Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

207. Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak)¹

Washington, undated.

VISIT TO VIETNAM

This reports on a visit to Vietnam, made during the period 25 June to 1 July 1963, to review progress in the counterinsurgency campaign.

Time was spent mainly in the provinces, where affairs, within their purview, were discussed with United States and Vietnamese military and civilian personnel, at the various levels of authority. Places visited are portrayed on the facing page.²

As a supplement to the practical part of the visit, a series of specific questions were presented to the Military Assistance Command. The responses to those questions are appended.³ They, coupled with the field visits and personal conversations, and reflected against the backdrop of two previous visits at five month intervals, formed the basis for these conclusions:

The counterinsurgency campaign is moving forward on the military and economic fronts. There is reason for optimism in both of these areas.

The strategic hamlet program, correctly characterized as the heart of the campaign, has acquired both momentum and balance. Its impact is most favorable.

Offensive operations against the Viet Cong are widespread and varied, and are growing steadily in intensity. While not always of high quality, their general effect has been to place the Viet Cong on the defensive.

The Buddhist issue is alive, serious and enmeshed with politics. It has not as yet affected adversely the essential operational programs.

The “Open Arms” amnesty program is effective, both as an index to progress achieved and as a weapon against the Viet Cong.

The operating relationship between US advisors and their counterparts is efficient and mutually respectful. It continues to be an essential to successful prosecution of the war.

Events in Laos are a source of growing concern to those charged directly with the conduct of the war in South Vietnam.

Field Visits

Field visits were conducted to: (a) Observe the evolution of the province rehabilitation program; (b) Note changes in the professional quality of the Vietnamese military, by observing units in actual operations; (c) Appraise the advisor/advisee relationship in action; and (d) Obtain low level views as to the progress of the war. The itinerary followed during the visit responded to these purposes.

The Province Rehabilitation Program

The constantly repeated assertion, heard over the past year and a half, that the strategic hamlet is the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy, is acquiring growing validation. Binh Duong Province-one in which province rehabilitation has lagged because of much hard core Viet Cong activity was first selected for a physical inspection. This is the province in which President Diem, against the counsel of others, launched the Sunrise strategic hamlet operation in 1962, at a time when the bulk of the population in the area was under Viet Cong control.

When the Secretary of Defense visited the Sunrise project in May of 1962, and despite the Vietnamese effort to conceal the fact, it was plainly far from a success. The only strategic hamlet in the province, its organization did not really extend far beyond a system of strong physical defenses. The inhabitants were there under duress. Combat capable men were conspicuous by their absence.

Fourteen months have seen a great change. There are now 92 strategic hamlets completed in the province, out of a programmed total of 302. Many have been carved out of areas wholly dominated by the Viet Cong for ten years or more. These, moreover, are now more than barbed wire enclosures into which women, children and aged men have been herded against their will, as was the case in Sunrise. The people have come willingly—in some cases having actually sent deputations to request the development of a hamlet. Economic and political developments have moved ahead in train with the defensive preparations. Two new hamlets visited—Bung Dia and Cau Dinh—had programs underway for pig raising, seed and fertilizer distribution, fruit tree planting, well digging and education. The people, unprepared for the visit, seemed enthusiastic. The hamlet chiefs had both been elected by the villagers. Neither had ever held any office before; both had just completed a province-run course in hamlet administration. These hamlets were impressive in every sense.

In Quang Ngai Province, also visited because of its long history of heavy Viet Cong infestation, progress was equally impressive. A year ago the province had no strategic hamlets deserving of the name. Today there are 273 completed and 125 more under construction, out of a total program of 419. Over two thirds of the people in the province are in hamlets, and the entire program is scheduled for completion by the end of this year. Here, as in Binh Duong Province, the people and the land have had to be wrested from the Viet Cong. The hamlet of Vinh Tuy, one of those visited in this province, rests on ground which only fell to Vietnamese forces after three attacks, in February of this year. It is still pretty crude, but the people in it, who were actually under Viet Cong control six months ago, seemed cheerful and busy. Most important, there was a reasonable percentage of young men of military age in evidence.

For contrast, a visit was also paid to Ninh Thuan Province, one of the two in which the strategic hamlet program is already fully completed. Here, 127 hamlets are in being, housing 97% of the people of the province. The hamlets differ greatly in quality and in physical character, being designed to suit the peculiarities of the varied population—which includes Vietnamese, Cham tribesmen and Montagnards. In several respects, however, they are similar. The all reflect a unified effort at training and equipping a hamlet militia contingent. They all are active in the radio warning system; and they all exhibit progress in the US/Vietnamese economic assistance program.

In fact, this province finds its problems now largely shifted from military matters to economic development. The area is tranquil-will probably soon be declared officially “white”. There are no regular military forces remaining in the province and the peoples’ concerns have now turned from the Viet Cong to an ambitious irrigation program and the development of rural power. The province, hopefully, is a foretaste of the future.

Throughout the visit to the central and northern parts of the country progress was noted in bringing together the US military and economic assistance programs. Every major military briefing attended in these regions included a presentation by a civilian member of the US Overseas Mission, and every discussion on strategic hamlets dwelt upon the indissoluble nature of our military/economic programs. This coordinated approach may have been in effect 15 months ago. If so, it was not nearly so obvious as today.

In the Delta, this degree of coordinated progress apparently has not yet been achieved. In Vinh Long Province, although the hamlet program is well along (206 out of 247) our economic participation is less in evidence. This may derive from the fact that there is not so much poverty in the Delta, or because the premium on security is still much greater than on economic improvement.

Military Operations

The Operational Phase of the National Campaign, directed to begin on 1 July, was actually in progress before that date. Over 1,000 assorted offensive operations are now conducted per month, over twice the level of a year ago. Not all are effectively executed, nor are all successful. In sum, however, they are putting great pressure on the Viet Cong, causing him casualties, degrading his resources and keeping him on the defensive.

In the forthcoming phase of the National Campaign, it is prescribed that every tactical unit-Regular, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps—shall be offensively engaged in the field for twenty days per month. While somewhat unrealistic, the directive still promises even further intensification of operations and even greater stress on the Viet Cong.

Tactical operations of varying sizes were visited in the field. They varied in quality, from extremely impressive to just fair.

1. The 25th Division, in Quang Ngai has been in existence for exactly one year. During that period it has succeeded in driving the Viet Cong from the coastal plain into the mountains of the Annamite Chain, where they are now largely on the defensive. At the time of this visit all three regiments of the division were in the field, and some 50 small ambush type patrols were in progress. This effort has made the Viet Cong’s food problem a grave one, has rendered the kidnapping of conscripts most difficult, is the cause of continued defections, and diminishes the enemy’s capacity for coordinated offensive operations.

The division commander has the taste of blood and is convinced that he can destroy the Viet Cong forces in his province—or drive them elsewhere—by the end of the year.

2. The 23d Division, in Khanh Hoa Province is engaged in a similar campaign. At the time it was visited the division had two battalions, broken down into their small component units, patrolling in the mountainous area in the western part of the province. They had been continuously at this task for the preceding 26 days, concentrating on harrying the Viet Cong, making him move and destroying his resources. It is a well conceived and fruitfully executed effort. In the 26 day period they had seized sizeable grain stocks (120 tons), destroyed crops, bivouac areas and crude weapons shops. They had freed 293 persons from Viet Cong control-people who have hitherto been terrorized into tilling the Viet Cong fields and bearing their loads.

In all of this, only 26 Viet Cong had so far been killed and six captured, which seems somewhat disappointing until it is recalled that the total number of Viet Cong involved is probably small, and the task of bringing them to bay in the mountains very difficult. More important, by far, is that patrol and attack efforts of this type deprive the Viet Cong of his initiative. So long as he is on the defensive, it is plain that he cannot attack anyone.

3. A similar conclusion was reached concerning an operation in the Delta, where elements of five battalions combed an area where about 200 Viet Cong were supposed to be bivouacked. Some 60 were killed, and the disruption created by the operation certainly diminished greatly the capability of those who escaped to do anything offensive for some time to come.

4. A patrol type operation by an M-113 detachment into hard core Viet Cong territory adjacent to Zone D was a disappointment. By moving into the Viet Cong enclave, the unit struck a raw nerve. It was taking casualties from both mines and snipers, yet little was being done to develop the situation aggressively. At three o’clock on a bright afternoon the troops were already beginning to settle down for the evening, with the soldiers keeping very near to their vehicles-which they clearly regarded more as mobile redoubts than offensive conveyances Despite the demonstrated proximity of the enemy, there were no patrols; no aggressive activity. It will be remarkable if much comes of the operation, other than casualties. The unit commander (a captain) and his US advisor (a captain) had little to say, when questioned, beyond frustrated observations on the elusiveness of the Viet Cong.

The Buddhist Problem

The Buddhist matter seems to break cleanly into two separate problems—the question of the metropolitan political maneuverings in Saigon, Hue, etc. and the influence of the Buddhist issue on the actual counterinsurgency campaign.

This being essentially a military report, it will be pertinent, in connection with the first element, to state only that the issue is serving as nourishment for all varieties of dissidents, malcontents, king makers and coup plotters, and that some of the most articulate Buddhist Bonzes are probably motivated more by politics than by religious conviction. On this basis it is not likely that the problem will be allowed to reach an early or an agreeable end. The anti-Diemists will not relinquish lightly this Buddha-sent opportunity to attack Diem’s position.

As to whether the affair has affected the war itself, Americans and Vietnamese of all stations were queried, and the nearer to the battle, the less gravely the problem was regarded. There appeared no evidence that the front line counterinsurgency effort has yet been impeded or decelerated at all by the crisis.

In Quang Ngai, for instance, the Province Chief-himself a Catholic-handled a group of demonstrators in the capital by inviting them to a free meal. The demonstration collapsed. In Binh Dinh, the commander of the 9th Division (a Buddhist) characterized the problem as regrettable, but one which time would solve.

At the same time, several Americans stated that this attitude of detachment in the field could not persist indefinitely; that sooner or later, if the matter is not resolved, the mid-rank military of Buddhist persuasion will begin to worry as to just what they would do if their unit were told to take military action against Buddhist demonstrators.

A significant point in this unfortunate matter is that the religious aspect of the issue has a narrower base than public reports might suggest, since the true percentage of practicing Buddhists is smaller than generally represented. These is a tendency to classify all non-Christians as Buddhists. IN fact, many are simple ancestor worshippers in the Chinese tradition, while other major religions are also represented in the country—including Confucianists, Taoists and Moslems. Finally, there 7,000,000 Montagnards, of whom many are animists.

“Open Arms”—The Amnesty Program⁴

First thoughts on the amnesty program are usually, “Can the Vietnamese really distinguish between simple refugees and genuine returning Viet Cong Sympathizers?” and “What assurance is there that the returnees will not re-defect to the Communists?”

A hint of an answer was found at the Chieu Hoi reindoctrination camp at Than Xa, Quang Ngai Province, where 115 returnees were observed undergoing reindoctrination.

The group was mostly men. They had come in voluntarily; some bringing weapons; all bringing intelligence which ultimately they transmitted to our side.

About a quarter were hard core Viet Cong. Another quarter were political cadre. The remainder were people who willingly followed the Viet Cong when the hamlet program and widespread military attacks caused the Viet Cong to retire westward from the plains to the mountains.

Most of this group were described by the US Sector Advisor as politically astute. They show evidence of having had careful Communist indoctrination. Some are sufficiently articulate to confirm that they were political instructors themselves. There seemed little reason to doubt the word of the Province Chief when he said that these were truly Viet Cong sympathizers and not refugees.

There are many reasons given for accepting the amnesty offer (usually received through leaflets), but they are generally polarized around one abstract attitude—disillusionment, and one concrete reality—hunger. In the north, hunger probably leads all the rest, although this is not true in the more fruitful south. Every one of the returnees queried during the visit to the Quang Ngai center got around to talking about food very quickly. They looked hungry, and are in poor physical shape.

It is too early to address the second question—whether the returnees will redefect. When asked this question, the tactical zone commander responded in this fashion. The program in Quang Ngai was begun on 17 December 1962. Since that time 823 people have passed through the rehabilitation center and thence returned to their own villages. A check is kept on all of them; none have yet gone back to the Communists.

The total number of “Open Arms” returnees—country wide, stands at 11,700. While more surrendered in June than in the preceding two months put together, it is not likely that there will be any vast domino effect. The base is too small. Over 60% of the population are already in strategic hamlets. In a few months the figure will be much higher. So there will actually not be a very great number of people available for the amnesty program to attract.

Nevertheless, those who have rallied to the government have already cut in to the Viet Cong logistic support structure, in areas where it badly hurts—food production, porterage and probably most important, native intelligence.

The US Advisory Presence

Forty-eight US advisors, from the Saigon level to enlisted men with tactical units, were asked to comment on the US/Vietnamese relationship. Their answers were singularly similar:

“There may be troubles, in this regard, elsewhere; but I have never had any difficulty at all.”

“My counterpart wants me here, and says so often. He takes my advice.”

“We have had our disagreements as to ways and means. Sometimes it takes a week for my advice to sink in; but we have come to understand one another.”

Of the forty-eight, none could recall any change in attitude since the subject was raised by Counsellor Nhu two months ago. Several have discussed it candidly with their Vietnamese counterparts. Among these, the general reaction obtained seems to be that the attitude of Mr. Nhu is remote from the realities of the war. Apart from this, the warm and respectful advisor/advisee relationship is quite evident. General Harkins, in this regard, lays the bulk of the trouble-making proclivity at Nhu’s door; considers Diem not to be an active participant.

One point noted frequently by the US advisors relates to language. The more senior Vietnamese commanders speak French, and some have fair English. The junior ones speak only Vietnamese, and struggle with English. Thus, ideally, they point out that we should send senior advisors with skill in French, while the lower ranking advisory personnel should have a basic grounding in Vietnamese before they come.

Laos

It is not difficult to synthesize the views of US/Vietnamese officialdom in Vietnam on the matter of Laos. They are all agreed on one point’ there is a direct and pressing relationship between affairs in the two countries and the worse things go in Laos, the more difficult matters will be in Vietnam.

Their viewpoints differ only as to degree. The Saigon CIA representative is unequivocal in his conviction that if Laos falls to the Communists the loss of Vietnam must inevitably follow. General Harkins believes that the loss of Laos would render our problem in Vietnam more difficult, but that it would not make a favorable conclusion impossible.

Meanwhile, Vietnamese commanders at all levels speak with feeling of the flow of warlike essentials and key personnel into their country via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. While generally unable to produce abundant hard evidence of the fact, they still, in recounting their day to day combat experiences, underscore that external influence on the battle—actual and potential—must form a part of every calculation. Certainly, the material flow could be greatly increased, should the Communists choose to do so, particularly were Tchepone, Attopeu and Saravane to come wholly under their control. It is for this reason that there is strong sentiment, on both the US and Vietnamese sides for more covert pressure on the Laos corridor and on North Vietnam.

Miscellaneous Observations

Visit with the Minister of Defense

Mr. Thuan expressed satisfaction with the growth of offensive military activity, and enthusiasm with President Diem’s formal approval of 1 July as the beginning of Phase II of the National Campaign.

In response to a question as to how the Viet Cong would react to this intensified effort, he responded that, in his judgment, they are already reacting—steadily acquiring forces and material in southern Laos. These, he says, will be used in a powerful attack in the highlands or Quang Ngai, to deal the Vietnamese military a hard blow, which can then be publicized as a basis for seeking a negotiated peace.

In this regard, Mr. Thuan is quite as alert as any interested American regarding the unfavorable image of the Vietnam war in the US press, and the necessity for getting what he called “the correct story” before the US Congress. Also, like the interested Americans, he was not prepared to offer any dramatic suggestions as to just how to achieve this purpose.

When asked what, in his view, most needed doing to get the National Campaign forward effectively, he responded with three specifics:

a. Settle the Buddhist problem quickly and completely. (On this he expressed great determination and at best, restrained optimism.)

b. Undertake numerous small scale incursions into Southern Laos, for intelligence purposes and to disrupt development of the Viet Cong logistic mechanism.

c. Increase greatly our sabotage, harassment, intelligence and subversive activities in North Vietnam.

The Vietnamese Organization for Counterinsurgency

The Vietnamese have a Special Group (Counterinsurgency) too. They call it the “Interministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets”. It is chaired by Counsellor Nhu, and includes the heads of all the civil ministries, the Chief of the Joint General Staff and the four Corps Tactical Zone commanders. It has much authority, in both the approval of plans for clear and hold operations and for hamlet development. It supervises execution closely through on-site observation and periodic progress reports.

The Continuity of Viet Cong Strength

The intensity of offensive operations is growing steadily, at a cost to the Viet Cong of over 2,000 battle casualties per month. Defections are increasing rapidly—from 200 per month in January to 450 in June. Over 60% of the Vietnamese rural population is in strategic hamlets, with a consequent narrowing of the Viet Cong recruitment base. Finally, the “Open Arms” amnesty program is beginning to diminish the number of active Viet Cong sympathizers and supporters.

Against this background, it is not surprising to find the Advisory Command’s best estimate of Viet Cong irregular strength to have dropped—from a high of 100,000 to 80,000. The Viet Cong now have less to offer the Vietnamese youth and, to the extent that they must rely on kidnapping to procure replacements, their problem is greatly complicated by the personal security afforded by the strategic hamlet.

Regular Viet Cong strength, on the other hand, remains about constant at 22,000-25,000. Both the Vietnamese and US authorities questioned were convinced that this strength is maintained largely by infiltration, supplemented by intensive training of selected local cadres.

Reduction in US Forces

It was not possible, in this brief visit, to do more than observe and to sample opinion on the subject, at various levels of authority.

Observation underscored these realities:

a. The shooting part of the war is moving to a climax. Our help for the Vietnamese in logistic and tactical support is thus probably not susceptible of much reduction in the immediate future.

b. On the other hand, the training effort has passed its climax. All divisions are organized and re rapidly being trained. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps training programs are also well advanced; and training of strike forces and similar paramilitary elements is maturing rapidly. A reduction in the advisory area is thus a logical prospect.

Discussion of the problem with responsible officers elicited the general reaction that reduction is feasible in both advisory personnel and in the various US staff and administrative support forces. General Harkins considers that a reduction of 1,000 men could be accomplished now, without affecting adversely the conduct of the war. About half of the positions vacated, as he sees it, would come as a result of the Vietnamese achieving greater self-sufficiency in training and command matters, with the other half coming from a withdrawal or replacement of US units.

The Press

Very little observed during this visit had any real sensitivity or secrecy. Almost anyone could see it without violating security.

This gave rise to the thought that what is needed is a few venturesome newsmen who are willing to forego the comforts of the city, and endure a little mud and discomfort. Those so inclined would be rewarded with a picture of resolution and progress which they would not quickly forget.

Conclusion

Almost the whole of this visit was concentrated in the field, observing the people—military and civilian, US and Vietnamese—who are carrying the front line burden. From them the sounds of confidence, achievement and cautious optimism can be plainly heard, and with growing resonance.

Military operations are more effective; rural economic progress is manifest; US/Vietnamese coordination is heartening; and the morale of US military forces is classic.

Acknowledging that this trip dwelt mainly upon the rural sector; acknowledging further the potential gravity of the political vibrations in Saigon; and recognizing the rapidity with which the situation could be worsened by adverse developments in Laos, the visit still added substance to the view that we are indeed winning the war, that our present course is sound and that, resolutely pursued, it will see the job done.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Vietnam 1963. Secret. Attached to a brief transmittal memorandum sent on July 5 by General Taylor to Secretary of Defense McNamara. A handwritten note on the covering memorandum indicates that Secretary McNamara saw the report. On July 9, Michael Forrestal sent a copy of the report to McGeorge Bundy for the President. Forrestal indicated, in his covering memorandum, that he felt the report gave “a fair and soundly optimistic picture of the part of the iceberg which is under water, i.e. the war against the Viet Cong.” A note on the covering memorandum indicates that the report was placed in the President’s weekend reading file. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 7/1/63-7/20/63)
2. The attached map, which details the 15 places visited by Krulak in South Vietnam, is not printed.
3. Not found attached.
4. See Document 92.