305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, August
27, 1963, 8:11 p.m.
256. Eyes only—Ambassador Lodge. Examination of reports to date gives considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions regarding:
- a.
- present balance of forces between coup and counter-coup elements
- b.
- personal force of character of coupe participants, and
- c.
- security of the operation.
Proceeding from the concept outlined in Deptel 2432 as modified, now desire your prompt interim appraisal of present prospects include specifically:
- 1.
- Are Generals now committed to coup plan [document number not declassified]3 sufficiently strong and sufficiently united to give high prospect of success in immediate future?
- 2.
- Would their chances be improved or lessened by delay, with
respect to such factors as:
- a.
- additional local military and political support at critical moment?
- b.
- Security, including hazard to coup participants and compromise of U.S. role?
- c.
- Public attitudes?
- d.
- Nhu’s own capability for counter-coup or further action of his own?
- 3.
- In particular, what is your best estimate or orientation and comparative strength of forces in Saigon area?
- 4.
- If operation is initially indecisive how is balance likely to tip as other forces become involved?
- 5.
- More generally, highest authority asks whether you and Harkins, in light of developing situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by Generals.
We wish to give you all possible support in best available course but not to insist on any decision that developing evidence makes it wise to modify.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET Top Secret; Emergency. Drafted by Hilsman and cleared in draft with McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, and Taylor and in substance with Rusk. Repeated to CINCPACPOLAD exclusive for Felt.↩
- Document 281.↩
- Document 299.↩