Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 19, 1963, noon.

541. CINCPAC/POLAD exclusive for Admiral Felt. Eyes only for the Secretary.

1. Dinner last night with Ambassador and Mrs. Goburdhun (Chairman of the ICC in Vietnam), brother Nhu, Foreign Minister Cuu, my wife, and me.

2. Nhu was extremely talkative. He repeated time and again that it was he who had invented the strategic hamlets, that everyone, including the Americans, had said he couldn’t do it but that he had done it. He reiterated time and again that the Buddhists had been murdered and had not committed suicide.

3. In all this Cuu was a faithful echo. But when Cuu said that the Buddhist corpses had been found with their arms straight instead of folded, Mrs. Goburdhun intervened with some heat and said that this had not been the case.

4. I have all along suspected that Nhu had promoted the dinner so I did not bring anything up, but waited for him. I was not disappointed. After awhile he said he could quite understand how Americans were naturally horrified to think that they were supporting conditions which were so bad that Buddhist priests were killing themselves. And he said he could quite understand why Senator Church had put in his resolution² (copy of which I had already sent to Palace).

5. I said I was glad he understood it, adding that he should realize that in the last few days four more Senators had added their names and that it would not be difficult to get enough signatures to guarantee a majority. This would be a body blow to foreign aid.

6. He then said that President Kennedy was the leader of the Free World and that he must save President Kennedy’s face.

7. I said that I was not worrying about President Kennedy’s face but about our joint ability, Vietnamese and Americans, as partners, to carry out the program and that one of the things which endangered the program was the extremely bad publicity which there had been ever since last May and which had created grave doubts as to whether the program was worthy of support. I said something should be done to show Americans there had been a real improvement and it was for that reason that I had suggested that he go away for awhile at least until December so as to provide an opportunity to get the appropriation bill passed. I said I realized that he and the President, in principle, were in favor of atoning to the Buddhists, but that President Diem had to do something symbolic which would hopefully provide some material for a photograph.

8. Nhu said: I don’t care for myself; I would be glad to do anything. We must do whatever is necessary. But if I go away it will hurt the morale of the Republican Youth which is so essential to victory. But I will be glad to do whatever is necessary. All along he kept stressing the vital importance of the Republican Youth and never once mentioned the Army.

9. As we broke up, I said several times: I hope to hear from you very soon.

10. This meeting certainly gave me the chance to make the point I wanted to make and it was a meeting which, I am sure, he (and not I) had arranged. This made for a tone most favorable to me and put me in a much stronger position than if I had sought an audience.

11. Frankly, I am not impressed by his statement that he is willing to do anything because actually he isn’t.

12. Nhu is always a striking figure. He has a handsome, cruel face and is obviously very intelligent. His talk last night was like a phonograph record and, in spite of his obvious ruthlessness and cruelty, one feels sorry for him. He is wound up as tight as a wire. He appears to be a lost soul, a haunted man who is caught in a vicious circle. The Furies are after him.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S VIET-US. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Received at 5:54 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House at 7:10 a.m.
2. See footnote 3, Document 84.