Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

385. Letter From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)⁰

Moscow, December 10, 1963.

Dear Tommy: So much has happened since the autobahn impasse and the post midnight calls to me in Cornwall last month that it all defies review or appropriate comment—November 7 and the Time-Life group, Freddie Barghoornʼs ordeal, the devastating assassination of President Kennedy, the encouraging start of President Johnson. So instead of reviewing the past, Iʼll just move toward the future.

I greatly appreciate your letters of November 29 and particularly the enclosures to the second.¹ As you well know, these are indispensable to the intelligent conduct of our business here and I shall of course handle them and any future exchange with appropriate caution.

I have been giving considerable thought—as I’m sure you and others in Washington have—to the question of how we may best continue the dialogue between ourselves and the Soviets. I was glad that in his talk with Mikoyan² President Johnson subscribed to the desirability of maintaining the tradition of private exchanges with Khrushchev and that in his letter the Chairman also endorsed the idea.³ While this is useful, I feel strongly that if this medium has been valuable in the past it was precisely because it had its origin in a personal confrontation between the two principals. This is a missing element now, and just as I felt nearly three years ago—a feeling you shared—that there should be an early meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev, so do I now feel that such a meeting would be useful for the new President.

There seems little question that Khrushchev would welcome the idea. In his remarks to me at Spaso when he signed the book of condolences,⁴ he referred several times to the usefulness of Vienna in his relationship with President Kennedy and he pointedly remarked on his lack of knowledge of the successor. He makes a similar point in his letter to President Johnson.

I have just read the Presidentʼs statement about traveling abroad.⁵ Despite this, I would hope he also would see merit in an early meeting. I’m sure he recognizes the advantages of personal confrontation over correspondence and the advice of even the best experts in taking the measure of a principal adversary. Beyond this, there is, it seems to me, a sound tactical reason for early agreement on the idea of a meeting. Khrushchev, given his personal modus operandi and the imperatives of communist dynamics, must at some point test the will and determination of his new adversary. While we canʼt avoid this, we can and should, I think, make an effort to postpone the test until the new administration has time to shake down a bit. With a meeting in the offing, I doubt if Khrushchev would attempt an early showdown.

On timing, I would think a meeting should follow the upcoming round of talks with Allied leaders and well precede the Party Conventions. March or April would seem the most suitable time—certainly not later than May. If a NATO spring summit is in the cards, as I have heard suggested, I would think a meeting with Khrushchev before rather than after would be preferable to avoid an impression that the President was in a position to negotiate on behalf of the alliance or even to act as its spokesman. Perhaps it would be desirable to schedule a meeting with Khrushchev just prior to a NATO summit to permit the President to report directly to his colleagues on the return trip.

As far as we can tell, this timing would fit Khrushchevʼs schedule; his only announced activity which he would find it difficult to rearrange is his June trip to Scandinavia.

On the site, I suppose an obvious requirement is that the meeting take place on neutral soil. There have been rumors about Stockholm as a suitable spot; I would not think this desirable because of Khrushchevʼs plans to visit there on his Scandinavian swing. I would opt for Vienna or some city in Switzerland.

One more thought. Despite the lack of positive reaction, the Soviets have not abandoned their idea of an ENDC summit in Moscow. While recent treatment has been in low key, the proposal has been kept alive by occasional references in the press, the most recent being in the joint communiqué following Novotnyʼs visit. The prospect of a private meeting with the President would almost certainly abate any enthusiasm Khrushchev may have for an eighteen-nation summit and would relieve any pressure there may be from neutral quarters for the idea.

Finally, a hooker. On the record, Khrushchev is committed to visit Cuba sometime this winter. We have heard little about this lately and the idea may have been abandoned in view of Castroʼs failure to sign the Test Ban Treaty and of his general wavering between Moscow and Peiping. Such a visit would clearly be absolutely incompatible with any meeting with President Johnson, at least before our election next fall. Consequently, if there should be a tendency toward a US-USSR meeting in the reasonably near future, this consideration should be put forward to Khrushchev frankly and firmly. I believe he is enough of a realist to get and accept the point.

For obvious reasons, I felt it unwise to surface these ideas in a formal message from the Embassy, but felt they should be put forward to you—and through you to the Secretary and any others with whom you may think they should be shared. I should, of course, appreciate your own informal reactions to the foregoing and your own thoughts on the subject.

Sincerely,

Foy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
1. The second letter transmitted copies of Khrushchevʼs November 24 letter to Johnson and the latterʼs reply; see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 311–313. The other letter has not been identified further.
2. See Documents 380 and 381.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 311–313.
4. See Document 378.
5. For a transcript of the Presidentʼs press conference on December 12 during which he stated that he would not be traveling abroad, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 34-38.