Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

279. Memorandum for the Record¹

Saigon , September 14, 1962 .

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Special Advisor to the President of Vietnam, 11 September 1962

ATTENDANCE

• Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Vietnam
• His Excellency Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., American Ambassador to Vietnam
• General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman-Designate, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• General Paul D. Harkins, Commander, Military Assistance Commands, Vietnam and Thailand

After an exchange of greetings General Taylor told Mr. Nhu that he was much encouraged by the progress which has been made in Vietnam since his visit to this country last year. Mr. Nhu said that he also was pleased with what had been accomplished and expressed the hope that much more would soon be done. Ambassador Nolting interjected a remark that in a few years he and Mr. Nhu should be able to resume their hunting trips. Mr. Nhu then said that the target date for the completion of the first phase of the Strategic Hamlet Program was the end of the year and that he felt that by that time it would be possible to plan for the exploitation of the gains which would have been made. General Taylor remarked that this situation resembled that which usually exists during any war. There is a period during which an impasse exists, and then, suddenly, a sudden surge to victory. Mr. Nhu then said that he wanted to explain to General Taylor what his ultimate views were concerning the value of the Strategic Hamlet Program and to review the general situation with him. He foresaw that the completion of the Strategic Hamlet Program would permit the government to switch from a counter-guerrilla concept to a genuine guerrilla operation against the enemy. At the moment the atmosphere is not set for aggressive guerrilla tactics. Until the Self Defense Corps and the Youth Movement become completely functional much assistance from the Americans would still be required. Ultimately, with the realization of the entire program, the Viet Cong would be expelled from the villages and they would then be compelled to wage a counter-guerrilla war. General Taylor remarked that if the accepted average of 20 to 1 is true it would certainly be better to be the guerrilla instead of the person obliged to fight against him. Mr. Nhu explained that once the Viet Cong are expelled from the hamlets it will then be possible to set up special guerrilla forces to hunt them down, to terrorize them and to ambush them, as they are now doing. General Taylor commented that President Kennedy lays great importance on the lessons to be learned from the struggle which is going on in Vietnam. Mr. Nhu then said that with the establishment of the Strategic Hamlets many people are rallying to the support of the government because they no longer fear reprisals. He added that if the project is well done this support of the government can lead to a favorable atmosphere for government operated guerrillas and would constitute a solution for the problems of all under-developed countries. It would mean a strategy without fear. To further explain his theory Mr. Nhu pointed out that what is going on in Vietnam was in fact a political and social revolution. Counter-guerrillas do not feel the need for revolution, it is only when an aggressive spirit oriented toward a system of democracy, by stages, exists that the revolutionary spirit necessary for a guerrilla mentality can be developed. Ambassador Nolting then asked Mr. Nhu if at the lower levels of government—the Province Chiefs and the District Chiefs—there was a better understanding of governmental aims. Mr. Nhu said that their understanding was increasing a little more each day and explained that there was a special training program for functionaries which required them to come to Saigon every three months for indoctrination. He pointed out that one of the difficulties in implementing his theory of converting the Vietnamese effort from a counter-subversive movement to a straight guerrilla war against the enemy was the question of how to wage a real democratic revolution with cadres who are engaged in anti-revolutionary activities. He hoped that the successful completion of the Strategic Hamlet Program would result in the banishment of fear and would make it possible to instill the revolutionary spirit in the people who were in support of the government. He added that his concept had to be expounded with a certain amount of care because many people within the government might be frightened by it and oppose it. General Taylor then congratulated Mr. Nhu on the rapid progress which had been made in the Strategic Hamlet Program. Mr. Nhu thanked him and remarked that some people thought that it had been done too rapidly and were a little afraid that, consequently, it might be badly done. He went on to say that the Communists could not win the battle against the Strategic Hamlet Program. They could continue to launch attacks against isolated posts and win or lose the struggle to overrun them, but to take over a hamlet they had to kill civilians. For this they were hated and therefore were compelled to realize that it was impolitic to do it. General Taylor then asked how the rhythm of construction of Strategic Hamlets would continue. Mr. Nhu answered that, with his American friends, a program of priorities had been set up. General Taylor asked if the Province Chiefs were closely involved in the construction of the hamlets and if a general plan had been set up for them to follow. Mr. Nhu replied that the Province Chiefs and the District Chiefs received thorough orientation in the program and that in fact special courses had been organized to train them in their role. Reverting to his original theme Mr. Nhu added that efforts were being made to change the attitudes of these government representatives from their orientation towards a counter-guerrilla aspect of their efforts. It was hard for them to understand the difference which exists between counter-subversive activities and direct guerrilla warfare, which is total in nature. The guerrilla counts on no one but himself. Those who have been oriented towards the counter-guerrilla concept have had the benefit of American aid including arms, equipment and all types of supplies. They have been sheltered and when they were sick they were cared for. The guerrilla has no hospital, no supplies and depends only on himself-a reversal of mental attitude. Ambassador Nolting commented that this was a hard philosophy and hoped there might be some way in which it can be softened. General Taylor asked how Mr. Nhu thought it would be possible to change the thinking of the people from one concept to the other. Mr. Nhu explained that the Strategic Hamlet concept was, in fact, a concept which consisted of a series of phases. The security of the hamlet offered protection for the people, the Province Chief with the forces available to him was charged with the destruction or dispersal of battalion sized enemy units. The District Chief had the capability of breaking up small regular units. Each echelon dilutes the strength of the enemy until, at hamlet level where the individual Viet Cong could be expelled, it would be possible to wage guerrilla warfare. General Taylor asked how this could be done. Mr. Nhu said that the most dangerous Viet Cong were the small groups of terrorists and assassins who came to the hamlets to extort, kill and kidnap. Within the defended hamlet the people are protected from such activities. Although this was not yet guerrilla warfare it was approaching it. The village defenders, Self Defense Corps are given arms. The next stage, guerrillas on the side of the government will be given only a method and an ideology. They will be loaned a weapon, their ideology will be freedom vs slavery, their purpose to hunt down and destroy their enemy. If we could succeed in this, we could give a step by step political strategy which would be valid for all of the under-developed countries who, lacking this ideology, are obliged to seek neutralism in order to reduce the tension which is placed upon them. General Taylor then asked what political measures would be taken. Mr. Nhu replied that in the Strategic Hamlets people, little by little, would be able to see the democratic system in action. He added that, of course, up to this time there had been hamlets and hamlets. Some of them had, as in olden days, became oligarchic. Most of them, however, operating under the principle of liberty and justice as the basis of progress, and administered by a locally chosen committee were becoming more and more aware of the advantages of democracy, such as the increased yield of their rice crops, better methods of cultivation, and improved methods of distribution. General Taylor commented that this was a deep-level thought and asked if he felt that the people in the hamlets really understood what was going on. Mr. Nhu said that he was sure that the people not only understood but were beginning to develop a true democratic spirit. As evidence of this, he had received a number of letters from villagers protesting that their rights had been violated and asking him to come and personally intercede in their behalf. He was fully aware of the fact that some of these letters might have been originated by Communists. He felt, however, that it was his duty to comply with the requests in order that the people might realize that the government was in sympathy with their claims to political rights. He said, in addition, that great strides had been made in gaining the support of the people by amending the procedures for loans to the peasants. Until recently, whenever a rice farmer had asked for government support to buy additional land, he had been asked to present titles as guarantees of his economic stability. Of course, only those people who were the most comfortably situated could present such guarantees and the course of complaints from the less favored was always the same: “If we ask for loans it is because we are poor and do not have titles to present as guarantees, if we were rich we would not need loans.”

General Taylor then asked how many hamlets were projected for the entire program. Mr. Nhu replied that he foresaw a need for all 16,000 of them, in addition to the extra protection which would have to be given to the resettled Montagnards. He spoke of the system of “Jumelage”—a plan whereby certain areas of cities would be responsible for the adoption of poorer hamlets in the most dangerous areas—as a sort of less favored twin. One-third of the hamlets would be completed by the end of the year. The final total would amount to some 16,230 protected communities. He explained, however, that the overall success of the Hamlet Program would be based on the so-called two-thirds concept—meaning that if two-thirds of the populace of any given area could be assured security the other one-third would automatically fall in line. General Taylor then asked Mr. Nhu what he thought would be the time required for the completion of the entire program. Mr. Nhu said that he had paced himself on a period of three years, however, he felt that with the progress which would have been made by the end of the year the concept which had been proposed by General Harkins might effectively be applied. General Taylor then asked if the hamlet concept did not, in fact, amount to the establishment of a feudal state. Mr. Nhu replied that he did not think that this was necessarily true. He said that there were certainly certain aspects of the “ville forte” idea but that, within the hamlets there would be established democratic principles which would teach the rights of the individual such as the right to work and the right to own and exploit land, as well as the duties of a democratic people, such as their obligation to respect property and to mutually defend their rights. Up until this time, he added, the government had been reluctant to speak of matters of immediate interest to the individual. The President had stressed the ideas of duty and sacrifice. Meanwhile, the Communists had been left the monopoly of promising reforms in the field of private interests. Now, the trend has been reversed, and there is, in fact, no contradiction to the reversal because the general mobilization and the construction of Strategic Hamlets has become a matter of individual interest. The basic support of the guerrilla has been in the villages. If village support is denied them, the maquis die of hunger. If the people become sincerely interested in sociological and economic reforms there must result a democratic revolution which will force the Viet Cong to go underground and to wage a war of counter-revolution. It is this concept, explained Mr. Nhu, that he thought would provide the world with a workable basic strategy against Communism. It was the only concept, in his opinion, that could be valid for people who do not want either nuclear or conventional war, or who do not want to bow under by adopting a form of neutralism. Ambassador Nolting commented that there would probably be a certain amount of opposition to such a concept. Mr. Nhu agreed that this was true as for any theory which might be presented anywhere. Mr. Nhu then reverted to his thought of the two-thirds which could be sufficient to sway the total. He explained that for each village which might consist of four to five hamlets the idea was to provide protection for two-thirds of them with the knowledge that the others would automatically go along. General Taylor then asked how many people there were in each hamlet. Mr. Nhu replied that the total varied from one to two or three or more thousands of inhabitants. He added that it was only last year that the government had realized that it was not the villages, consisting of four or five hamlets, which was the most important element but rather the individual hamlet itself. Ambassador Nolting commented that the hamlet had as its origin the family group. Mr. Nhu agreed and said that it was in the hamlet that traditions were founded and where the family roots and the spirits of the ancestors could be located. The administration of the villages was sometimes artificial in that outsiders were brought in to supervise the activities. In the hamlet, committees were selected from the local inhabitants.

At this point Mr. Nhu digressed to say that he felt that something should be done to relieve the tension exerted on American military personnel assigned to Vietnam. He thought that there should be a regular rotation every two months for rest and recreation in Manila or some other area outside of Vietnam. He pointed out that there was little if any distraction for these people in Vietnam and emphasized the point that, not only would it provide a different atmosphere which would permit relaxation for the Americans, but it would lighten the burden on the Vietnamese who had nothing to offer as distraction to the American advisory personnel. He referred vaguely to the implications which might follow the progression of the Vietnamese effort from counter-subversive to all out guerrilla activities, implying that this might be bad for the Americans. He then added that Americans in Vietnam should be provided with sources of information other than the American books and the Stars and Stripes newspaper. He said that unfortunately many of them understood nothing of the problems of the country and that it would be valuable if they were given access to information concerning the Vietnamese viewpoint of the war which was going on. They might, perhaps, not be in sympathy with Vietnamese views, but at least they would be given the opportunity to understand them. Ambassador Nolting said that the American Embassy published a daily synopsis of the Saigon newspapers and that it might be worthwhile to distribute this to all American personnel.

In summary, Mr. Nhu repeated that he thought that his concept would be useful for all underdeveloped countries and would assist greatly in enabling them to progress to a state of democracy. He pointed out that the Communists have clear cut, long ranged plans for their designs on these countries and that no basic concept exists to combat these plans. He added that there could be 200 changes in the government of Saigon but, if no workable concept were offered to them, there would be no effect on the peasants. He concluded by saying that his theory of a revolution for democracy could not be implemented without a war. The people of Vietnam were becoming more and more aware of the fact that this was their war and that, with it, they would gain democracy, new ideas, political and social freedom—in fact a complete reversal of values.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: 68 A 5159, Sgn(62)42 Taylor Visit. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was prepared from the interpreterʼs notes and should not be considered a stenographic record of the meeting. Taylor was in Vietnam September 10-13 as part of a tour of the Far East, August 31-September 21.