Attachment
THE VIET CONG IMPROVED COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND
INSURGENCY POSTURE
The government has apparently been unable to materially reduce the
strength of the Viet Cong in spite of the increased number of RVN offensive operations. The Viet Cong
by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and
have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort. In
1963, the Viet Cong have effectively harassed RVN lines of road and rail
communications; developed their main force units; conducted
intensive psychological warfare campaigns; effectively harassed and
terrorized a large portion of the population along the northern and
central coastal plains (although primary enemy emphasis remains in
the delta region); varied the intensity and scale of their armed
attacks against strategic hamlets almost at will; and, in general,
have maintained a high level of guerrilla activity. To date, [Page 708] with few exceptions,
deployments of RVN military forces
in selected areas have not been able to compress the enemy into
manageable pockets and destroy him.
While increasing RVN operational
activity may demonstrate positive results in the near future, up to
the present time the Viet Cong have stood off a better equipped army
composed of regular and paramilitary forces totalling about 500,000
men; nearly five times the maximum estimated strength of the Viet
Cong hard-core and irregular forces.
Statistically, the number of Viet-Cong initiated incidents, including
armed attacks, shows a definite trend upwards since February 1963
and in general has remained above the 1962 monthly average since
August. There has been generally less fluctuation in monthly
large-scale attacks in 1963, averaging about 12 per month, than in
1962. RVNAF weapons losses have
risen over the past year. Thus far, approximately 2,400 modern
weapons have been lost, 900 of these in November alone. On the other
hand, Viet Cong weapons losses have gradually declined.
On the other hand, the casualty rate and particularly the KIA ratio continues to favor government
forces. Estimated Viet Cong casualties in 1963 through November
total approximately 27,000 (20,000 KIA), more than the maximum strength of the Viet Cong
main force figures carried by COMUSMACV (21-23,000) or almost one-half of the
estimated Viet Cong irregular strength (60-80,000). The casualties
may have been over-estimated. Assuming, however, that these are
accurate statistics, the Viet Cong have two means of replacing these
man-power losses: importation of cadres from North Viet-Nam or local
recruitment within South Viet-Nam, or both. In any case, large
numbers of men are involved. Concerning infiltration, only 914
persons are known to have been introduced into the RVN during 1963. Even if this
represents only a small fraction of those actually arriving, clearly
the bulk of the reported Viet Cong casualties must be replaced
through extensive local recruitment. A recruitment program of this
magnitude would appear to indicate a lack of meaningful progress in
government efforts to attain control and influence -over the rural
areas to deny the Viet Cong their main source of strength—the rural
populace. Most significant perhaps, while the Viet Cong reportedly
suffered over 27,000 casualties, they initiated and maintained a
level of incidents and armed attacks in November which reached an
all-time high.
The Viet Cong main force units have expanded over the past year. In
1962 there was insufficient evidence to confirm the existence of any
regimental-type headquarters in South Viet-Nam. During 1963, five
such headquarters have been accepted in the COMUSMACV order of battle. During
1962 a total of 30 Viet Cong battalions were confirmed. This number
has increased to 37 confirmed battalions in 1963. In [Page 709] addition, the latest Viet Cong
battalion has an accepted unit strength of 400 men, whereas during
1962 MACV computed these units at
an average strength of only 250 men.
There have [has] been some variation in Communist tactics during
recent months. For example, there is a growing tendency to stand and
fight, to attack the same objective two and three nights running,
and to employ large units when attacking objectives. In recent weeks
there has been a slight but noticeable rise in the number of Viet
Cong daylight attacks indicating perhaps a growing confidence in
their ability to meet and defeat government forces in open combat.
RVN use of armor and aircraft,
however, will tend to inhibit enemy daylight activity. Also, in the
past two months, there has been an increased Viet Cong underwater
mining effort.
The Viet Cong have improved their antiaircraft capability through the
capture of US automatic weapons and intensified AA training in the
use of small arms against low flying aircraft and helicopters. This
is evidenced by the growing number of RVN/US aircraft hit and downed. For example, during
October and November 1963, over 100 aircraft suffered battle damage
as a direct result of enemy ground fire.
Other factors favoring the Viet Cong are:
- (1)
-
Defections: The Viet Cong appear to
be defecting to the government in fewer numbers.
- (2)
-
Intelligence: A well coordinated
and highly effective Viet Cong intelligence and
counterintelligence system is believed to exist. In many
instances where RVN
intelligence indicated the probable presence of the enemy
and a friendly military operation was subsequently
initiated, the Viet Cong either successfully escaped or
tactically dispersed their forces and ambushed the attacking
RVN unit. There is
recent evidence of penetration of RVN paramilitary forces by the Viet Cong over
the past year, facilitating attacks on the Civilian
Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and the Vietnamese Special Forces.
- (3)
-
Economy of Force: The preponderance
of Viet Cong operations has been carried on south of Saigon
where only roughly one-third of their main force units are
located. The remainder of their main force units remain
positioned through central and northern Viet-Nam where Viet
Cong activity is relatively light.
- (4)
-
Communications: We believe that the
Viet Cong possess a highly sophisticated, effective and
secure political and military communications network.
- (5)
-
Food: Food is a problem for the
Viet Cong but not a major one. The Communists have been able
to by-pass controls established to deny them sustenance,
although they have experienced more difficulty in the
northern and central regions than in the delta where food is
more plentiful.
In summary, the Communist capability to extend or escalate the
insurgency has not been significantly negated. Available evidence
indicates that while the Viet Cong have not made spectacular gains,
they [Page 710] have prevented the
RVNAF from gaining effective
control over much of the countryside. Communist safe havens, bases,
and transient areas are available to them in North Viet-Nam, Laos,
and Cambodia.
It is apparent that the Viet Cong are maximizing their present
capabilities, aided substantially by resources captured from
government forces. It is evident that the Viet Cong over the past
year have sustained and in many instances have improved their combat
capabilities despite RVNAF
advantages in firepower, armor, mobility, communications and
airborne operations.
The Viet Cong have demonstrated an extensive capability to exploit
the opportunities of the provisional government’s preoccupation with
political reorganization during this transitional period. Unless the
government attains organizational stability and is able to devote
its major energies to the prosecution of the war in the near future,
Viet Cong activities can be expected to increase.
