Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

343. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, August 5, 1963, 1 a.m.

Secto 3. Uncleared memcon, subject revision, Noforn Distribution. US-UK bilaterals—Tactics in Gromyko/Khrushchev meetings. (Aug. 4) At British Embassy today, Secretary and Lord Home had general exchange of views on tactics to be followed in separate bilaterals as well as trilaterals with Gromyko and Khrushchev.

Secretary expressed view that principal purpose in upcoming talks with Sovs should be to prove whether Sovs genuinely interested in moving toward détente or simply at this point concerned with atmospherics. At same time, particularly in context Sov preoccupation with non-aggression pact, we should make clear we expect Sov compliance with existing commitments—e.g., Laos as well as Sov avoidance aggressive behavior in other potential trouble spots—e.g., Berlin. In any case we must be careful to avoid any impression of commitments re NAP or partial measures affecting Allies which would cause trouble particularly with Bonn and/or would hamper TB ratification process in US. Meanwhile, we should attempt in our tactical handling of proposals in which Sovs have indicated primary interest to avoid seeming completely negative and thus keep ball in play. Secretaryʼs recommendation would be:

(1) Seek ascertain real Sov motivation for vigorous NAP campaign;

(2) Stress need for close consolation with Allies as precondition to further discussion beyond probing stage;

(3) Express interest in some Sov partial measures and seek clarification particularly on Sov proposals for exchange of observers and fixed-control posts, pointing out our reluctance to give favorable consideration such steps if narrowly confined—e.g., to Germany; and

(4) Suggest further examination both Sov and West partial measures could be most usefully pursued in ENDC. (To assuage possible German and French concern at discussion measures affecting them in forum where they not represented, SEC suggested desirability establishing inNAC Disarmament Steering Committee composed of 4 Geneva powers plus France and Germany and possibly smallerNATO Ally on rotating basis.)

Lord Home said British had hoped in upcoming talks we could take more positive attitude in order “maintain momentum” and that impression of progress could be reflected in communiqué.¹ However, he prepared buy Secretaryʼs formula in view of obvious uneasiness on part our Allies, particularly Bonn. Home said he felt compelled raise non-dissemination issue since HMG publicly committed do so. Sovs would undoubtedly counter with insistence on assurances against spread to Germany via MLF, and, if so, Home promised vigorous support MLF concept as device for controlling spread despite known British lack of enthusiasm for idea. On Laos, Home, in his capacity as co-chairman, would press for more active Sov role and particularly for assurance more cooperative behavior on part of Polish member ICC although in view Khrushchevʼs statements in Harrimanʼs talks doubted if they would be forthcoming. Secretary urged Home to take particularly strong line with Soviets on Laos; he himself intended take vigorous issue with Soviet contention, conveyed to Harriman, that they considered their responsibilities in Laos at end.

In discussion possible communiqué following trilateral Tuesday talks it was agreed we should press for bland formulation stating three parties had engaged in useful probing exercise and each side now had clearer idea of othersʼ proposals, and now in better position to consult with Allies on further steps.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Priority. Rusk and British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Home were in Moscow to sign the nuclear test ban treaty on August 5.
1. For text of the communiqué issued at the time of the signing of the test ban treaty, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 992-993.