278. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to Congressman Odin Langen1
Dear Congressman Langen: I want to thank you for your letter of August 28, 1962, concerning queries by Mr. Richard S. Anderson, Box 69, Alexandria, Minnesota,2 on our policies in South Viet-Nam.
The military operation in the Ca Mau Peninsula mentioned by Mr. Anderson was not a U.S. venture. It was conceived, planned, and executed by the Vietnamese Armed Forces. As in other operations, U.S. military personnel served as advisers and provided logistic and technical support which the Vietnamese lack. The operation should not be described as the brainchild of General Harkins. We would emphasize that the Vietnamese are planning and fighting their own war in defense of their independence.
Our military advisers do not regard the Ca Mau operation as a failure. Although it was so described in some press reports, we consider it an encouraging success. The Ca Mau operation was carried out in an area long under Communist control, large stores of food and equipment were destroyed, and the Communist forces were dispersed.
The objective of the Ca Mau operation was to frustrate large scale offensive actions by the Viet Cong into other areas which the government is now trying to secure permanently by different kinds of programs. Vietnamese strategy is designed to clear and hold the countryside step-by-step. This is accomplished by coordinated military, economic, and social programs which give the peasant population the means and the will to defend themselves. Because resources are limited, these permanent clear and hold operations cannot be carried out simultaneously in all parts of the country. But the Viet Cong must be kept off balance in those areas where coordinated clear and hold operations are not yet underway. The Ca Mau operation was such a “spoiling attack.” Given the object of the Ca Mau operation and the nature of guerrilla warfare, the casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong are in fact considered quite heavy. Moreover, according to our reports, which are still incomplete, the figure of 124 killed indicated by Mr. Anderson is low.
Because this is also a war for menʼs minds and allegiances, we have matched our military effort with a corresponding increase in our information program. Today the magnitude of our information program [Page 635] in South Viet-Nam is second only to Japan in the Far East. We do not have our own radio station broadcasting in Vietnamese, but we do work closely with the Vietnamese Information Service providing advice, scripts, tapes, and technical assistance in broadcasting.
We also assist the Vietnamese Information Service in the preparation of various newspapers and pamphlets which serve to explain to the people their stake in winning this war. Most provinces now have a daily or weekly provincial newspaper which is distributed in the villages. Special newspapers are prepared and distributed for the clear and hold operations described above. The armed forces distribute pamphlets as part of all operations. With our assistance, a net of six radio stations covers the country with government information. Large village receivers and low cost transistor radios have been widely distributed to receive these programs. The effort to improve the Vietnamese information program continues to occupy a high priority in our assistance efforts.
Economic assistance is also geared to the political need for providing the peasant population with a stake in the fight. The clear and hold operations include increased economic assistance to the countryside in such forms as village schools, dispensaries, and cheap agricultural credit.
American economic aid to Viet-Nam in fiscal 1961 was $127.9 million under the Mutual Security Economic Program. It is $124.5 million for fiscal 1962. Until the present Communist attack forced us to increase military assistance, about three-quarters of all our aid to Viet-Nam was primarily economic in nature. The amount of military assistance is classified for security reasons.
An outline of the Viet-Nam situation, our program and some of its accomplishments may be seen in the enclosed documents. The nature of the Communist threat is treated in the attached State Department document, “A Threat to the Peace.”3
If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.
Sincerely yours,