375. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to President Johnson
1
Washington
,
December 23,
1963
.
Dear Mr. President: I have read Secretary McNamara's memorandum to you on the
Vietnam situation.2 My observations on the situation are covered in a
separate memorandum which was left with Mr. Bundy on
Saturday,3 but attached
is a copy for your ready reference.
There is no substantive difference between Secretary McNamara and myself except perhaps I feel
a little less pessimistic than he. Nevertheless, as I state in my
conclusion, there are more reasons to be pessimistic than to be optimistic
about the prospects of our success in South Vietnam.
[Page 736]
Much depends on the ability of the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) to provide strong leadership and
inspiration to the people of Vietnam, to properly administer the affairs of
the country, and to successfully prosecute the war. All this is yet to be
demonstrated.
I am dispatching to Saigon a number of our “old South Vietnamese hands” for
temporary duty to assist in developing the necessary covert resources of
native case officers and agents to inform us concerning the effectiveness of
the MRC and the public acceptance of the new
government. This has not been CIA's role in
the past, as intelligence of this type has come through military channels.
However I believe the next few months are so critical that information
covertly developed will complement reporting we receive through the other
channels.
I intend to return to South Vietnam in 90 days or sooner.
Sincerely,
Attachment
HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON 18-20 DECEMBER
19634
- 1.
- There is no organized government in South Vietnam at this time.
The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) is in control, but strong leadership and
administrative procedures are lacking. Reports were received that
province and district chiefs do not act because of the lack of
direction and orders. Nevertheless, the MRC are confident. They feel they are winning the
support of the people. They recognize there is a big job ahead but
feel it is not insurmountable, and they feel their plan of
organization will lead to success. They claim complete understanding
among all members, however, there is evidence of tension, which, if
it grows, could lead to serious political difficulties.
- 2.
- The Military Revolutionary Committee, MRC, has replaced about 70 percent of the 42 province
chiefs and a substantial number of the 253 district chiefs. This
replacement program is continuing. Many appointments are reported to
be good, some not so good. The MRC
feel that practically all must be replaced.
- 3.
- The MRC feel they have reached an
understanding with the Hoa Hao and on 27 December will reach
agreement with the Cao Dai. These arrangements could substantially
improve the security of the Cambodian border, relieve GVN troops in Hoa Hao and Cao Dai
provinces, provide important information on VC concentrations and [Page 737]activities, and have a significant psychological
impact on the population. The success of the detente arrangements
will bear significantly on the future of the GVN.
- 4.
- It is abundantly clear that statistics received over the past year
or more from the GVN officials and
reported by the US mission on which we gauged the trend of the war
were grossly in error. Conditions in the delta and in the areas
immediately north of Saigon are more serious now than expected and
were probably never as good as reported. The Viet Cong control
larger percentages of the population, greater amounts of territory,
and have destroyed or occupied more strategic hamlets than expected.
Admittedly, this area of South Vietnam had been recognized as the
most serious. Revelation of factual data evidences a far greater
problem for the GVN in arresting the
unfavorable trend and recovering the situation than was
thought.
- 5.
- Starting in about July, indices on progress of the war fumed
unfavorable for the GVN. The number
of Viet Cong attacks and the losses of strategic hamlets to the Viet
Cong increased. VC casualties vs
GVN casualties, weapons lost vs
weapons captured, etc., all turned in favor of the VC and against the GVN. The trend lines were gradual until
1 November, the date of the coup, and then moved very sharply
against the GVN because of a great
increase in number and intensity of VC attacks in the weeks immediately following the
coup.
- 6.
- The tempo of VC activities has
slowed down. Incidents were fewer during the last week in November
and have continued at a lower rate so far in December. Concurrently,
the tempo of GVN activities has
increased. Hence, the trend lines of all indices have turned in
favor of the GVN in recent weeks,
although in no instance has the situation which existed in June or
July, 1963, been recovered.
- 7.
- There is continuing evidence of infiltration of cadres and small
arms from North Vietnam through Laos and across the Laotian border.
GVN intelligence reports
indicate 1550 men with substantial but not precisely known
quantities of arms have entered South Vietnam from North Vietnam
through Laos this year.
- 8.
- Large machine weapons, such as recoilless rifles, mortars, and
anti-aircraft guns, and men trained in their use, have appeared in
the delta in recent months. It is not known whether they came
through Laos and Cambodia and across the border, down the rivers, or
by sea. Large weapons have not appeared in the northern sectors of
South Vietnam.
- 9.
- The MRC recognizes the seriousness
of the problems in the delta and have taken a number of actions
which they feel will produce results. However, there is evidence of
serious deficiencies in the Self-Defense Corps, which must be
corrected. Also, there is an urgent need for substantially more
organized GVN units in the delta and
the provinces around Saigon.
- 10.
- The strategic hamlet has encountered resistance in the delta
because relocation removed families from their fields and locations
occupied for generations. Many defections of entire villages were
reported as due to the above reason. The villages built along the
banks of rivers and canals could not be rearranged into defendable
compounds without hardships the villagers considered
unacceptable.
Conclusion
It is my conclusion that the coup came when there was a downward trend
which was more serious than was reported and, therefore, more serious
than realized.
The military government may be an improvement over the Diem-Nhu regime, but this is not as yet established and the
future of the war remains in doubt.
The Viet Cong are receiving substantial support from North Vietnam and
possibly elsewhere, and this support can be increased. Stopping this by
sealing the borders, the extensive waterways, and the long coastline is
difficult, if not impossible.
The VC appeal to the people of South
Vietnam on political grounds has been effective, gained recruits for
their armed forces, and neutralized resistance.
The ability of the GVN to reverse this
trend remains to be proven. Much depends on the ability of the MRC to deploy their forces and pursue the
conflict in a manner which will ensure the security of the people and
provide them desired freedom, privileges, and some tangible
benefits.
The lack of an outstanding individual to lead and absence of
administrative experience within the MRC
are ominous indicators.
The political stability of the new government under the MRC is subject to serious doubt. Conflicts
of ambition, jealousy, differences of opinion over policy matters all
are possible, could develop serious schisms, precipitate further
dissensions and coup attempts all of which will affect the war effort
against the VC.
Overcoming the VC movement by the GVN is formidable and difficult, but not
impossible. The problems can be intensified by continuing increased
support from NVN and political failures
by the MRC. Hence, in my judgment, there
are more reasons to doubt the future of the effort under present
programs and moderate extensions to existing programs (i.e., harassing
sabotage against NVN, border crossings,
etc.) than there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of our
cause in South Vietnam.
