69. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1
0698. 1. With approval Ambassador Lodge, CAS applied during morning 6 Sept for interview with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu set interview for afternoon same day and we had two-hour conversation.
2. Apparently Minister Luong had already talked with Nhu about Tran Van Khiem matter (CAS Saigon 0647).2 Nhu assured CAS there was nothing to this. Said either Khiem or SEPES3 personnel through Khiem were attempting restore SEPES. This would go nowhere as Diem had reached final decision not to reestablish SEPES. According to Nhu, Diem has “physical allergy” to Khiem and would not think of allowing him either role or office. Khiem has no agents or anything else. Nhu had not talked with Khiem as result these reports but Madame Nhu has done so. Khiem had said to Madame Nhu that if he was to have no role in Vietnamese life he would prefer to go abroad. In sum Nhu debunked report and gave assurances about Khiem.
3. We then discussed 2 Sept Times of Vietnam article.4 Nhu alleged he had nothing whatever to do with article and claims he had not even read it. Stated that he did not hide himself behind backsides of a woman, in this instance referring specifically to Mrs. Gregory. He surmised in passing that Gregorys may have obtained some of their information from American sources but did not emphasize this line. CAS did not raise question of Madame Nhu’s role nor did he.
4. Nhu stated he wished explicitly authorize CAS and station to proceed with all station programs of joint nature. Volunteered that Diem, he, Thuan and Luong and others had approved these programs. Nhu considers the programs invaluable in support of counterinsurgency which, he continues to claim, is his primary interest. Stating he had previously said he had no political or power ambition he modified this to say he has primary ambition after all, which he describes as winning counter-subversive war because of its importance not only to South Vietnam but also because of bearing counter-subversive [Page 125] war has on Cambodia, Laos, and other countries of SEA and on struggle of free world. At conclusion our conversation, he again stressed his desire we continue joint programs. Without CAS putting question to him, Nhu disclaimed any role in attack on Agency.
5. Nhu seems convinced some Americans (unidentified) arranged sanctuary of three bonzes in American Embassy. When CAS expressed complete disbelief, Nhu admitted arrival of three bonzes probably came as surprise to Embassy officials but continued to claim GVN in possession telephone tap indicating that (unidentified) American had been behind this episode. He did not elaborate on problem constituted by bonzes in Embassy nor did CAS press him on this matter.
6. Nhu feels there are too many American civilians in Saigon and that some of these personnel are maintaining continual campaign of anti-GVN criticism. Did not name them but expressed view that this was matter for internal discipline of U.S. Mission, not for GVN action. Nhu seems to think number of American civilians in Saigon should be reduced and states he was asked at Interministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets meeting morning 6 Sept about presence U.S. military advisors. Had answered question to effect that military advisors should be increased where they were needed and effective and decreased where contrary situation prevailed. Said nothing about any reduction in military establishment.
7. With respect to negotiations with Hanoi, Nhu said Italian Ambassador D’Orlandi and Indian High Commissioner Goburdhun had asked him to see Polish ICC Commissioner Maneli to find out “what was in his stomach”. Maneli had made several previous efforts to talk with Nhu but had not been received. As result of D’Orlandi and Goburdhun’s persuasion, Nhu received Maneli about three days ago. Maneli expressed view that Nhu should take advantage of De Gaulle and Ho Chi Minh declarations5 and to enter into negotiations with Hanoi. Maneli said he had been authorized by Pham Van Dong to act as intermediary. He suggested to Nhu that SVN could sell rice and beer to North Vietnam in return for coal. Volunteered to be at Nhu’s services any hour of day or night. Maneli told Nhu he was only man in SVN who could dare to undertake such negotiations.
8. Nhu claims he answered Maneli to effect that, while De Gaulle’s statement was interesting, only combatants in this war had right to speak and act. SVN is allied with U.S. and it would be “immoral act” to explore such a problem unilaterally behind backs of Americans. Commercial relations with North Vietnam would have inevitable political repercussions on fighting morale and political clarity of SVN population. Maneli asked what was next step and Nhu said he replied “continue building strategic hamlets”. To CAS Nhu said he [Page 126] has no secret channel to Hanoi but could communicate through Goburdhun or Maneli if he wished. His contacts are with Viet Cong in SVN and his objective with them is to win them over against North Vietnam. Nhu stated he believes the guerrilla war would be greatly advanced in SVN favor by end of 1963 and that at some future time SVN and U.S. might be able negotiate with North Vietnam from position of strength. He states he is adamantly opposed to neutralism, although CAS had not brought up this subject. Neutralism, according to Nhu, is completely contrary to GVN’s outlook and policy.
9. Without specifying, Maneli [told Nhu?] Saigon GVN would soon have four enemies against it, presumably including U.S. Nhu says he answered Maneli with comment that GVN accustomed to being attacked from many sides and would prefer go down with dignity than to live on knees. Nhu told CAS that neither GVN nor any other government could possibly negotiate with Hanoi either openly or secretly, except after having won guerrilla war and not in terms of neutralization but rather within framework of strong SVN seeking to incorporate North Vietnam within free world order.
10. On Buddhist question, Nhu said he had been off on vacation with family, 8 May and had not participated immediately in crisis which exploded that date. Buddhist problem advanced too far and too fast, reaching final point where surgery was necessary to survival of government and conduct of war. Still claims he had nothing to do with declaration of martial law or with attacks on pagodas. Denies he manipulated Secret Police or Colonel Tung’s forces. When general officers saw Diem evening 18 August to propose martial law, claims Diem asked Nhu what Generals wanted see him about at that hour and Nhu surmised to Diem that probably they wanted take up question of new Chief of Staff. Nhu claims general officers informed him on 19 August of their discussion with Diem. During general officers/Diem meeting on 18 Aug, Diem approved martial law in principle, asked that bonzes not be harmed, and recommended that military legal officer be present at pagodas to see that military forces acted in accordance with law. Nhu claims military found this last stipulation unrealistic and impractical. Nhu said General Do Cao Tri had visited him about 19 or 20 August and initiated discussion on what General Tri intended to do during martial law. Tri brought out notebook indicating precise steps he intended take and persons he would arrest. Nhu commented that Tri said he had been planning for the action over the past preceding month. Nhu stated to CAS that he is “scapegoat” of entire affair, although said at same time that situation had reached point where surgical action necessary. The [He?1 says there was no [Page 127] meeting of civilian leaders after Diem/general officers session of 18 Aug (contrary to Minister Hieu’s report (FVS 9513)).6
Nhu said that, apart from surgical operation of 21 August, he has been for policy of conciliation and continues to be now. He said this was another part of Diem’s stipulations during his session with Generals on 18 August, i.e., that martial law and removal of Buddhists to home pagodas would not constitute breach of his policy of conciliation.
11. CAS asked Nhu how long he thought martial law would last. Nhu answered that he had no idea. He felt persistence of martial law was dangerous to government and commented that martial law was having psychological effect on general officers which he thought could become a serious problem. During today’s meeting of Interministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets, general officers had raised question of their participating in Cabinet positions within government and problems relating to general style structure. Nhu had answered them to effect that Interministerial Committee was not proper forum nor did this lie within his responsibility. CAS impression is that Nhu is in fact worried about changes in general officers’ outlook and increasing demands from their side for participation in government.
12. Nhu gave some time to discussing how his children found life at Gia Long unpleasant and unlike normal lives led by other children. They felt they did not have playmates like other young people, could not walk down the street normally, were surrounded by too many servants, and would much rather live in villa somewhere in other part of SVN, like their villa at Dalat. Nhu said that he had to take this family problem seriously because psychological wounds of this kind in childhood could have lasting effects into adult life. (CAS had impression, as result Nhu’s emphasis on this subject, that Nhu might be laying ground work for his temporary withdrawal.)
13. Nhu’s comments are contrary to information we have received from other sources. See no point in trying to elaborate on his sincerity or insincerity but do not exclude that there are various substantial elements of deception involved in his statements. This would not be unnatural in power and politics. He claims to want to go forward with [as] U.S. ally and that he recognized fully American contribution to winning guerrilla war. I had no impression from this meeting that Nhu was inclined toward significant cutback in American presence of programs. He again claimed he is not anti-American. Discussion was conducted on both sides in friendly, dispassionate manner. Nhu was looking well.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S VIET. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text is a copy sent by the CIA to the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman. Also sent to the White House exclusive for Bundy and to the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), Department of the Army, exclusive for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, and Krulak. There is no time of transmission from Saigon on the source text, but it was received at the Department of State at 7:15 p.m.↩
- Not found.↩
- SEPES, Service des Etudes Politiques et Sociales (Political and Social Studies Service), was the name of Ngo Dinh Nhu’s secret police.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 68.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 26, and footnote 3, Document 44.↩
- Not found.↩