Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 7, 1963, 9 p.m.

189. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 160.² I have received today categoric assurances from Ngo Dinh Nhu that he is supporting fully and with both hands Diem’s announced policy of conciliation vis-a-vis the Buddhists. In answer to direct question of whether he favors “crushing” Xa Loi Pagoda or its inmates through any means (i.e. directly, or by means of a coup d’etat or by a false coup d’etat), he said that he did not favor any such move. On contrary, he is convinced, he said, that government must continue to try to conciliate Buddhists, to make further concessions, and to demonstrate to Vietnamese people and to world absolute sincerity of President Diem’s July 18 declaration.³ He claimed that he had been urging this course upon the Tho commission as well as upon Diem, specifically that Tho commission should commence investigations of all complaints immediately, unilaterally if necessary, keeping door always open for Buddhist participation. (I understand from other sources that this is going to be done next week.) Nhu stated that any other interpretation of Reuters dispatch was erroneous. I summarized long discussion this point in approximately above language and told him I was going to so report to my government. He said that this would be an accurate report and a truthful statement of his position. He added that this position represented a politically risky course in Viet-Nam, since many people, including large segment of the Army, felt that it represented weakness on the part of the government towards a movement which was standing in the way of, if not actually subverting, the war effort and victory over the Viet Cong. He nevertheless reiterated that he would stand behind this policy, since he was convinced it offers the best way out. I told him, as I have once before, that if he was telling me the truth, he is a most misunderstood man. He replied that he knew he was misunderstood, but I could rely on his word. The conversation was direct but friendly.

Regarding Madame Nhu’s speech to the Women’s Solidarity Movement, I told him that it was considered by my government and myself, as well as by a number of Vietnamese with whom I had spoken, as inflammatory and directly contrary to the President’s policy of conciliation. I said that our own governmental, Congressional and public opinion could not understand or accept the contradictions between the government policy and her speech. I was sorry to say this but it was necessary if we were to retain our present relationships. Nhu did not defend the content of his wife’s speech, but defended at great length her right to make it as a private citizen who “does not speak for the government”. I told him in all frankness that he and the President could not expect this explanation to be accepted in my country, and I thought not in Viet-Nam. He said nobody realized, for example, that Madame Nhu had not seen President Diem for two months, that he and his family do not have meals with the President except on special occasions (under a mutually satisfactory arrangement), that she is in fact a private citizen who, he insisted, has the right to express her own views.

I am seeing President Diem on this matter and on others early tomorrow morning.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Document 245.
3. See Document 228.