244. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Kattenburg) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1
SUBJECT
- What We Know of Coup Planning, Methods, and Personalities—11:00 a.m., October 30, 1963
Coup Methods
We are actually in the dark as to the methods the Generals and their civilian allies, if any, plan to use. Going back to Conein’s conversation with Big Minh on 5 October,2 he outlined three possible plans:
- a)
- assassination of Nhu and Can keeping Diem in office—he said this was the easiest plan to accomplish;
- b)
- encirclement of Saigon by various military units;
- c)
- direct confrontation between coup military units and the loyalist military units in Saigon, dividing city into sectors impeding [sic] it out pocket by pocket.
Minh also said in the same conversation that he would have to get rid of Nhu, Can and Hieu, that would bring Colonel Tung on his knees before him.
There have been further somewhat more indirect references to assassinations and elimination of the entire Ngo family.
Coup Planning
Don earlier promised Conein that the coup committee had agreed that the complete political and military planning would be turned over for study by Ambassador two days prior to scheduled time for coup (conversation night of 24 October3), but in a conversation with Conein on 28 October,4 Don said that possibly plans could only be made available four hours in advance. He questioned Conein closely as to time on 31 October Ambassador would [be] leaving.
As to who is doing the planning, Don indicated to Conein that he was contact man with the Americans, other Generals and division commanders. Kim was doing the political planning and military planning is in the hands of others (presumably Big Minh himself).
[Page 492]Leading Coup Personalities
A. Military:
As early as October 5, Big Minh informed Conein that “among other Generals participating with him in this plan were: Major General Don, Brigadier General Khiem, and Major General Kim.”
In their October 24 conversation, Conein told Don that the coup committee included himself, General Minh, General Chieu, and General Kim. (Note: General Khiem is here left out and replaced by General Chieu whom we know to have been long in dissidence. In their October 28 conversation, Don told Conein that General Khiem was being very circumspect as he knew he was under suspicion by the President.)
Again on October 28 Don told Conein that General Khanh was cooperating, but not a member of the coup committee; he would “not attempt to take his corps area into dissidence.” Don also said the same applied to Generals Tri and Dinh.
In their October 28 conversation, Don told Conein that he would be leaving on the morning of October 29 to see Generals Tri and Khanh to perfect the planning. He cautioned against trusting Lt. Col. Thao whom he said was suspect by the Generals’ group.
B. Civilian:
It is clear that certain civilian and oppositionist elements have knowledge of the Generals’ coup planning though perhaps not in significant detail. These civilians are predominantly the leaders of the old anti-French, anti-Communist, anti-Diem Nationalist Dai Viet group.
Notably they include Bui Diem, the more dynamic of younger Dai Viet leaders; Dang Van Sung and Pham Huy Quat, old-time leaders of the Dai Viet; and Tran Trung Dung, Diem’s Defense Secretary from 1955 to November 1960.
In a conversation between Dung and a CAS officer,5 the former stated he envisaged a regime headed by Vice President Tho, with Quat as Prime Minister. He singled out the following for cabinet posts; Tran Van Ly (former Governor of Central Vietnam); Phan Quang Dan (long-time oppositionist who spent many years in US); Tran Van Tuyen (a former Cao Dai political adviser); and Pham Khac Suu, another well known Dai Viet oppositionist in Saigon. He also mentioned three exiles as worthy of consideration, including Nguyen Huu Chau and Nguyen Ton Hoan.
Military Units Involved
You will receive separate material on this subject.
[Page 493]Political Program
The only reference thus far to a political program was made in Don’s conversation with Conein on October 24, in which Don stated that: a) the succeeding government would be civilian; b) it would as soon as possible free non-Communist political prisoners and hold honest elections, and would tolerate the operation of opposition parties; c) there would be complete freedom of religion; and d) it would be pro-Western, but not a vassal of the US, to “carry the war against VC to successful conclusion with Western, particularly American, help.”
- Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries-Vietnam. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Initialed by both Kattenburg and Hilsman.↩
- See Document 177.↩
- See Document 215.↩
- See Document 225.↩
- See Document 229.↩