317. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

SUBJECT

  • Conversation with Ambassador Alphand

I spoke to Ambassador Alphand after dinner last night to sound out his views on the French attitude towards the new regime in Saigon. He gave me to understand that France could be expected to recognize the Government soon, although it might do so in a less formal way than the United States.

He asked me what I thought of the prospects for eventual unification and neutralization of North and South Vietnam. I told him that I thought this was a highly unlikely prospect in the foreseeable future, given the relative power balance of the two areas. Ambassador Alphand said that he thought that the French and U.S. positions were not far apart except on the question of timing. I said that this might be so, but that I had the impression that the French did not take sufficiently into account the problem alluded to by General Minh in his exclusive interview with Le Monde several days ago. To be neutral, one had to be strong; and it would take some time to build the necessary strength.

Ambassador Alphand asked why the United States had been so surprised at General De Gaulle’s statement about South Vietnam prior to the coup. I said that we were not so surprised at the substance of the statement as we were at the timing of it and the fact that it was made without consultation. Ambassador Alphand observed rather sourly that since we never consulted them on Southeast Asia, we should not be surprised if they did not consult us.

I attach two cables (Paris 23242 and 23313) which shed some more light on the French attitude.

Mike
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret.
  2. Telegram 2324, November 13, reads as follows: “French Delegate General De Buzon recently saw DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. Latter said coup in Saigon, although US-inspired, was step in right direction. US would tire of fighting and in that case DRV would show itself as supple as it is now rigid. It still not the moment for negotiations. Dong hoped French would exert influence on us to see latter observed Geneva Accords of 1954. Reportedly Buzon made no comment and there no plans instruct him pursue matter.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-4 VIET)
  3. The reference is in error since telegram 2331 from Paris is an unclassified administrative cable. (Ibid., AV 10)