375. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to President
Johnson
1
Washington
,
December 23,
1963
.
Dear Mr. President: I have read Secretary
McNamara’s memorandum to you
on the Vietnam situation.2 My observations on the
situation are covered in a separate memorandum which was left with Mr.
Bundy on Saturday,3 but attached is a copy for your ready
reference.
There is no substantive difference between Secretary McNamara and myself except perhaps I
feel a little less pessimistic than he. Nevertheless, as I state in my
conclusion, there are more reasons to be pessimistic than to be
optimistic about the prospects of our success in South Vietnam.
[Page 736]
Much depends on the ability of the Military Revolutionary Committee
(MRC) to provide strong leadership
and inspiration to the people of Vietnam, to properly administer the
affairs of the country, and to successfully prosecute the war. All this
is yet to be demonstrated.
I am dispatching to Saigon a number of our “old South Vietnamese hands”
for temporary duty to assist in developing the necessary covert
resources of native case officers and agents to inform us concerning the
effectiveness of the MRC and the public
acceptance of the new government. This has not been CIA’s role in the past, as intelligence of
this type has come through military channels. However I believe the next
few months are so critical that information covertly developed will
complement reporting we receive through the other channels.
I intend to return to South Vietnam in 90 days or sooner.
Sincerely,
Attachment
HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON 18-20 DECEMBER
19634
- 1.
- There is no organized government in South Vietnam at this
time. The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) is in control, but strong
leadership and administrative procedures are lacking. Reports
were received that province and district chiefs do not act
because of the lack of direction and orders. Nevertheless, the
MRC are confident. They feel
they are winning the support of the people. They recognize there
is a big job ahead but feel it is not insurmountable, and they
feel their plan of organization will lead to success. They claim
complete understanding among all members, however, there is
evidence of tension, which, if it grows, could lead to serious
political difficulties.
- 2.
- The Military Revolutionary Committee, MRC, has replaced about 70 percent of the 42
province chiefs and a substantial number of the 253 district
chiefs. This replacement program is continuing. Many
appointments are reported to be good, some not so good. The
MRC feel that practically
all must be replaced.
- 3.
- The MRC feel they have reached
an understanding with the Hoa Hao and on 27 December will reach
agreement with the Cao Dai. These arrangements could
substantially improve the security of the Cambodian border,
relieve GVN troops in Hoa Hao
and Cao Dai provinces, provide important information on VC concentrations and [Page 737] activities, and have a
significant psychological impact on the population. The success
of the detente arrangements will bear significantly on the
future of the GVN.
- 4.
- It is abundantly clear that statistics received over the past
year or more from the GVN
officials and reported by the US mission on which we gauged the
trend of the war were grossly in error. Conditions in the delta
and in the areas immediately north of Saigon are more serious
now than expected and were probably never as good as reported.
The Viet Cong control larger percentages of the population,
greater amounts of territory, and have destroyed or occupied
more strategic hamlets than expected. Admittedly, this area of
South Vietnam had been recognized as the most serious.
Revelation of factual data evidences a far greater problem for
the GVN in arresting the
unfavorable trend and recovering the situation than was
thought.
- 5.
- Starting in about July, indices on progress of the war fumed
unfavorable for the GVN. The
number of Viet Cong attacks and the losses of strategic hamlets
to the Viet Cong increased. VC
casualties vs GVN casualties,
weapons lost vs weapons captured, etc., all turned in favor of
the VC and against the GVN. The trend lines were gradual
until 1 November, the date of the coup, and then moved very
sharply against the GVN because
of a great increase in number and intensity of VC attacks in the weeks immediately
following the coup.
- 6.
- The tempo of VC activities has
slowed down. Incidents were fewer during the last week in
November and have continued at a lower rate so far in December.
Concurrently, the tempo of GVN
activities has increased. Hence, the trend lines of all indices
have turned in favor of the GVN
in recent weeks, although in no instance has the situation which
existed in June or July, 1963, been recovered.
- 7.
- There is continuing evidence of infiltration of cadres and
small arms from North Vietnam through Laos and across the
Laotian border. GVN intelligence
reports indicate 1550 men with substantial but not precisely
known quantities of arms have entered South Vietnam from North
Vietnam through Laos this year.
- 8.
- Large machine weapons, such as recoilless rifles, mortars, and
anti-aircraft guns, and men trained in their use, have appeared
in the delta in recent months. It is not known whether they came
through Laos and Cambodia and across the border, down the
rivers, or by sea. Large weapons have not appeared in the
northern sectors of South Vietnam.
- 9.
- The MRC recognizes the
seriousness of the problems in the delta and have taken a number
of actions which they feel will produce results. However, there
is evidence of serious deficiencies in the Self-Defense Corps,
which must be corrected. Also, there is an urgent need for
substantially more organized GVN
units in the delta and the provinces around Saigon.
- 10.
- The strategic hamlet has encountered resistance in the delta
because relocation removed families from their fields and
locations occupied for generations. Many defections of entire
villages were reported as due to the above reason. The villages
built along the banks of rivers and canals could not be
rearranged into defendable compounds without hardships the
villagers considered unacceptable.
Conclusion
It is my conclusion that the coup came when there was a downward
trend which was more serious than was reported and, therefore, more
serious than realized.
The military government may be an improvement over the Diem-Nhu regime, but this is not as yet established and
the future of the war remains in doubt.
The Viet Cong are receiving substantial support from North Vietnam
and possibly elsewhere, and this support can be increased. Stopping
this by sealing the borders, the extensive waterways, and the long
coastline is difficult, if not impossible.
The VC appeal to the people of South
Vietnam on political grounds has been effective, gained recruits for
their armed forces, and neutralized resistance.
The ability of the GVN to reverse
this trend remains to be proven. Much depends on the ability of the
MRC to deploy their forces and
pursue the conflict in a manner which will ensure the security of
the people and provide them desired freedom, privileges, and some
tangible benefits.
The lack of an outstanding individual to lead and absence of
administrative experience within the MRC are ominous indicators.
The political stability of the new government under the MRC is subject to serious doubt.
Conflicts of ambition, jealousy, differences of opinion over policy
matters all are possible, could develop serious schisms, precipitate
further dissensions and coup attempts all of which will affect the
war effort against the VC.
Overcoming the VC movement by the
GVN is formidable and difficult,
but not impossible. The problems can be intensified by continuing
increased support from NVN and
political failures by the MRC.
Hence, in my judgment, there are more reasons to doubt the future of
the effort under present programs and moderate extensions to
existing programs (i.e., harassing sabotage against NVN, border crossings, etc.) than there
are reasons to be optimistic about the future of our cause in South
Vietnam.
