Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 3, 1963, 8 p.m.

24. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw President Diem at 5:45 PM. I thanked him for receiving me promptly, and said that I was sorry to interrupt his busy schedule but the matter was important and, in our view, urgent.

I then gave him my letter (Embtel 18).² After he had read it, I said that if he were disposed to make an address, we were prepared to offer some suggestions as to its content. He replied with marked politeness that he would be glad to consider any ideas we might have. I then outlined for him the main points in a paper³ which I subsequently left with him, emphasizing that we attach particular importance to his inviting Buddhist leaders to meet with him personally as a matter of urgency. He read over the list, put it to one side, and said that he would consider it, along with the letter, and his “collaborators”.

Diem then talked briefly and in general terms about difficulties of Buddhist problem, giving no hint of what if any action he has in mind. He spoke of difficulties of meeting demands which might in themselves be reasonable but would encourage further demands which government could not meet. He referred to inherent complexity of some of the problems, notably questions relating to ownership of property. He mentioned also, in surprisingly good natured way, that some of Buddhist leaders had political motives and used unfair tactics.

I said I thought we could grant all these things and that we understood very well that there were real risks in whatever course he took. Had not the time arrived, however, for him to take matters into his own hands? I was afraid that the letters being exchanged between Vice President and Buddhists were simply piling up charges and counter-charges and, if anything, making a solution more difficult. What was needed was for President personally to take actions which would firmly establish good faith of government and leave isolated those who still cavilled. Diem did not react.

I then said that I hoped in any case he understood gravity of situation from standpoint of U.S. He replied to effect that he understood we had a problem with public opinion. This arose, he felt, largely from news and information which was not strictly accurate and often exaggerated. U.S. Government should set record straight. I said that before we could set record straight we had to have further action by GVN on which to base ourselves. In this connection, I said, I could bring up, as I had been instructed to do, Times of Vietnam article.⁴ I told him I had been instructed to talk to Nhu also about this article and, as he said he had not seen it, I described main offensive features and gave him a copy of the newspaper. I told him with some (very genuine) feeling that unless such statements stopped no settlement was possible, in view of my government. Diem limited himself to saying that he would study the article. He then brought interview to a close ushering me out with great, but perhaps forced, politeness.

Whole meeting lasted less than half an hour, which may be a new record.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Document 201.
3. No copy of this paper has been found.
4. See footnote 2, Document 196.