they are aware of our noise standards and can do such things as modify the propellers on the 114 if necessary.

Ambassador Thompson inquired about the teletype line envisaged in the Air Agreement for service messages between two air lines. Mr. Halaby said that Aeroflot indicated there would be no problem establishing the line as provided in the Agreement. They specified, however, that such a line would be limited to transmitting operational messages for the air service.

The Secretary asked what attitudes Mr. Halaby encountered toward the Air Agreement. Were technical people, for example, strongly interested in the Agreement. Mr Halaby responded that he found great interest among the Soviet officials with whom he spoke. He added that this was a little hard to understand since in any genuine competition in this field they would clearly be at a disadvantage. The Secretary said that the Soviets undoubtedly believe that it might assist them in their efforts to fly to other countries. He added that the Soviets will have to give something to the Danes and others in order to secure overflight privileges. “We want to stay out of this situation. Thatʼs their problem, not ours.”

Mr. Halaby explained that the service is scheduled to be non-stop but provides for four emergency points: at Shannon, Prestwick, Gander and Oslo. He continued that in accordance with his instructions he had laid out a schedule for technical talks before Aeroflot officials. However, three days later General Loginov responded that there would be no further technical talks until the bilateral agreement was formally signed. Under questioning Loginov indicated they estimate that four months would be required to complete technical preparations prior to service. Mr. Halaby explained that this is a minimal figure and that six months might be more realistic. Thus, it was determined in Moscow that if service is to begin this summer it would be necessary to sign the Air Agreement in January or February.

Mr. Halaby then discussed the Soviet officials with whom he met, explaining that Loginov is equivalent to the FAA, CAB, and airline presidents all wrapped up in one person. Mr. Dementiev, Chairman of the Committee for Aviation Production, is the equivalent of Mr. Webb, Harold Brown² and several other figures. Mr. Halaby added that Dementiev had proposed a series of visits by Soviet civil aviation engineers to the United States and that such proposals are now being framed for negotiation within the cultural exchange negotiations beginning next month. In response to the Secretaryʼs question, Mr. Halaby affirmed that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was represented at all his talks by Second Secretary Davydov of the American Section.

The Secretary stated that the timing of the signature of the Agreement and technical talks is important. If, for example, we were to lay our prestige on the line in signing the Agreement and then have the air services break down on technical grounds, this would be a serious problem for us. Mr. Halaby agreed, adding that it also would pose problems for the FAA in the form of pressure to issue an operation certificate to the Soviets as quickly as possible. He recalled that there is a precedent for such difficulties in the form of a BEA-Aeroflot agreement which was delayed two years after signature because of a noise factor in the Soviet aircraft. Mr. Halaby also pointed out that the TU-114 now flies internally, but only to Havana and New Delhi in foreign countries.

Each time he talked to Soviet officials, Mr. Halaby said, he always stressed that the Air Agreement is only one facet of the general question of accessibility or communication. He would refer to air corridors into Berlin, the need for a direct tie-line between our Embassy and Washington for telegraphic traffic, and access between consular representatives and American citizens in the Soviet Union. Soviet officials usually listened without comment, he added, but Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov insisted these subjects are all separate. In response to the Secretaryʼs question, Mr. Halaby stated that there is nothing concrete in the Air Agreement regarding access to citizens except in the form of a provision for search and rescue in the event of a crash. He explained that the present agreement consists of the agreement itself, a technical agreed minute, and an agreement between Aeroflot and Pan American. The Secretary suggested that the latter should include a specific provision on access to citizens such as PAA personnel. Ambassador Thompson added that he felt we should only go ahead with the Air Agreement if we get either a leased line or consular convention including our requirement on consular access and notification.

Mr. Ferguson introduced the problem of the effect of the Agreement on United States interests in other areas, particularly in Latin America. The Secretary stated that these factors have all been considered and we have decided on balance that we should go ahead with the Air Agreement. He asked Mr. Halaby whether the Soviets have any impression that they will be able to fly on to Havana from New York. Mr. Halaby responded no, that it seems to be clear in their minds that such would not be the case. He then recounted the background of the distortion of this point by the Baltimore Sun and summarized his explanation to the President as to why the FAA follows the navigation of Aeroflot flights to Havanna. The Secretary opined that it is logical to keep track of Soviet aircraft off our coast and questioned whether the Soviets do not now have the right to make emergency landings in the United States during these flights. Mr Halaby confirmed that they do and that our airfield at Charleston, South Carolina, has been alerted for the possibility.

The Secretary stated that we will aim at signing the Air Agreement but not before February. He asked Mr. Halaby whether he owed a response of any kind to his opposite numbers in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Halaby explained that no action is necessary now with Aeroflot and that Dementievʼs exchange proposals are being handled in the cultural exchanges negotiations.

In response to Mr. Halabyʼs question, the Secretary advised him to make the following points in his press conference:

1. He had visited Moscow to hold technical discussions with his opposite numbers.

2. He has found that technical problems for Moscow-New York service could be worked out but that several details remain.

3. He has made a full report on his trip to the Secretary and to the President.

Ambassador Thompson suggested Mr. Halaby play down the results of his visit in order to avoid promoting the impression that the signing of the Agreement is imminent. The Secretary commented that as so often with the Soviets broad agreements break down over technical considerations. He recalled General Marshallʼs advice never to make arrangements in principle with the Soviets, but always in detail.

Mr. Halaby summarized by saying the fact the Soviets would have established organized flights to New York would inevitably mean that they will not send their planes to New York empty. There will be 14,000 seats a year in their aircraft. Secondly, he pointed out that in a US-Soviet competition in this field of civil aviation we have a clear superiority. In short, he concluded, this provides an opportunity to use the airplane for its intended purposes. The Secretary agreed, saying that “I would like to see us get ahead with this.”

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 FAA. Confidential. Drafted by Kempton B. Jenkins (SOV).
1. Halaby visited the Soviet Union December 8-18. Memoranda of his conversations with Kuznetsov on December 13 and with Loginov on December 17 were transmitted as enclosures to airgrams A-837, December 17, and A-876, December 24. (Ibid., POL 1 US-USSR and ORG 7 FAA)
2. James E. Webb, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering.