173. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs’ Special Assistant (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1

The ultimate objectives of the United States in Viet Nam do not coincide with the Diem-Nhu objectives. We wish to defeat Viet Cong subversion so that South Viet Nam may develop as a free state. They wish to defeat Viet Cong subversion so that Viet Nam can develop as a totalitarian state, which, in Nhu’s words, will “challenge the communists on their own grounds using their own methods”. I believe such an effort will fail and will result in a communist victory in South Vietnam.

The question is not, therefore, whether we can win with this regime but rather whether we want this regime to have the benefits of such a victory for purposes which are contrary not only to our objectives but also to our interests. The fact is that Nhu is exploiting two principal elements of power to produce his totalitarian state. The first is the Vietnamese Establishment—that educated, propertied, leadership class which makes up the military officer class, the bureaucracy and the Vietnamese portion of the business community—the second is the military power of the United States.

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Nhu will disestablish the first element by liquidation when he feels he has achieved enough success in the fight against the Viet Cong and the establishment of a peasant power base. He will eject the second by a deal with North Vietnam when he feels he has adequate means to continue in power without its assistance.

At the current moment, therefore, our situation equates with the thoroughly discontented Establishment, and their ultimate goals more closely coincide with ours than do those of the Diem-Nhu regime. I conclude therefore that it is in our interest to make common cause with them to overthrow the current regime.

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Vietnam—Policy. Secret.