296. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President1
VIETNAM
Lodge-Diem Conversation
Ambassador Lodge met with President Diem from 5 to 7 p.m. (Saigon time) today.2 Lodge described the dangers to U.S. assistance to South Vietnam which would be incurred if U.S. public opinion turned against the GVN as a result of the Buddhist crisis. Diem replied by minimizing the importance of the organized Buddhists and the difficulties he had in running a country which had such a dearth of educated people.
General Khanh’s Reaction
General Khanh is not ready to move immediately. CAS reports that he is looking for a pretext on which to hang action, such as an attempt by Nhu to negotiate with the North Vietnamese. CAS comments that Khanh was caught off base by the swiftness of our response and needs time to organize himself.3
Voice of America Goof
VOA goofed badly in failing to follow instructions given them last night by State. In their Vietnamese broadcast they said that U.S. officials were considering cutting off aid to Vietnam. They added, as they had been instructed, that it appeared to us that the Vietnamese Army was not involved in police action against the pagodas.
Lodge wired back an angry telegram4 pointing out that this announcement could conceivably trigger a violent reaction by Nhu. State has told him of the mistake5 and this morning briefed the U.S. press to the effect that we were not considering cutting off aid to Vietnam. As might be expected, this attempt to correct the Voice of America broadcast itself is producing bad speculation in the wire services. Hilsman is taking steps to get control of all U.S. government output.
[Page 650]Vietnamese Public Opinion of the United States
The attached cable (Saigon [document number not declassified])6 gives in a fair summary the answer to the question you raised this morning on what the Vietnamese think.
Comment: The problem in Vietnam is rapidly becoming an operational one, and it is of the utmost importance that the execution of your decisions be lodged in one person, in one office. Mac agrees that Roger Hilsman is the logical person and office for this, for the time being. It would be helpful if you mentioned that at your meeting tomorrow at 4 o’clock.
If you need more information, I shall be near the telephone and available throughout the night.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Vietnam Security, 1963. Top Secret.↩
- See Document 292.↩
- See Document 294.↩
- Document 233.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 283no such footnote, errata? TODO.↩
- This telegram,
August 26, which was not attached, reads:
“Past few days we have been hearing increasing comments from Vietnamese from many walks of life criticizing US to effect that events of past few days would not have been possible without US equipment (not a little of which has familiar handclasp emblem), asking why US refrains from stopping [garble] and observing that only US can solve present difficulties. Strong implication in these comments (and frequently overtly stated) is that Diem government and family must go. Here again, those who openly state Diem and family must go invariably add that Vietnamese people powerless to change government and only US can bring about change. Significant that such comment now coming from Vietnamese who normally quite careful about discussing political topics.
“Wish emphasize Vietnamese attitudes have not reached point of hostility toward Americans but if current situation persists likely that criticism will increasingly be tinged with hostility. Some Vietnamese tending to equate use US equipment and US ‘hands-off’ stance as acquiescence in GVN suppression of populace, which is only one step removed from placing share of blame on US shoulders.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 25 S VIET)
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