Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 6, 1963, 5 p.m.

39. Dept pass DOD, MilRep to President,JCS/ISA, ACSI, CNO, CIA, HQUSAF (AFCIN & AFCIN-EI-A) AID, OIA, and USIA. CINCPAC also pass CINCPAC PO LAD, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINPACAF,DOD/PRO. Bangkok also pass JUSMAAG and JUSMAAG, Deputy Chief. Phnom Penh also pass MAAG. Taipei also for Taiwan Defense Command. Ref: Embtel 1257.² General Harkins has requested that following amplification of section B (1) of TF Saigon monthly report of June 29 be circulated to all addressees:

At repeated urging of General Harkins to President Diem, Secretary Thuan and General Ty, JGS, RVNAF, issued instructions to corps commanders as noted in monthly report of June 29. Principal political criterion for successful conclusion of Phase I of National Campaign Plan (NCP) was completion of 2/3 of Strategic Hamlet Program. This criterion had been met nationwide, except for Delta in IV Corps tactical zone, well before target completion date of 1 July 1963. It could have been serious set-back had RVNAF taken this opportunity to rest on their oars throughout rest of country while IV Corps, which has by far most difficult task politically and militarily, caught up. To lose or level out momentum built up by RVNAF at this stage would be unthinkable in terms of achieving quickest practicable victory over insurgency.

June 29th wrap-up report treatment is technically correct in terms of original NCP. JGS instructions of June 18 adjusts military tasks and concepts in manner acceptable to US. It accommodates situation and capabilities of both GVN and VC after four months of concerted and aggressive action in all arenas and with all instruments of conflict. Terms Phase I, II and III used in NCP have now lost all real validity in context evaluating over-all national progress. Tasks and objectives outlined in three nominal phases, however, remain essentially valid and provide solid guidelines for control, direction and evaluation of counter-insurgency military effort by GVN authorities and their US advisors. Depending on local RVN conditions, personalities and capabilities and VC counterparts which face them, there is every reason believe that, in many military and political subdivisions of country, pacification will shortly be so far along, if current rates are maintained, that major elements of regular RVNAF forces can be redeployed to more active areas where progress is not as fast and VC problem is tougher.

General Ty’s order might be narrowly construed as limited to psychological impact on recipients in some areas of RVN, principally in Delta. Even here, however, instructions clarify and re-emphasize uncompleted tasks and objectives of so-called Phase I of NCP. As a practical matter, NCP objectives of establishing GVN infrastructure of a broad population and land area base while destroying VC popular base, and destruction of main force VC installations and forces, are mutually supporting, though to different degrees in different areas of RVN. Current and continuing problem facing US military advisors in their military planning role is to determine logical balance of effort in each of several areas of RVN while local balances of VC versus GVN strength vary substantially. Persuading GVN and RVNAF authorities to accept these solutions or to devise and implement equally effective solutions of their own as aggressively and professionally as they possibly can, will determine rate of success in counter-insurgency. Progress here is afoot. There remains no doubts that military defeat of VC is attainable, barring catastrophic political or social development in RVN.

In summary, MACV notes that as of 1 July, over 2/3 of strategic hamlets planned have been completed, nationwide. Over eight million people are now living in these hamlets, who together with those living in secure metropolitan areas, comprise well over 2/a of population. RVNAF forces overall have attained required posture vis-à-vis VC forces to launch accelerated operations to destroy them. Conditions for launching Phase II as defined in original NCP have been met. Phase II has in fact been launched, while some tasks originally described for Phase I are being cleaned up concurrently.

It is requested that all holders of 29 June monthly report apply these contents to report and annotate section B, 1, of report to refer to them.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-S VIET. Secret; Limit Distribution; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Taipei, Singapore, Hong Kong, Hue, Kuala Lumpur, Rangoon, Vientiane, Manila, Paris, London, New Delhi, and Djakarta.
2. Telegram 1257 from Saigon, June 29, was the monthly report by the Saigon Task Force, containing an overall assessment of the success of the initial phase of the South Vietnamese Government’s National Campaign, which reads as follows:

   “Although directive states that Phase II of National Campaign Plan to be initiated on 1 July, specific tasks outlined are more in consonance with those prescribed for Phase I of Plan. Ngo Dinh Nhu had established 30 June as date Phase I of Plan would be completed. This based on projected completion of two-thirds of strategic hamlets then planned. This target has not been reached, and indications are that 31 December 1963 is more realistic target date for most provinces. Current analyses by MACV indicate that populace and land area base required to provide posture necessary for sustained operations against VC main forces has not, as yet, been obtained.

   “It is apparent that reason for directing implementation of Phase II of National Campaign Plan is psychological and it cannot, in fact, be implemented at this time. Specific actions prescribed suggest that this is realized at least by military.” (Ibid.)