266. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

SUBJECT

  • Defoliation

If we will win in Viet-Nam with defoliants, but lose without them, then we must use them. If we will probably win with defoliants and probably lose without them, then also we must use them. If we might win with defoliants, and might win without them, then we had better consider the implications before undertaking the project proposed by the Department of Defense for 2,500 acres in Phu Yen Province.

We have a tradition in this country of not using food as a weapon of war. Chemical and biological warfare are subjects which arouse emotional reactions at least as intense as those aroused by nuclear warfare, as witnessed by the publicity surrounding the recent accidental death of the British scientist, our Korean and East German experiences, and the recent Indian incidents. A series by Rachel Carson currently running in the New Yorker and soon to be published in book form sets forth with devastating impact the consequences of insecticides on insect-plant life balance and human health. The Agriculture Department is concerned about the implications of this book for our foreign crop marketing; if we launch a defoliation program in Viet-Nam our enemies and many of our friends will use this book against us.

Depriving the Viet Cong of their local food supplies and forcing them onto the open plain where they can more easily be dealt with is a legitimate and necessary military objective. But what are the alternative methods of achieving this objective? Have all been tried and have all failed? Given the relative predictability of the growing season, can not the Viet Cong be ambushed or otherwise prevented from harvesting these crops?

No matter how reasonable our case may be. I am convinced that we cannot persuade the world—particularly that large part of it which does not get enough to eat—that defoliation “is good for you.” Nonetheless, should the President decide to proceed with the project, it is [Page 591] important that we be given a brief period to explain to the world exactly what we are doing and why. This will reduce, to some extent, the impact of the inevitable Communist propaganda campaign.

Edward R. Murrow2
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field—Far East (IAF). Secret. Drafted by Thomas C. Sorensen, Deputy Director of USIA.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.