Office of the Historian

240. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)1

Saigon, October 30, 1963, 4 p.m.

MAC 2028. Your JCS 4188-632 arrived as I was in the process of drafting one for you along the same lines. I share your concern. I have not as yet seen Saigon 768.3 I sent to the Embassy for a copy at 0830 this morning-as of now 1100-the Embassy has not released it. Also CINCPAC 0-300040Z4 info JCS came as a surprise to me as I am unaware of any change in local situation which indicates necessity for actions directed. Perhaps I’ll find the answer in Saigon 768. Or perhaps [Page 480] actions directed in CINCPAC 300040Z are precautionary in light of Gen Don’s statement reported in [document number not declassified]5 that a coup would take place in any case not later than 2 November. It might be noted Don also is supposed to have said [document number not declassified]6 that though the coup committee would not release the details, the Ambassador would receive the complete plan for study two days prior to the scheduled times for the coup.

I have not been informed by the Ambassador that he has received any such plans. I talked to him yesterday on my return from Bangkok and he offered no additional information. He has agreed to keep me completely informed if anything new turns up.

Incidentally he leaves for Washington tomorrow (31st) afternoon. If the coup is to happen before the second he’s hardly going to get two days notice.

One thing I have found out, Don is either lying or playing both ends against the middle. What he told me is diametrically opposed to what he told Col. Conein. He told Conein the coup will be before November 2nd. He told me he was not planning a coup. I sat with Don and Big Minh for 2 hours during the parade last Saturday. No one mentioned coupe. To go on:

Both CAS Saigon 18967 and [document number not declassified]8 were sent first and delivered to me after dispatch. My 19919 was discussed with the Ambassador prior to dispatch. My 199310 was not, basically because I had not seen CAS Saigon [document number not declassified]11 before dispatch and I just wanted to get the record straight from my side and where my name was involved.

The Ambassador and I are currently in touch with each other but whether the communications between us are effective is something else. I will say Cabot’s methods of operations are entirely different from Amb Nolting’s as far as reporting in the military is concerned.

Fritz would always clear messages concerning the military with me or my staff prior to dispatch. So would [less than 1 line not declassified] if MACV was concerned. This is not true today. Cite CAS 1896 and [document number not declassified]12 for examples. Also you will recall I was not the recipient of several messages you held when you were here.

[Page 481]

CINCPAC brought this matter up again when I saw him in Bangkok, this past week end. He is going to make a check when he returns to see if he holds messages I have not received. Have just received Saigon 768.13 I will have to report you are correct in believing that the Ambassador is forwarding military reports and evaluations without consulting me. For his weekly report to the President, at his request, I furnish him a short military statement. For preparation of 768 I made no mention of the Delta. I will answer 768 separately today.

There is a basic difference apparently between the Ambassador’s thinking and mine on the interpretation of the guidance contained in CAP 63560 dated 6 October14 and the additional thoughts, I repeat, thoughts expressed in CAS Washington 74228 dated 9 October.15 I interpret CAP 63560 as our basic guidance and that CAS 74228 being additional thoughts did not change the basic guidance in that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup. The Ambassador feels that 74228 does change 63560 and that a change of government is desired and feels as stated in CAS Saigon [document number not declassified]16 that the only way to bring about such a change is by a coup.

I’m not opposed to a change in government, no indeed, but I’m inclined to feel that at this time the change should be in methods of governing rather than complete change of personnel. I have seen no batting order proposed by any of the coup groups. I think we should take a hard look at any proposed list before we make any decisions. In my contacts here I have seen no one with the strength of character of Diem, at least in fighting communists. Certainly there are no Generals qualified to take over in my opinion. I am not a Diem man per se. I certainly see the faults in his character. I am here to back 14 million SVN people in their fight against communism and it just happens that Diem is their leader at this time. Most of the Generals I have talked to agree they can go along with Diem, all say it’s the Nhu family they are opposed to.

Perhaps the pressures we have begun to apply will cause Diem and Nhu to change their ways. This is apparently not evident as yet. I’m sure the pressures we have begun to apply if continued will affect the war effort. To date they have not. I am watching this closely and will report when I think they have.

[Page 482]

I do not agree with the Ambassador’s assessment in 768 that we are just holding our own. The GVN is a way ahead in the I, II and parts of the III Corps and making progress in the Delta. Nothing has happened in October to change the assessment you and Secretary McNamara made after your visit here.

I would suggest we not try to change horses too quickly. That we continue to take persuasive actions that will make the horses change their course and methods of action. That we win the military effort as quickly as possible, then let them make any and all the changes they want.

After all, rightly or wrongly, we have backed Diem for eight long hard years. To me it seems incongruous now to get him down, kick him around, and get rid of him. The US has been his mother superior and father confessor since he’s been in office and he has leaned on us heavily.

Leaders of other under-developed countries will take a dim view of our assistance if they too were led to believe the same fate lies in store for them.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, State and Defense Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Bangkok for Felt. Attached to the source text was a signed note from Krulak to McGeorge Bundy stating that Taylor asked that this message, which had been shown only to McNamara at Defense, should be conveyed to Bundy. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, Vol. 11, pp. 784-785.↩
  2. Document 227.↩
  3. Document 207.↩
  4. Not found.↩
  5. Reference is to the second CIA telegram cited in Document 209.↩
  6. Not found.↩
  7. See footnote 5, Document 207.↩
  8. Reference is to the same telegram cited in footnote 5 above.↩
  9. Document 213.↩
  10. Document 214.↩
  11. Reference is to the same telegram cited in footnote 5 above.↩
  12. Reference is to the same telegram cited in footnotes 5 and 8 above.↩
  13. Document 207.↩
  14. Document 182.↩
  15. Document 192.↩
  16. Document 216.↩