Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

67. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, February 17, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting in Honolulu on February 19

A. The Agenda

Attached are the Agenda items for the Honolulu meeting.

As you know we are particularly interested in Item 5 “The Concept of Close-In Air Support”, Item 8 “The Military Civic Action Program”, and Item 9 “The Status of Provincial Surveys”.

The question of close-in air support is one which I discussed with the Air Force planners in the Pentagon Thursday morning,² stressing repeatedly that they would make more enemies than friends unless they are very careful. Ben Wood also reminded them that the President had delimited the U.S. military role in Viet-Nam quite clearly in his last news conference,³ saying that U.S. troops were engaged in training and logistic support, that they are not engaged in what would generally be considered combat. If there were press stories to the effect that U.S. military are bombing and strafing Vietnamese villages, we would have serious political problems. I gather that General LeMay had talked to them on the same line, that they are willing to cooperate, but wanted a clear set of rules under which to operate. I suggest the following as a simple rule: U.S. planes should not attack ground targets in Viet-Nam unless 1) their assistance is requested by troops on the ground who are engaged, or are about to be engaged, with the Viet Cong, or 2) the targets to be attacked are specifically cleared by the Ambassador or his Deputy in the Embassy. The second provision would emphasize that the political implications of this war are at least as important as the military. I do not think that this would cause serious delay since they would still have a free hand to move in fast when there was an actual fight and I am sure that Ambassador Nolting could work out a system whereby permission or refusal could be given promptly.

As to Item 8, civic action, there has been a great deal of talk but not too many specific ideas. Herewith are three suggestions which you might wish to bring up: (1) that we support existing Vietnamese civic action teams which reportedly have been operating near Zone D since August under the direction of General Cao. We understand they are very short of supplies; (2) that the Vietnamese Government order its troops to automatically and promptly give rewards in rice, salt, or money to persons giving information on the Viet Cong (there is too much tendency to treat persons who give information as suspicious characters); (3) that in the present widespread state of the war in Viet-Nam it will probably be necessary to assign considerable number of American and possibly third country NCOs to work with the Vietnamese in organizing defense and civic action in the villages. This will be a difficult decision since good NCOs who could fit into the Vietnamese way of life are hard to find in large numbers and it will present the political problem of increasing American casualties. The Australians, Malayans, Filipinos, and even the Koreans and ChiNats might also be asked to supply some of their NCOs.

The thinking behind this suggestion is set out most clearly in Hilsmanʼs “A Strategic Concept for South Viet-Nam” which is attached. You might want to review this book on the way out since it is the best statement of how counterguerrilla actions should be conducted in Viet-Nem that I have seen. However, if you use these ideas I would not cite Hilsman or his book since the military are resentful of it.

As to the status of the Provincial Surveys, Item 9, we understand that three provinces have now been surveyed (Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh and Binh Long). While the Embassy has submitted preliminary reports on Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces,⁴ we have not received the actual provincial surveys.

B. For Discussion with Ambassador Nolting

1. The Department intends to assign John Plakies (FSO-2) to Saigon as Economic Counselor. He has a thorough economic background and his French is very good. Messages about this assignment will reach Saigon soon.

2. The New York Times story on Ambassador Noltingʼs speech (attached) played it as a major policy statement and headlined the idea of reforms in the Government. However the article itself indicates that Nolting stressed the importance of supporting the GVN and of working with it to make it more effective rather than standing aside and criticizing. This is healthy advice for the Saigon intellectuals.

We are hoping the text of the speech will be received on time to attach with this memorandum.

3. AID-State-Defense intend to send a three-man team to Saigon, arriving about Friday, February 23 and staying about a week. The team will work with Task Force Saigon (including the USMAG) on the FY 1962 and FY 1963 economic project programs to give priority to projects in support of the expanded counterinsurgency program. With the collaboration of Task Force Saigon the team will hold discussions with the U.S. technicians, military, and other personnel at all levels of the Task Force so as to get information not presently available here. Then the team will eliminate projects or parts or build them up in keeping with counterinsurgency requirements. The AID member of the team will have authority to approve some projects on the spot after such discussions.

The job cannot be done in Washington without information, nor in Saigon without the background of Washington discussions. Saigon seems best because that is where the needed information and people are. (Cleared with AID-Mr. Janow.)

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, Honolulu Meeting, July 23, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Silver. The source text lists four attachments: (1) Agenda items for the Honolulu Meeting (held on February 19); (2) the Hilsman paper “A Strategic Concept for South Viet-Nam” (Document 42); (3) A New York Times story of February 16 on a speech by Nolting; (4) a partial text of the Nolting speech, February 15. Only the first was found attached to the source text.
2. February 15. No record of the meeting has been found.
3. See footnote 3, Document 68.
4. Not further identified.