344. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0

Secto 14. Secretary accompanied by entire US official party had one hour meeting with Khrushchev in latterʼs Kremlin office at 11 a.m. August 5. Following memcon is uncleared and subject to revision:

Khrushchev said wished greet Secretary and those accompanying him, who had arrived here to attend act of importance to all humanity. Believed signing of three environment TB Treaty was in effect fulfilling doctorʼs prescription so that health of people would not be affected. Consequently, if anyone objected to this treaty, such people should be subjected to psychiatric examination, for they were harming their own health.

Secretary expressed gratitude for reception US group had received and particularly for Khrushchevʼs willingness change his vacation plans in order receive US group and attend signing of treaty. Conveyed warm regards from President, noting President greatly encouraged by what was going to take place this pm. Expressed view all world welcomed three environment TB Treaty. Noted that if everyone who wished to come here from US for this occasion had really come, Khrushchev would believe Sovs had been invaded. We had had numerous requests from people wanting to come. Secretary then observed many in US group were inUSSR for first time; everyone was greatly pleased with and [Page 730] thankful for warm hospitality they were accorded. Secretary then said he was looking forward to discussions with representatives of Sov Govt during his stay inUSSR.

Khrushchev thanked for Secʼs kind words and for Presidentʼs good wishes. He was also grateful to President for his correct evaluation of historic act taking place this afternoon. While he did not wish overestimate significance TB Treaty per se—it was only small beginning—it laid foundation for further steps in right direction. One could not undertake a major project in one full swoop, but rather had to proceed in steps. In this connection, one could imply analogy of procedures used in felling big oak tree; could not fell a big tree by simply axing it down but had to make appropriate cuts in appropriate sequence and with appropriate instruments. Problems two sides were to resolve were extremely difficult, particularly taking into account fact that systems of two sides were different and antagonistic and that in dialogue between two sides many expressions of animosity were used. Therefore both sides have to act like a mother teaching her child to walk; if she pushed child, he would fall, but what mothers usually do is hold their child by hand and teach him how to walk before child can learn how to run.

Khrushchev said although TB Treaty a small step, it constituted an act of historic significance and expressed hope further steps would follow. He said Sovs appreciated greatly efforts by President, Secretary, and all other US citizens who supported this kind of endeavor. As for USSR, it had been and was making efforts at solving other problems by peaceful means, because they believe war could not resolve those problems. What must be done was develop trade, economic ties, and cultural relations, for such things brought joy to man; as to arms race, it should be stopped since it could lead only to catastrophe. Khrushchev then again welcomed Secretary and entire US group.

Secretary responded by thanking Khrushchev for his welcome and then noted Khrushchev quite right in saying our two systems were different. Recalled Khrushchev had said that neither Sovs could persuade US nor could US persuade USSR.

Khrushchev interjected this was quite true and commented that even in their graves two sides would adhere to their different positions, although then they would be of no danger to each other.

Secretary continued he believed however there were important areas of common interest to two sides, e.g., in insuring peace, something Khrushchev had spoken so eloquently in connection with TB Treaty. Secretary then expressed view both sides had unfinished tasks at home. US had such problems as building more schools, creating more universities, and education more teachers; also there were great urban centers in US which had been built 75 or 100 years ago and which required redevelopment or rebuilding, particularly because of population growth. Thus US [Page 731] had great deal to do for its people, and he knew Khrushchev had also interests in welfare of his own people. Secretary believed two sides could sit down to sort out their problems and see how they could move towards peaceful world, be it in small or large steps. He felt both governments were obligated to their peoples do so, and as far as US was concerned it was prepared do its share.

Khrushchev said Sovs also believed it more useful engage in productive efforts, which brought joy to the living, rather than in preparing graves for the living. Latter was also activity in which Sovs were now engaged, but this was because of necessity and Sovs were doing everything possible to halt arms race ASAP. He believed two sides must not stop at what they have achieved. Sovs had listed matters they believed could be resolved next, and there was no need to repeat that list. He had spoken about this publicly and to Harriman, and he was certain Harriman had informed in detail both Secretary and President.

However, Khrushchev continued, Sovs believed basic problem was German problem. So long as German problem remained unresolved, two sides would be like hedgehogs sticking their needles into each other. German problem was such as made each side wish have it resolved in its own way. He could understand very well that if US could resolve German problem in its own way, i.e., by liquidating social system inGDR and establishing united capitalist Germany that would be great victory for President, Congress, and those who supported capitalism. Likewise, if FRG were made part of socialist camp that would be tremendous victory for communism. But all this was sheer fantasy, for it could not be achieved without war. He wondered therefore whether time had not come when we, mature people who knew life and had seen war, should try move things from rails of war to rails of peace, namely, record situation as it existed now and forget about Adenauer and other people opposing such course. It was not only US who had such allies, for God had not forgotten USSR either and had given it allies who did not understand its policy. He believed however all such allies would eventually realize they had been wrong and unrealistic.

Secretary said US recognized German problem was fundamental and most important to future of our two countries and of our associates. He said he was prepared discuss this matter with representatives of Soviet Government during his stay here in order to see whether some understanding possible. We on our side recognize that in view past history what happened in Germany was of great importance to USSR. Likewise, again for historical reasons, we too were interested greatly in having peace in Central Europe. US recognized this very well as it had also been involved in two World Wars. Secretary then observed two sides perhaps differed in their respective interpretations as to what was happening in that area now. For our part, we believed German people were prepared [Page 732] put past behind them and become part of peaceful community of nations. We also believed we must not make situation such as would deprive German people of opportunity pursue this course or create danger of war. He reiterated he prepared discuss these matters while here. Referring to Khrushchevʼs hedgehog simile, Secretary said he not sure who were those hedgehogs; however he had impression that during past few years relaxation had occurred in Central Europe. FRGʼs increased relations with countries to east in such fields as trade, commerce, and exchange of persons had, in his view, reduced tensions.

Khrushchev interjected Secretary had mentioned “countries to east” and apparently did not wish use term “socialist”, but Sovs would teach us to use this term and, after all, time was best teacher.

Secretary continued he had been encouraged by this trend over past few years and believed possibility for peaceful settlement had now improved as compared to possibility existing two or three years ago.

Khrushchev agreed.

Secretary then said that as to use of term “socialist”, he had visited Belgrade recently1 and on basis that visit had gained impression there was less involvement by government in economy in Yugoslavia than was in US. He also noted Khrushchev had been using term “incentive”, which was capitalist term.

Khrushchev said Sovs knew this and indeed had argued some Communists about relationship between incentive factor and moral factor.

Sovs believed period of transition between capitalism and communism must include both capitalist factors, such as incentive, and moral factors, the two overlapping each other. Sovs believed capitalist phenomena in history was a positive one, as it was better than feudalism; however, Sovs believed communism was highest form of human society. In fact, capitalism had given birth to communism for if there had been no capitalism there would have been no Marx and all we would have today in such case would be legends about Christ and other utopian theories. What Sovs wished was to see efforts of two sides directed at competition in economic and cultural fields; they liked such competition much better than competition in rockets and nuclear weapons.

Secretary recalled Seaborg, Udall, Freeman had visited USSR in recent months and believed there were a number of points, some of them small, where greater cooperation between our two countries should be possible. Khrushchev himself had been soldier, therefore knew that when there was advance on broad front obstacle arising at one particular sector of front should not stop advance on rest of front. Thus we should [Page 733] move forward in such fields as nuclear energy research, space medicine, education, and other fields where US could benefit from USSR and USSR could benefit from US. He hoped he could explore possibilities of cooperation in details quite apart from more difficult problems before our two countries, although of course he was prepared to discuss more difficult questions as well.

Secretary then said he knew Khrushchev had another appointment very shortly and suggested that since he was not permitted speak on behalf of Senate, Senator Fulbright might wish to make a few remarks.

Fulbright said wished first recall pleasant meeting Foreign Relations Committee had had with Khrushchev four years ago, during latterʼs visit to US. That had been very interesting meeting and committee had benefited from it greatly. Fulbright then said he was very much interested in Khrushchevʼs exchange views with Secretary. It seemed to him that differences Khrushchev had been talking about could perhaps be compared to differences existing between North and South some 100 years ago. He himself was from South but he felt differences of past had virtually disappeared and Yankees now looked quite all right to him. Believed many differences between two sides were exaggerated. After all, both our countries wished improve life of their people, and he was impressed with what was being done in this respect inUSSR. As to US, we had mixed system and we did many things as Sovs did. Indeed, while Khrushchev was sometimes accused of promoting capitalism in his country, US Government was frequently accused of being socialist. Thus he believed things our two countries try to do were not different; differences lay in methods and means, because we believe our methods were more effective than Soviet methods, and vice versa. Indeed these differences appeared to him to be more in our minds than in our actions. Fulbright then recalled that during Khrushchevʼs visit to Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Russell had observed Khrushchev would make good US politician and Khrushchev had replied USSR would not have stupid man as its Premier.

Khrushchev remembered this exchange, but noted our two countries different and indeed opposite political and philosophical views. Nevertheless, he agreed that two countries had same ultimate goal, namely, development of their resources for benefit of their people. However, in pursuing that goal US was applying capitalist principle of private property, whereas Sovs were applying principle of common socialist property. While objective was same, Soviet approach was more noble for Sovs were acting on broad popular basis while US was acting on individualistic basis; US believed in principle of each for himself, while Sovs believed in principle of everyone for all. In any event, he did not think it would be possible sign agreed document on this matter now. He noted however Sovs could learn a lot from US and indeed had borrowed [Page 734] a lot from US experience. Lenin and Stalin had also recognized that there were many interesting things in US whichUSSR could borrow. However, USSR had been a student worthy of his teacher as it had surpassed US in certain fields. At time of Udallʼs visit here, latter had noted US had taught USSR how to build hydroelectric power stations, but now could learn something from theUSSR.

Khrushchev then said Sovs now wished bring about radical solution of their agricultural problem, and hoped to do so within seven or eight years. When Garst was here2 he had said that in order to have chemical fertilizers it was necessary to invest a great deal of capital. But now USSR had money available for this purpose and intended allocate billions of rubles to development of chemical industry producing such things as fertilizers, plastics, etc. Khrushchev then showed sample of polyethylene, saying it had been produced at a plant Sovs had brought from Krupp. He said some people in US believe that by imposing arms race onUSSR they would prevent it from catching up with US. However this was totally erroneous, and he could give his word that USSR would catch up with US.

In closing, Khrushchev observed he leaving for Black Sea tomorrow and would be happy if Secretary could come there too and take a dip in sea with him. He recalled he had swum there with McCloy, Udall and others, and he hoped Secretary would also immerse himself in that baptismal font.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority.
  2. Regarding Ruskʼs visit to Belgrade May 4-5, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVI, pp. 350353.
  3. See footnote 2, Document 44, and footnote 7, Document 341.