Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

250. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 31, 1963—5:40 p.m.

1. A provisional analysis of past coup reporting indicates that various dissident officers have been slowly getting together, establishing contacts with other groups, and by evolutionary process this now appears to be congealing primarily behind the Generals.

2. Among the dissident elements of which we are aware are the following:

a. The Tran Kim Tuyen group, which in itself was an amalgam of military, civilian nationalist, Buddhist and student groups. Organization was extensive and well compartmented.

b. The Lt Col Pham Ngoc Thao/Huynh Van Lang group which developed military support, established liaison with and now reportedly has partially merged with and trying to take the leadership of the Tuyen group.

c. A group of Central Vietnamese military officers who appear to be a part of the the Generals coup, headed by Gen Le Van Nghiem, with Generals Pham Xuan Chieu, Le Van Kim, Tran Van Minh, Nguyen Ngoc Le, and Duong Van Hinh as part of the upper structure. It was supposedly paralleled by group of Northern and Southem officers under Gens Chieu and Kim respectively. While little is known of the overall direction, some unit support was identified.

d. The United Front Party, described by Bui Thngt [sic] Long Hy, which is organized into three-man cells of intellectuals and professionals, with the aim of overthrowing the Diem regime. This may be one of the segments of the Tuyen group.

e. The Dai Viet element, represented by Bui Diem, working with the Generals. Conversation with Dang Van Sung and Tran Trung Dung indicate they are very knowledgeable and, we suspect, participant.

f. The Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang element of Nguyen Van Luc who very early established contact with and promised support for the Tuyen group, and the Thao/Lang group have been trying to exploit them.

g. We have had several reports indicating Colonels, and junior officers, particularly from Airborne, Marines, and Armor, were discussing a coup among themselves.

h. The group of Major Nguyen Van Bich, reportedly DCO of 23rd Division, who came to our attention through Du Phnoc Long of the Press Liaison Bureau, which wished to develop a redoubt area near the Cambodian border. Long’s involvement may indicate that this was an element of Tuyen’s group which may have lost contact with other elements with Tuyen’s departure. Other comments of Long indicate it may also have been an element of the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang. Long stated later that events had left these plans behind.

i. The group of Nguyen Huu Duong, a govt attorney, has many contacts in both the civilian and military sides. This group worked parallel with the Tudo group, both having many contacts with students. Duong’s group and the Tudo group were interdependent and were associated with the Tuyen group.

j. The Generals’ group, headed by Duong Van Minh with Tran Van Don as spokesman and Le Van Kim as political organizer. Most of the above groups now appear to be involved with this group. Elements of a, c, e, f, and g, have been identified with the Generals. In addition there is considerable duplication of units claimed by the Generals and the Thao/Lang group.

k. Pham Huy Co’s Territorial Action Committee, clearly planning overthrow of regime, has been active in psywar, has some civilian organization; no real indication of broad military support, but there is no indication yet that it constitutes a unified coup mechanism.

3. We feel that most coup activity now centers around the Thao/ Lang group on the one hand and the Generals’ group on the other, and the question may well be who will lead the units anxious to participate. Both groups seek to use many of the same units with the Generals’ group appearing to be better and more broadly organized. If the Thao/Lang group move first, they must hope for defections from the evident opposition, support from units whose loyalty they are not sure of, or a swift action which quickly eliminates the Ngo family. Even if successful, it is not at all certain they can implement their political program. We believe that if the Generals move first, the power will be with them and the Thao/Lang group would be forced to lend the support of what little is distinctively their own. The Generals reportedly do not plan to bring in Thao from the start as they distrust him, but are willing to use him.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text is CIA Station telegram 2114 from Saigon sent to the Department of State eyes only for Rusk, Harriman, Ball, Hilsman, and Hughes. Also sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense eyes only for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak, and William Bundy; to the White House eyes only for McGeorge Bundy repeated to Honolulu eyes only for Felt and to CIA eyes only for McCone, Carter, and Helms. Received at the Department of State at 9:33 a.m.