199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
10. Embtel 10.2 Purpose Deptel 4,3 which was not brought out sufficiently clearly, was not simply to threaten Diem with old threats but to say, in effect: “If you (Diem) will make statement designed to bridge gap of understanding and if there is then a Buddhist incident, GVN and US will be in position to point to your statement as evidence GVN good faith in trying convince Buddhists of genuine desire reach understanding. We believe present state of mistrust in Viet-Nam requires such statement from you very soon before there is another Buddhist incident and in view two week period now over. If there is another incident and you have not made a conciliatory statement, however, we believe the situation in Viet-Nam will soon get out of control. U.S. situation which must be clearly understood, will be as follows:
- 1.
- U.S. liberal and press opinion increasingly and now almost unanimously critical of religious situation in Viet-Nam.
- 2.
- There are now indications that matter may be brought up in United Nations where US, as chief supporter of Viet-Nam, would face difficult situation.
- 3.
- Justly or unjustly this is situation U.S. Government is facing vis-à-vis domestic and international opinion.
- 4.
- Most importantly religious toleration is one of the most basic tenets of American civilization. The U.S. Government does not believe that GVN has gone far enough to convince and explain to its people the basic importance it attaches to religious tolerance and national unity.
Therefore unless the GVN acts quickly, the U.S. will have to make its own position perfectly clear.”
You should convey these views officially and under instruction to Diem personally in writing or orally in whatever manner you think best.
You may wait not longer than twenty-four hours if you think a further period for Diem to reflect on situation would help your difficult task.
You are requested to give Diem a piece of paper containing thoughts he might express in such an address as suggested Deptel 4. Believe invitation to Buddhist leaders to confer with him should be given top billing.
Also, you should request separate interview with Nhu and convey to him that in U.S. view Times Viet-Nam article was clear challenge to U.S. and to Buddhists as well as being a denigration of Buddhists (points 1, 3 and 4 Embtel 10). You should tell Diem of what you will say to Nhu and make clear to Diem we believe no settlement possible until such statements are stopped. Assume you will wish see Diem first, but leave to you.
Realize these demarches may seriously impair your further ability to influence Diem, but believe strong medicine needed to clear his vision, especially in view of what is at stake.
FYI. We are fully conscious of the possibility that a stern warning to Diem will only make him more stubborn and the he might perform somewhat better if we made no warning but only gentle suggestions for positive steps. The fact is, however, that, if he is so incapable of rational consideration of what we believe are the extreme dangers of the Buddhist crisis, and can only behave emotionally, then we have no confidence in his ability to lead an effective fight against the Viet Cong.
Top level here admires courage and skill which you have displayed and fully supports you.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POLS VIET-US. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Wood and cleared by Hilsman, Harriman, Ball, and Forrestal. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Document 198.↩
- Document 196.↩