330. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
3128. Deptel 2687.1 I fear our session last night, at Foreign Ministry (former Kalinin) dacha did not advance things much along lines of your suggestion. Dep Fon Min Kuznetsov and wife joined party as late starters and this did not exactly loosen up the talk. While friendly toward us in general, he speaks with some bitterness about his “failure” in disarmament field, saying he tried not to cause trouble for his friend Dean, but the latter did not do as much for him. Particularly in after-dinner conversation among the men he was tense and insistent, reiterating at every turn Soviet Governmentʼs desire to find some ground for agreement with U.S. in international and/or bilateral areas.
As one of those members of Soviet Government so often mentioned by Dobrynin as believing it possible and desirable find means of agreement with U.S. in face scepticism others in Government seems likely his hard attitude may have been purposefully assumed to impress upon us essentiality of positive results in forthcoming meetings—a theme that was recurrent in conversation.
In response my specific inquiry (per reftel) Dobrynin said his consultations here had not changed but rather confirmed his remarks to you on boat ride.2 Even so we took a turn around the field with Kuznetsov carrying main burden for Soviet side. While Soviets insisted U.S. must come forward with new ideas or proposals if talks were not just falsely to [Page 706] raise and then disillusion peopleʼs hopes, challenge and prodding from our side elicited no indication anything new to be expected from them, or even a hint as to what they really look for from us.
On tests insisted on-site inspection not necessary and that this proved by objective facts of improved identification techniques of which confirmation exists in U.S. detection and identification single Soviet underground shot and general detection and identification French Sahara shot. Outstanding questions in test ban treaty are purely political and can only be resolved as such.
Disarmament mentioned only briefly with no indication of new Soviet thinking.
Germany and Berlin received standard treatment with usual references to elimination “NATO occupation”. Dobrynin seemed ready discuss question further but Kuznetsov did not pick him up on it. No indication of any early Soviet action or initiative in Berlin.
Non-aggression pact was injected by Dobrynin as possible area of agreement.
In bilateral matters, Kuznetsov pressed hardest on trade discrimination, list of concrete examples of which he said he passed over during Washington visit but apparently received no attention. (“Comrade” Smirnovsky was instructed provide Embassy with copy.) Insisted groups in U.S. including “State Dept,” erroneously believed U.S. economic pressures could cause Soviet structure to crumble. Wide diameter pipe only most recent example falsity this view. Trade in itself not specially important but trade discrimination clear reflection of basic U.S. Government attitude to relations with U.S.S.R.
Most heated remarks related to Cuba. Why does U.S. Government think it has right to dictate to Cuban people and so forth. Questioned as to whether Soviet Government realizes price it paid in terms US/Soviet relations with outcome Castro visit to U.S.S.R., Kuznetsov maintained and reiterated Soviets doing more and paying higher price for hoped for improvement relations with U.S. than anywhere else in its foreign relations. Conversation got to point where Soviets seemed to be putting question would U.S. have preferred Cuba aligned with China and therefore wasnʼt price paid in interests U.S.?
- Source: Department of State, Kohler Papers: Lot 71 D 460, Telegrams. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by McSweeney and initialed by Kohler.↩
- Not found.↩
- See Document 323.↩