332. Editorial Note
On June 14, 1963, the Committee of Principals discussed the upcoming trip to Moscow by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman, whom Kennedy had designated as his personal representative at the three-power test ban talks that would begin July 15. According to the memorandum of conversation, “Rusk said that the Harriman mission was not based on indications that the Soviets were prepared to move toward the kind of treaty we wanted,” but “the President feels the mission should be made because this may be our last chance to avoid a larger and more difficult arms race.” On June 20 Carl Kaysen, Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, sent President Kennedy a paper suggesting positions that Harriman should take. The paper argued that the initial part of the talks should deal with a comprehensive test ban treaty but noted that the U.S. offer to sign a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space remained open, and conceded that a partial test ban treaty might be the best solution obtainable in the [Page 708] current international climate. In that case, the United States might want to seek a limitation on underground tests. For text of both documents, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 719–726 and 728–733.