Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

52. Memorandum From the President’s Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles) to the President¹

Washington, March 7, 1963.

Secret.

SUBJECT

• Recommendations for a Fresh Approach to the Vietnam Impasse

I hesitate to play the role of Cassandra again in regard to Vietnam and Southeast Asia. However, I remain deeply concerned about the outlook there, and having talked to Mike Mansfield about his Report and the rather fragile nature of our present position, I feel that I should frankly express my misgivings to you.

I see nothing in the present course of events to dispel my conviction, expressed to you and the Secretary on several occasions, that this situation may ultimately prove to be as troublesome as Cuba in its effects on the Administration’s position at home and abroad.

Although the general outlook here in Washington and in Saigon now seems to be cautiously optimistic, it may be worthwhile to remind ourselves of the confident assumptions of the Eisenhower Administration in a somewhat similar situation during the winter of 1954.

Thus on February 19, 1954, Congressman Walter Judd told the New York Times that Admiral Radford, in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reported “the development by the French and Vietnamese commanders in Indo-China, supported by United States financial and military assistance, of a broad strategic concept which within a very few months should insure a favorable turn in the course of the war …² Communist prospects of achieving any decisive immediate successes are slight while their prospects for ultimate victory are non-existent.”

One month later, on March 22nd, following a White House conference with President Eisenhower, General Ely, and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, Admiral Radford was again reported in the New York Times as saying that he planned to take up with General Ely the question of U.S. participation in training the Vietnamese army.³ “The French are going to win,” the Admiral was quoted as saying. “It is a fight that is going to be finished with our help.”

Six weeks later, on May 8, 1954, came the surrender of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and the collapse of the entire French position in Southeast Asia.

Nine years have passed, and now it is we who appear to be striving, in defiance of powerful indigenous political and military forces, to insure the survival of an unpopular Vietnamese regime with inadequate roots among the people. And now, as in 1954, many able U.S. military authorities are convinced that the situation is moving in our favor and that victory can be foreseen within two to three years.

I wonder if these assurances are not based on a dangerously false premise, i.e., that the Communists will not embarrass us by upping the military ante.

What we are now holding in check is the Communist “Fourth Team,” most of which, as General Harkins pointed out in a recent interview in Saigon, is made up of local forces armed with old weapons. A much more effective Third Team could be produced by introducing a few thousand of General Giap’s well-armed North Vietnamese troops as “volunteers,” either as cadre infiltrators or as organized units. A still more formidable Second Team could emerge through the addition of Chinese “volunteers” with modern equipment. The First Team (an admittedly unlikely entry since it would create an all-out war) would comprise the Chinese and Vietnamese armies themselves.

Is it not a serious mistake for us to assume that the Communists will limit their efforts in South Vietnam to actions that we can conveniently contain through our present “advisory” operations? On the contrary, it seems to me very likely that Communist counter-pressures will grow in direct proportion to the effectiveness of our own efforts.

If this assumption is borne out by events, it is more than possible that we may soon be faced with increasing Communist opposition, growing U.S. casualties, and rising public resentment here in the United States, followed, as in the days of Korea, by politically inspired demands that we either “admit our error” and withdraw, or go after “the real enemy, which is China.”

I am not unaware of the enormous amount of time, energy and dedication that our people in Washington and Saigon are giving to the problems we face in Vietnam. Nor do I profess to have a handy formula that will enable us quickly to move to firmer ground in our Vietnam operations. I am nonetheless convinced that the ground on which we now stand is likely to become steadily more treacherous unless we attempt a new approach to these problems.

Recommendations:

In the light of this situation, I believe that some basic changes in the policy and personnel aspects of our South Vietnam operations are required as quickly as may be feasible.

These changes should be designed (1) to strengthen our political and military position in Vietnam vis-a-vis the Viet Cong; (2) to lay the groundwork for an acceptable negotiated political settlement in Southeast Asia as a whole at a time when we still retain some strong cards; and (3) to head off serious political pressures here at home well in advance of the 1964 open political season.

Specifically, I suggest action along the following lines:

1. A directive by you, requesting an immediate review in depth of our present Vietnam position within the framework of Southeast Asia as a whole. Such a request might pose the following questions:

(a) What are our basic long-range interests in Southeast Asia and, specifically, in South Vietnam?

(b) What kind of South Vietnam will best serve to secure these interests and to assure the continued existence of a viable state free of Communist control: a U.S. military bastion (like Taiwan or South Korea), or a buffer-state area that can be reasonably neutralized (like Malaya or even Burma)?

(c) What sort of military operations are best designed to achieve our minimum political objectives in Vietnam? Our maximum objectives?

(d) What are the political tactics, vis-a-vis the Diem Government and the South Vietnamese people, best calculated to put us in an effective negotiating position?

What we need is not merely a policy to “win the war,” but a definition of what constitutes “winning the war,” and how our military operations relate to realistic political objectives.

I suggest that with all the information now at hand such a policy review could be completed within thirty days.

2. A directive by you to AID and Defense to commence at once a Long-range Assistance Strategy (LAS) study of Vietnam to be used as a contribution to this basic policy review of our interests in Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole.

3. On the basis of this overall review, I suggest that the draft speech on U.S. interests and policy in Southeast Asia which I prepared for you last June⁴ be updated for early delivery on TV or elsewhere by you, the Secretary, Averell Harriman, or some major Administration spokesman.

By laying down a clear and realistic set of objectives now, we could begin to neutralize present and potential domestic critics of our position, bring pressures on the Diem Government, and strengthen our influence among the people of Southeast Asia.

4. Simultaneously, a series of moves should be prepared to narrow the gaps between Diem and the anti-Communist-left and between Saigon and the villager.

Such measures should include: increased pressure on Diem for the broadening of the government’s urban political base and for the wider delegation of political and military authority; new proposals for increased peasant welfare (perhaps along the lines of the Taiwan JCRR); and plans for a gradual lessening of conspicuous one-family rule.

5. At the earliest appropriate moment, a responsible representative (Averell Harriman would appear to be best fitted for the assignment) should be sent to Saigon to make clear to Diem that our continued assistance to his regime is dependent on his acceptance of the fresh political, economic and military approach that these moves embody.

Should Diem refuse to accede to this request, we should be prepared to convey our disapproval of his actions and our openness to alternative leadership through increased Embassy cultivation of Diem’s chief political and military critics.

I do not underestimate the risks of such a course; I simply suggest that they are far less than those we now run, tied as we appear to be to Diem’s coattails.

6. In order to symbolize our shift in policy (and not in any sense to impugn his efforts), I recommend that we recall Ambassador Nolting. Ambassador Edmund Gullion, who knows the area intimately and whose courage, persuasiveness and toughness have been thoroughly tested, would be my first choice as Nolting’s successor.

Gullion’s appointment would indicate to everyone concerned a new U.S. resolve to achieve a more favorable balance among military, political and economic factors in Vietnam.

Although this is admittedly an inopportune time to transfer Gullion from the Congo, he is so ideally qualified for the difficult task in Saigon that I believe the sacrifice to be justifiable.

7. Through personnel changes or otherwise, we should see that the Administration’s new approach is clearly understood and fully supported by U.S. military officers at the highest level in the Pacific Command.

8. Simultaneously, we should seek ways to widen our present set of political choices in dealing with the area as a whole and with Vietnam in particular.

I believe that the time may be ripe, for instance, for a discreet, noncommittal, and confidential approach to the USSR in which the potential dangers to both Moscow and Washington that the Vietnam impasse contains may be underscored.

Indeed, there is already some evidence of an increasing concern about the two Vietnams on the part of the USSR, a concern that we might profitably explore.

Against the background of my previous talks on Cuba and Communist China with Ambassador Dobrynin, there may be something to gain—and certainly nothing to lose—in my quietly raising the Vietnam dilemma with him in an informal way.

The eight-point program which I have proposed is admittedly strong medicine. But, in my opinion, our present course of action within a rigid political and military framework dominated by Diem is very likely to fail, and for this failure we may eventually be called upon to pay a heavy price, both in Asia and here at home.

Again forgive me the Cassandra role, but I am deeply alarmed about the present situation, and I feel that more promising policy choices are available to us.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda-C. Bowles.
2. Ellipsis in the source text.
3. For documentation on discussions concerning Vietnam with General Paul Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, in Washington in March 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 1133-1173.
4. A copy of this speech is attached to a June 13, 1962, memorandum from Bowles to Kennedy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memos, Staff Memos, Chester Bowles) For the text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. II, Document 214.