232. Briefing Paper Prepared in the White House1
Washington, October 29,
1963.
CHECK LIST FOR 4 PM MEETING2
(Not intended to be exhaustive)
1. Intelligence
- A.
- Estimate of prospective balance of forces;
- B.
- Estimate of quality and quantity of military leadership committed;
- C.
- Summary of intelligence questions on which it would be profitable
to ask further field assessment, e.g.,
- 1.
- Can we insist on independent process of confirmation or crosscheck?
- 2.
- Should we ask for a separate evaluation on these questions by Harkins?
2. Lodge’s Movements
- A.
- If we keep him in place, what are consequences for
- 1.
- Plausible denial;
- 2.
- Possible indefinite delay in return while nothing happens;
- 3.
- Possible bad signal to Nhu or to coup group.
- B.
- If he returns on schedule, who is in charge in Saigon, and under what instructions. (There should be a draft instruction to Trueheart and Harkins on this point for the 4 o’clock meeting.)
3. Contingency Planning
- A.
- CINCPAC—Presumably Defense will draft instructions for Felt which will preserve cover but move substantial forces to within easy range of Saigon.
- B.
- Response to coup. Presumably Harkins should be asked for detailed plans on use and withholding of U.S. forces so as not to choose up sides.
- C.
- There should be a political scenario of U.S. posture:
- 1.
- while in a possibly prolonged struggle;
- 2.
- if coup succeeds;
- 3.
- if coup fails.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings on Vietnam. On a draft of this paper, McGeorge Bundy wrote the following note: “Should we cool off the whole enterprise[?]” (Ibid., Vietnam, Memos and Miscellaneous)↩
- See Document 234.↩