Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

JCSM-180-63

Washington, March 7, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Comprehensive Plan, South Vietnam

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the attached Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN), submitted 25 January 1963 by CINCPAC² for approval in response to your directive set forth during the 23 July 1962 Honolulu Conference.

2. This comprehensive plan provides the special military assistance and equipment the Government of Vietnam will require to carry on an adequate and effective counterinsurgency program with essentially no help from US personnel after Calendar Year 1965.

3. To attain its objectives, the CPSVN is dependent upon the success of the parallel development of many mutually supporting national plans and programs such as the National Campaign Plan, the Strategic Hamlet Program, and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program. For example, the Strategic Hamlet Program, which normally is conducted in areas controlled by the Government, is perhaps the greatest single factor in the all-important effort of the Government to reach the people. In close support is the CIDG program which will provide security initially in those areas where the inhabitants do not identify themselves with the Government. It is intended that the successful prosecution of these two mutually supporting national programs will result in 90 per cent of the population pledging allegiance to the Government of Vietnam. The attainment of such a goal is inseparable from the success of the CPSVN.

4. The CPSVN plans a peak armed strength of 575,000 in FY 64-65. This total includes a CIDG with a strength of 116,000 [less than 1 1ine not declassified]which will be phased out as the Government approaches its goal of control of 90 per cent of the population. In this connection, the plan considers the 18 months between FY 64 and end CY 65 as the maximum effort “phase down” period for the CIDG, during which time the strength of these forces is to be reduced from a ceiling of 116,000 to a theoretical zero. The plan also provides a balanced residual national military strength approximating 368,000. Maintenance of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces at the levels proposed in the CPSVN, while providing an essential part of the desired military balance within Southeast Asia, will result in an economic imbalance in South Vietnam. Continued US assistance will be required to maintain these forces. This assistance must be subject to continued assessment to reflect requirements resulting from situation changes both in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. By separate action the Joint Chiefs of Staff are establishing procedures for semi-annual formal review of the over-all situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). In this review the size of the proposed residual force will be considered to insure that it is planned to be maintained at a level consistent with the degree of control of the insurgency attained. Conceivably, should the insurgency be reduced to a state of subversion as currently exists in Thailand, some reduction in residual forces could be attained provided the United States guarantees protection against external aggression and renewed insurgency. Long-range AID programs are expected to provide for assumption of internal security responsibilities by a national police force permitting a planned reduction in Government of Vietnam forces.

5. The CPSVN cannot be considered apart from military assistance planning, and to be in consonance, the period of the CPSVN has been extended through FY 69. Based upon current in-country experience factors, a comparison of the estimated costs of the CPSVN with the new dollar guidelines³ indicates an over-all requirement in military assistance planning for an additional $66 million, exclusive of the CIDG program. The preponderance of this additional requirement will be needed in FY 64 when the major portion of the costs of increased training programs, new equipment, and construction occur.

6. Because the greatest increase occurs in FY 64 military assistance planning, an early decision on the CPSVN is required.

7. Related political, economic, and sociological problems, which are under the purview of US Government agencies other than the Armed Services, and which are capable of influencing the success of the CPSVN, will have to be resolved separately. Not the least of these problems is consideration of the effects of the CPSVN on the outflow of gold, the ability of the RVN to undertake additional deficit spending, and the impact of planned residual force structures on the RVN economy. Others include the development by the Country Team of a national police plan for the eventual return to a situation of law and order under normal police controls, and the probable requirements thereafter for continuing US assistance. In addition, the communications-electronics portions of the plan, as it relates to utilization of the tropospheric scatter systems, poses the problem of the replacement of the US military system by the proposed AID microwave system manned by Vietnamese. The problem is presently being reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with the impact that redistribution of PACOM communication resources would have on current contingency plans for Southeast Asia. US personnel and materiel will have to be further augmented in view of the increased force levels, compression of training, and accelerated introduction of equipment, for RVN forces, called for in the CPSVN. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, has been requested to furnish an estimate of the peak US military personnel required.⁴ With regard to materiel, some other transport aircraft, such as C-47 or C-119 aircraft, will have to be substituted for the RVN C-123 aircraft requirement in the plan, since no C-123 aircraft will be available for MAP in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the CPSVN provides an adequate basis for defining the five-year MAP and a realistic framework for integrating the efforts already being expended in related and mutually supporting nation-wide programs and plans such as the National Campaign, the Strategic Hamlet, and the CIDG programs.

8. The CPSVN has been coordinated with the RVN Country Team and concurred in by the Ambassador for MAP planning purposes. It now requires careful coordination and integration of effort by all involved governmental agencies at the Washington level. CINCPAC and Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, have recommended that the CIDG program (Switchback) be funded from outside of PACOMMAP. Funding of Switchback for the period FY 64-66 has not been resolved and requires early action to insure a capability for supporting CPSVN as well as other programs covered by NSAM 57.⁵

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the CPSVN submitted by CINCPAC be approved as the basis for the refinement of the FY 64 MAP and development of the FY 65-69 Military Assistance Plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Vietnam 380 thru 381 1963. Secret.
2. Printed as Document 18.
3. Defense Message DEF 923923, DTG 222243Z Jan 63. [Footnote in the source text. For a summary of this message, see footnote 4, Document 18.]
4. In a March 26 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that Admiral Felt had estimated that peak U.S. military strength in Vietnam should not exceed 15,640 personnel. (Washington National Records Center RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Vietnam 380 thru 381 1963)
5. Not printed.