70. Memorandum From the Chief Adviser, Michigan State University Group in Vietnam (Fox), to James B. Hendry of Michigan State University1

SUBJECT

  • Future of MSUG in Vietnam

This is to review the events of the past few days. We are now notified officially and definitely there will not be a renewal of MSUʼs contract with GVN. Meetings between the President and Secretary Thuan with Dean Seelye and myself have made it clear that GVN does not want MSU to continue here.

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Dean Seelye himself intended to write both you and President Hannah this morning but he was called suddenly and unexpectedly to see President Diem. It was necessary for Dean Seelye to go directly from the interview to the aiport. Therefore, he has requested me to report on developments here and to send a copy of my memorandum to President Hannah.

On Thursday, February 15, Dean Seelye and I met with Secretary of State at the Presidency Nguyen Dinh Thuan. The attached memorandum for the record2 gives an account of that meeting. Though Thuan was cordial he made it clear that the President considered the articles by Taylor and Child3 to be so harmful and such a breach of ethics that he believes it inadvisable for MSU to continue here. Thuan said the President realizes MSU cannot exercise control over project returnees and therefore believes it better that the government directly hire advisors who can be prevented from writing “irresponsibly” and “unfairly” on political matters.

President Diem, who was quite friendly during the meeting this morning, revoiced much of what Thuan had said. The President said he was grateful for the assistance and achievements of MSU and praised the good work of the overwhelming majority of our personnel. But he said he was deeply hurt and shocked by articles written by MSUG professors after their return to the United States. The Child and Taylor articles—especially that of Child—urged the forceful overthrow of the government, he said. If Child and Taylor had written the articles while they were in Vietnam the President said they would have been tried before a tribunal for fomenting an insurrection. Diem did not appear bitter, but, rather, shocked and disappointed that “those in whom he had placed confidence and trust” had fumed against him. The President expressed the view that the interest of the government would be served best by having foreign advisors hired by the NIA. This arrangement, he believed, would insure control by the government over the advisors’ publications. Of course, Dean Seelye outlined the Universityʼs position, with which you are familiar. He said in effect that whereas he did not agree with much of the material from the Taylor-Child articles the University must recognize the right of returnees to write freely so long as they do not disclose genuinely secret information—he believed GVN would have to weigh the total good of our efforts against the relatively small number of objectionable articles.

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The President became sentimental toward the end of the meeting, reviewing the years of warm, harmonious relations with MSUG, again expressing his appreciation for our work here and asking Dean Seelye to convey his best wishes to President Hannah.

There is one other development of which I should apprise you: On February 15 just before our meeting with Thuan, Malcolm Browne, of the Associated Press, called for an interview with Dean Seelye. He said he had heard the MSU contract was not to be renewed because of the writings of our returnees. We haven’t the least idea where he received the information, but the news now seems to be all over Saigon. Because he was tied up with various meetings—including one with American Ambassador Nolting-Dean Seelye delayed having a meeting with Browne until the next day. In the meanwhile he took up with Nolting the question of dealing with the press. Nolting said he supposed there was little we could do but tell the truth that the Government of Vietnam did not want a contract because of objectionable articles by former MSUG members. Nolting seemed quite concerned that the President might make a big issue of the governmentʼs position vis-à-vis MSU.

On the sixteenth Dean Seelye met with Browne. Browne said he thought he had a real story here because fundamental principles of freedom of press were involved. He recounted his own difficulties with Vietnamese censorship, which has prevented him, he said, from telling the American people of the actual conditions here. At one point during the interview both Dean Seelye and I emphasized was that GVN has never on any occasion asked MSU to muzzle returning scholars nor indicated it would want a contract renewal in the event we agreed to throttle returnees. The government, he said, simply objected to the writings of our former members and as a result did not believe it advisable to have us continue beyond the expiration of the present contract. Browne asked if we believed the government would have agreed to a renewal if we had agreed to curb freedom of expression of returnees. We said quite candidly we did not know, because the matter had never arisen. The government had never made such a request and we certainly have not and would not make such an offer. I mention this point specifically because in Browneʼs release he has said that Seelye said “the government had asked his university to order returning MSU professors not to write articles criticizing the national administration.”4 There are other inaccuracies in the release. For example, Browne says that Seelye, who has always been on cordial terms with the President, has been unable to confer with the President this time. As I have already mentioned, Dean Seelye did meet with the [Page 155] President. In another place Browne said that Seelye would return to the United States “without the contract renewal he had sought.” As a matter of fact we told Browne that Seelye was here to present the conditions under which the University would accept a new contract and to precipitate a decision from GVN. I am sending you a copy of Browneʼs release, which contains several other minor misrepresentations.

Dean Seelye left today at 2:30. While in Saigon he talked not only with Diem and Thuan but with various other governmental officials, such as the Secretary of State for National Economy, Thanh; Dean Thuc, Director of the Law School; and the President of the Bank of Vietnam. He also had discussions with officials and faculty at the NIA and saw a number of persons in private business such as the President of the Bank of China, President of the Chamber of Commerce.

At USOM several times with Gardiner; Knox and Rome of PAD; Fippin, the Deputy Director. At the American Embassy he met with the Ambassador, with Bogardus of the Economic Section, and others.5

I believe his visit was interesting and profitable in the sense that he precipitated a decision from GVN.

  1. Source: Michigan State University, Hannah Papers, H, Viet. fr., 1962. None of the attachments is included with the source text.
  2. A record of this meeting by Fox, February 16, is ibid.
  3. Presumably a reference to Milton C. Taylor and Adrian Jaffe, “Crumbling Bastion,” New Republic, 644:17-20, June 14, 1961; and Frank C. Child, “Vietnam,” ibid., 645:14-16, December 4, 1961.
  4. Malcolm Browneʼs despatch, February 17, appeared in the Washington Post, February 13. 1962.
  5. No records of meetings with anyone except Thuan and Diem have been found.