112. Memorandum for the Record of the Daily White House Staff Meeting1

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.]

Vietnam. Bundy then turned to Vietnam, saying that judging from the reports, it seemed as if things should be quiet there for the next day or so. Forrestal reported that martial law and censorship had been lifted, and that free elections were scheduled. He added that the practical effects of this were not known.

Bundy then commented on how the Halberstam article in the Times yesterday (attached)2 laid out positions of the various agencies. He reminded Forrestal that he (Forrestal) had warned that this was coming, but that everyone realized that there was nothing that could be done. Bundy then asked whether it would be useful to have Krulak come up with an analysis of the errors in the article, particularly those parts dealing with the conduct of the war. Bundy added that the reports on the fighting, e.g., number of incidents and wounded, were about the most useful type of evidence he had seen.

Forrestal tried to discourage Bundy from this, saying that CIA had written a companion piece on the last Krulak analysis3 which challenged the DOD version. Bundy said he must not have seen that and asked Forrestal for particulars. Forrestal began to back down a little bit and it turned out that Bundy had seen the CIA piece, whose main import seemed to be that the war in the Delta was not going as well as the war elsewhere and that there were two different kinds of wars.

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Someone then introduced the Alsop article in today’s Washington Post (attached)4 which evidently says the war is going fairly well.

About this point in the discussion, Cooper of CIA, in an excited outburst, said that there are not two different kinds of wars in Vietnam, but 7 or 8, depending on who does the reporting, to whom he talks, the time of the year he talks, etc. Bundy summed up by saying that Cooper evidently agreed with him that the situation was very difficult to assess.

Toward the end of the discussion, Bundy said that the removal of martial law and censorship will get the government to the gut issue more quickly with far deeper emotion on both sides.

Judging from the discussion I would say Bundy is not committed to any course of action just now. If anything, he seems more sympathetic to the military viewpoint than I thought. Forrestal tried to be non-committal, but his past actions, as well as those at the table today, put him still squarely on the side of getting rid of Diem. The most surprising thing was Cooper’s attitude. To me it indicated more of a split between the CIA and DOD than I, following the evidence at a distance, had been aware of.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Vietnam.]

  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-646-71. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by W.Y. Smith.
  2. Not attached. Reference is to David Halberstam’s article in The New York Times, September 15, entitled, “U.S. Civilian Aides in Vietnam Press for a Decision on Diem.”
  3. The CIA companion piece has not been further identified; the Krulak analysis is a reference to a memorandum by Krulak, August 19, analyzing a news report by David Halberstam in The New York Times of August 15. Forrestal gave the Krulak analysis to the President on August 28; see vol. III, p. 589, footnote 4.
  4. Reference is to Alsop’s “Matter of Fact” column in The Washington Post, September 16. The column was an anecdotal account of a small skirmish in the strategic hamlet of Binh Thanh, near Binh Dai in Kien Hoa Province, which Alsop concluded demonstrated, contrary to popular conception, the Vietnamese masses’ will to resist Communism. It was not attached.