Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

134. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹

Saigon, September 19, 1963—7:47 p.m.

MAC J00 7536. Personal for Gen Taylor, Adm Felt and Gen Krulak. From Gen Harkins.

1. As everyone else seems to be talking, writing and confusing the issue here in Vietnam, it behooves me to also get into the act. From most of the reports and articles I read, one would say Vietnam and our programs here are falling apart at the seams. Well, I just thoroughly disagree.

2. The RVN is divided into two parts, Saigon with its satellite Hue and the remainder of the country. In Saigon one can hear any imaginable rumor or grievance one wants to hear and I suppose could get better ones for a price.

Thank goodness I do not get to read the newspapers until they are at least three days old. If I got them as soon as you do, I would be afraid to go to work or I wouldn’t know what to do. All is not black. No, far from it.

3. As you know, our programs are pointed towards the RVNAF and the people in the countryside. None are designed for Saigon.

The programs for the Armed Forces are completed or on schedule. The ones in the country continue without let-up. Both are paying dividends.

4. I remain as optimistic as ever, particularly on the military side and I firmly believe there is reason for optimism in some of the other spheres.

Here are some of the indicators.

a. Martial law has been lifted.

b. Press censorship relaxed.

c. The rapid reaction by RVNAF in countering several larger than usual VC attacks and the impressive results obtained by the RVNAF counter forces as regards both VC killed and VC supplies and equipment captured.

d. The voluntary movement by the heretofore reluctant Behnar Montagnards tribesmen in the Pleiku area seeking resettlement and government protection.

3. [e.] The obvious interest displayed at all levels of the RVNAF to get on with the war against the VC. This particularly apparent since the lifting of martial law.

f. The obvious desire evidenced on the part of RVNAF personnel to further develop rapport and understanding with their US adviser counterparts.

g. As reported in the most recent Task Force Saigon Weekly Program Report (Saigon A-204 to State 16 Sep)²

(1) Although business continued slow the shortened curfew (now relaxed) and lengthened business day allowed more general circulation of people throughout the area. Restaurants and theaters renewed evening activities and taxi and cyclo-posse were available until late.

(2) Rice and hog deliveries to Saigon from province not affected by martial law and local curfew. Small increase in daily rice deliveries over August. Hog deliveries only slightly less than before with wholesale price steady.

(3) Trend toward normal relations between USOM technicians and counterparts continued.

(4) USOM provincial representatives continue to report province programs outside Delta problem areas going well and Inter-Ministerial Committee efficiency returning to normal. Provincial operations normal or nearly so with exception of Thua Thien. Individual programs remained on schedule.

(5) All Corps have made comparable consistent progress during period in hamlet completions.

(6) GVN sponsored seed seminar this week in Saigon is latest step in establishing efficiency system for distribution of seeds to farmers.

(4) [7] Tam Giang irrigation project in Phu Yen Province officially opened. Project financed by GVN will provide water to irrigate some 2400 hectares of rice lands.

5. These and others are indications that our programs are moving. We must not stop them and let fourteen million people go down the Communist drain. Admittedly we are on the front-line and the VC are using every trick in their bag. Murders, ambush, propaganda, Buddhists, and school children all are part of their game. They know they’re losing and are going to desperate ends to hang on. We can not give up now.

Incidentally President Diem accepted my recommendation and is moving the Ninth Division to the IV Corps beginning 19th Sept.

Had a long talk with Sec Thuan today. He’s back in business and needed his batteries charged.

Also, through Thuan, sent Diem a letter³ pointing out several “musts” in the conduct of the war and asking him to direct his commanders to assume an all out offensive. Regards.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Lodge. Received at 12:11 p.m. JCS sent it to the White House exclusive for Bundy; to the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman; and to the CIA exclusive for Helms.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., Def 19 US-S VIET)
3. Not found.