33. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)1

MAC 1583. Request that a copy be passed to State, CIA, and other interested agencies.

[Page 65]

On instructions from Ambassador had a talk with Brig Gen Khiem, Chief JGS, this morning. Purpose was to give assurance of U.S. backing as per State 272.2

Khiem was at first reluctant to say anything, indicating he was just a junior officer and that I should talk to Big Minh who was really the head guy.

I said I would be delighted to talk to Big Minh, but he had put the word that no Americans were to contact him.

He stated Big Minh had stopped planning at this time, and was working on other methods—these he did not elaborate on.

He said because Big Minh had called off the planning so had others mentioning only himself and Gen Khanh.

He said all concerned had such a respect for Big Minh they followed his direction.

Asked where Col Thao, CAS 0483,3 stood in the picture. Khiem replied he knew Thao was making plans-but that few of military trusted him because of his V.C. background—and that he might still be working for the V.C. Comment: This might be an indicator of the other method, but this just conjecture.

Then he went on to say the Generals were not ready as they did not have enough forces under their control compared to those under President and now in Saigon.

He indicated they, the Generals, did not want to start anything they could not successfully finish.

Khiem then said Gen Don was not in Big Minh’s confidence. Comment: Probably because of Don’s present position because they are not personal friends.

At a meeting yesterday, Mr. Nhu said he now went along with everything the U.S. wants to do, and even had the backing of President Kennedy. I said this was news to me. Khiem said he wondered if Nhu is again trying to flush out the Generals. He intimated the Generals do not have too much trust in Nhu and that he’s such a friend of Mr. Richardson (CAS), the Generals wonder if Mr Nhu and Madame Nhu were on the CIA payroll. Comment: (A new angle indeed).

He also stated Big Minh and others could not put too much backing on Mr Connie’s4 word as representing U.S. because he was low in position in CAS. It would take someone like myself or Ambassador Lodge to give them complete confidence. Though it was my purpose to do just that—in view of what Khiem had already admitted [Page 66] I decided not to—and told Khiem that I would be glad to talk to Big Minh. But we would have to arrange the meeting. He said he would. No date set.

I asked if someone couldn’t confront the Nhus with the fact that their absence from the scene was the key to the overall solution. He replied that for anyone to do that would be self immolation—he also went on to say he doubted if the Nhus and Diem could be split.

He did say that Gen Don was going to present a plan to the President next week with the backing of the Generals. This was similar to one I had heard mentioned before; that of placing three Generals in key Cabinet positions, Interior, Defense, and DGI. Nhu would get some job such as Chief of Cabinet or a government coordinator.

So we see we have an “organization de confusion” with everyone suspicious of everyone else and none desiring to take any positive action as of right now. You can’t hurry the east.

Maybe my meeting with Big Minh, if it occurs, will smoke out other ghosts.

Regards. Ambassador Lodge has seen.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Defense Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to CINCPAC exclusive for Felt. A note on the source text indicates the President read this telegram. The source text is a copy Krulak sent to the White House for Bundy; Krulak also sent copies to the Department of State for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman; to CIA for Helms; to the Army for General Wheeler; to the Navy for Admiral MacDonald; and to the Marine Corps for General Shoup. A summary version of this cable is printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. 11, pp. 740-741.
  2. Document 16.
  3. Document 22.
  4. Reference is to Conein.