Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

387. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, December 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Suggested President/Khrushchev Meeting

You will note from the attached letter that Foy Kohler¹ advocates a meeting between the President and Khrushchev not later than May of next year in either Vienna or Switzerland. Although I would suggest that we keep an open mind about such a possibility, I would not, myself, at this time, recommend such a meeting for the following reasons:

1. I should think it would be far better if the President could defer meeting Khrushchev until after the elections when he can face him with a mandate from the people based upon his campaign platform. I should also think that in any meeting shortly before the Party conventions, the President would be greatly handicapped in what he could say and do and that a meeting would risk injecting into the campaign East-West issues in a form that may not be helpful. The Soviets have given many indications on a low level that they recognize that major agreements with the United States will be difficult if not impossible until after our elections.

2. So far as Khrushchev is concerned, while I think he might like a meeting for reasons of prestige, I think that he also would be handicapped in any meeting at an early date. He will probably still be beset by internal difficulties and, more importantly, it is unlikely that his quarrel with the Chinese Communists will have reached a definitive stage. Moreover, he will not have had much time to see what direction the four new governments in the West are going to take.

3. While it would be possible to bill such a meeting merely as an opportunity for the two men to get acquainted along the lines of the Vienna meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev, I think that in fact this poses some difficulties. I think it would be essential for both parties to have at least some discussion of the Cuban and German and Berlin problems and, at this stage, I should think any such discussion would probably be harmful in the sense of resulting in a hardening of positions on both sides. Moreover, President Johnson has met Khrushchev when he visited the United States and has followed so closely our relations with the Soviet Union that I do not think the need is the same as it was with President Kennedy when he first took office.

4. I should also think that no matter how we tried to play such a meeting, it would disturb our Allies for a variety of reasons.

The views expressed above would be materially affected should the possibility of an agreement on some major subject develop between now and next Spring, but I think such a prospect most unlikely.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Initialed by Thompson. Copies were sent to Ball, Harriman, and Bundy.
1. Document 385.