Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

246. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 6, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Buddhist Problem in Viet-Nam

The following is a status report on the Buddhist situation in South Viet-Nam.

1. Situation Summary

Certain events in the last two weeks have pointed to an amelioration of the situation:

a. Diem’s radio broadcast of July 18² expressing the Government’s “utmost spirit of conciliation;”

b. Removal of the barricades around the pagodas in Saigon

c. Release by the Government of most, if not all, those arrested in the Buddhist demonstrations;

d. The July 30 Buddhist manifestations were orderly and peaceful and the Government police were at pains to avoid incidents.

On the other hand, the following events of the last two weeks point to continued trouble and unrest:

a. The Buddhists continue to refuse to meet with Vice President Tho’s committee to investigate complaints.

b. The Government continues to refuse to identify and punish the officials responsible for the May 8 deaths, which it considers an impossible Buddhist demand.

c. Ngo Dinh Nhu, in an August 3 interview,³ virtually threatened to crush the Buddhist headquarters at Xa Loi Pagoda. On the same day, Madame Nhu made a speech violently attacking the Buddhist leadership.⁴

2. Analysis

We conclude that the situation remains tense, volatile and potentially explosive. We anticipate further Buddhist demonstrations quite possibly resulting in violence and additional incidents.

a. There are increasing signs that the Buddhist leadership will attempt to prolong the dispute until the Government is overthrown.

b. It is increasingly likely that the Buddhist leaders now feel that they have gone too far to stop and revert to patience and conciliation. They may well fear later retaliation by Ngo Dinh Nhu if the dispute is resolved and Diem remains in power.

Continued unrest will, of course, play into the hands of the various coup groups which we know to be plotting Diem’s overthrow.

a. We estimate the chances of an attempted coup in the next few months at 50-50.

b. The odds of success of a coup are much more difficult to estimate but may also be about 50-50.

If Diem is overthrown, the risks of the interregnum period are great but they are probably less great than they were a year ago.

a. The insurgency situation is under considerably better control.

b. There still has not emerged a clear alternative leadership to Diem, but a military junta—with or without Tho as figurehead—is the most likely. Yet, neither the rise of Ngo Dinh Nhu to power, at least for a period, nor civil war between several non-Communist factions can be ruled out of the equation.

c. We have an approved contingency plan,⁵ which [we?] are continuously reviewing and attempting to perfect, to throw all our influence behind Tho and the military if a serious, and likely successful, attempt were made against Diem.

d. In addition, we are urgently seeking further but discreet contact with oppositionist elements, military and civilian, in order to give us a better chance to manipulate the outcome of a coup attempt.

If Diem is not overthrown, it is becoming increasingly likely that he will ultimately try to resolve the Buddhist problem by means of repression.

If so, it is quite possible that his popular support will be so reduced that he could no longer hope to defeat the Viet Cong.

3. Policy Guidelines

On the Buddhist issue, we should continue privately to press Diem and the GVN to take all measures required to conciliate the dispute. Our public praise of the GVN should continue to be reserved for specific acts, and we should avoid praise of the regime in general.

On the more general question of Diem and his regime, our policy should continue to be neither to encourage nor to discourage coup attempts. We do not know whether or not Diem can survive. With all that is at stake in Viet-Nam, we obviously cannot afford to back a loser but we are not yet in a position to pick a winner with any confidence.

This should remain our posture until the trend of events has further crystallized and Ambassador Lodge has had a chance to establish himself.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries, Vietnam. Secret. Drafted by Kattenburg.
2. See Document 228.
3. Nhu also warned that if the Buddhist crisis was not resolved, it would lead to an anti-American and anti-Buddhist coup. See footnote 3, Document 245.
4. See footnote 2, Document 245.
5. Enclosure to Document 133.