Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

68. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, February 17, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Tuesday² Senate Foreign Relations Meeting—Viet-Nam

1. Veil of Secrecy

The President has said we have been as frank as we can be, consistent with the security needs of the situation. In his words, “We have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word”.³ American military personnel are in Viet-Nam to help the Vietnamese with transport, communications, and various technical services. We are providing the logistic facilities and skills that they lack. But it is their war, and they are doing the fighting. We have not publicly gone into details on numbers and kinds of equipment because of military security and because of possible charges of violating the Geneva Accords. Although only five Americans have been killed by the Viet Cong since 1955 we recognize the dangers of this situation. Having helped Viet-Nam since it became independent we do not intend to withdraw our help when it is fighting to survive Communist guerilla attack. Further, the fall of South Viet-Nam would endanger the future of all Free Asian nations. (NB—We understand Senator Morse is particularly dubious about risking American lives in Viet-Nam.)

2. Geneva Accords

The DRV has systematically violated the Accords almost from the day they were signed. Their present campaign against the GVN strikes at the basic raison d’etre of the Accords, which is the preservation of peace in SEA. While neither the Government of Viet-Nam nor the U.S. signed the Geneva Accords, we have respected them.

At the time the Accords were concluded, the U.S. declared that while it would not use force or the threat of force to disturb the situation created by the Accords, it would “view any renewal of aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.” The DRV attack on South Viet-Nam must be regarded as such a threat. Our increased military assistance to Viet-Nam is our response to this effort to conquer South Viet-Nam.

In presenting our action to the world, we have stressed the DRV violations. We have publicly pledged that extraordinary American aid to Viet-Nam would be terminated when the Viet Cong cease their aggression. We have avoided specifics in describing our efforts in order not to accuse ourselves of violating the Accords.

3. Military Assistance Command

The new U.S. military command set up in Viet-Nam February 8 was required because our effort there is no longer only advisory but now includes operational personnel such as helicopter and communications people. The old MAAG command structure did not meet the needs of this activity. The new command also recognizes the increased importance of our effort in Viet-Nam by assigning a higher-ranking man toward it.

It does not mean that our people are to seek out and engage the enemy in combat situations. It is not a combat command. It does not mean that we are directing the war in Viet-Nam. This is not a joint command. The Vietnamese are running their own war. The head of our Mission in Viet-Nam is still a civilian, Ambassador Nolting.

4. American Casualties

Five Americans have been killed and twelve wounded by the Viet-Cong since 1955.

Fifteen of these seventeen casualties occurred before December 1961 when our increased military aid began. Three of the casualties were civilians, the rest were military.

Table of U.S. Casualties and Accidental Deaths in Viet-Nam (since 1955)

Total	39	(18 dead, 20 wounded, 1 missing)
Accidental deaths	13	(all military)
Killed by Viet Cong	5	(1 civilian, 4 military)
Accidentally wounded	8	(2 civilian, 6 military)
Wounded by Viet Cong	12	(2 civilian, 10 military)
Missing	1	(military)

5. Importance of Viet-Nam

(a) The loss of Viet-Nam would convince many Asians now on the fence that Communism is indeed the wave of the future. We cannot afford to have American support devalued by the loss of a nation which is covered by the SEATO protocol and to which we are deeply committed in terms both of public statements of support and in terms of a large and long-standing aid program.

(b) The loss of Viet-Nam would encourage the Bloc to use similar tactics of infiltration and subversion in other countries. Southeast Asia would be immediately threatened.

(c) North Viet-Nam has been one of the most aggressive members of the Bloc. If it succeeds in conquering South Viet-Nam, it will solve what is perhaps its most pressing internal problem: food. Given its performance in Laos, it seems certain that any strengthening of the DRV will increase the dangers faced by free Asia.

6. The American Role

The Vietnamese have the will to fight Communism. Total casualties on both sides of 3,000 per month, of which over half are Viet Cong, prove that the Communists are meeting strong opposition.⁴ Even more illuminating is the fact that the clear majority of Vietnamese casualties does not belong to the Army but to the village defense units (Self-Defense Corps and Civil Guard). Our role is to give these people the technical and logistical assistance they cannot provide for themselves to enable them to win their own war.

The DRV can raise the ante. There are more than 350,000 men in their armed forces—many of them natives of South Viet-Nam as well as veterans of the long guerrilla war against the French. They can be infiltrated into Viet-Nam via Laos with little difficulty across the long and rugged border between the two countries. If the DRV chooses to take the risk, they can compel us to take further measures or lose Viet-Nam. We do not intend to lose Viet-Nam.

7. Why We Support Diem

For thirty years Diem has recognized the Communist threat to Asia. He has done all he can to strengthen his country against it. He is a determined and courageous man. He has been right in emphasizing the importance of defense, education, communication and rural welfare.

If Viet-Nam is not a democracy, neither is any other underdeveloped country. These countries must develop politically as well as economically. Viet-Nam has no democratic tradition. It is divided and at war. Yet Diem has held elections. Opposition candidates were given equal time on the radio. They were critical. They are not in jail. President Diem recently followed his Cabinetʼs recommendation that an unpopular bill proposed by his sister-in-law be returned to the National Assembly.

Diemʼs strong leadership has been needed to prevent factionalism which is endemic in Vietnamese politics.

He has been reluctant to delegate authority, but has recently agreed to our suggestions that he set up a National Internal Security Council (War Cabinet) which meets twice a week and that military chain of command and intelligence operations be reorganized. American advisers are playing a larger role.

We support the Government of Viet-Nam and Diem as the head of that Government. The future is up to the Vietnamese. We do not intend to interfere.

Since the war in Viet-Nam cannot be won without the closest cooperation between our two Governments, public American criticism of Diem only succeeds in hurting our own efforts in Viet-Nam.

8. Our Economic Aid Program

The economic assistance program in Viet-Nam was developed (1) to provide those commodities the GVN cannot afford out of its own resources, but which are necessary—even on an austere basis in which consumer goods are minimized—to keep the economy primed and pumping; and (2) to provide projects for the development of Viet-Nam into a democratic self-sustaining economy. Right now, however, we are in the midst of a very urgent revamping to assure priority to projects in full support of the expanded counterinsurgency program. We want to speed up projects that are particularly useful in the short run because they support the war effort directly or by producing important social and economic benefits in a hurry. While we want to continue successful, long-range development projects, we are going to defer new starts for the time being, and we are reviewing other long-range development projects to modify them or terminate them. We especially want to work out civilian (and military) projects that will have the swiftest impact in winning the peasants to the government, i.e. civilian and military civic action progress.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files; Lot 66 D 307, 1.A-2 Briefing Papers, GVN, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Wood, Heavner, and Silver.
2. February 20.
3. President Kennedy made this statement in response to questions asked at a February 14 news conference; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1101.
4. During 1961 total casualties were: GVN—12,686; DRV—20,390. [Footnote in the source text.]