265. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
150. In conversation with Thuan Aug 15 during trip,2 we discussed at some length attitudes of various governments on subject of long-range outcome in Vietnam in relation to psychology of Vietnamese people. This discussion held in context rather optimistic assessment by Thuan of current developments here.
Thuan led into subject by mentioning report GVN had that GOF predicted as inevitable some sort of parley between North and South Vietnam “in a year”. He said Lalouette3 was extremely vague in describing this idea, but GVN definitely smelt a rat. (See also FVS-77994 for account of Nhuʼs suspicions.) I said I had not detected any such thought in conversations with Lalouette since his return from Paris. On contrary, he had told me GOF was firmly behind policy line which US pursuing in SVN and that GOF realized, as well as we do, that Laos-type settlement is not applicable to Vietnam problem.
We also discussed UK attitude, and agreed that UK policy vis-à-vis Vietnam is firm and realistic increasingly so.
Thuan then questioned me seriously on possible shift in US policy vis-à-vis SVN, mentioning inter alia a garbled report he had heard of Secretaryʼs talks with Barcroft [Barwick] at recent ANZUS meeting.5 I told him on basis all information available to me, including recent talks in Honolulu, US policy vis-à-vis SVN was firmly fixed on achievement of immediate objective here and we were not interested at this time in looking into distant future to try to formulate hypothetical ultimate solutions. The immediate problem is obviously to restore governmental control, law and order throughout SVN and to promote conditions in which people of South Vietnam could work towards their chosen social, political, and economic aspirations without intimidation. Many people inquired about the “ultimate solution” to Vietnam problem. I thought it wise to avoid being drawn into public speculation on this subject. To say that one is against ultimate reunification of the Vietnamese people is obviously bad politics; to say that [Page 589] one is in favor of reunification risks misinterpretation, and undermines will to resist in South. Thus, it seemed to me wise to fix attention on immediate objective and refuse to speculate about long-range future. This, I thought, was about essence of US position, and I saw no reason to suppose that it would change in foreseeable future. I added, that, in discussions with new Indian Chairman of ICC, as well as with his predecessor, I had tried to get across idea that best role for ICC also was to try to help promote restoration of peace in SVN in limited frame, without seeking overall or ultimate solutions to Vietnam problem—in other words, a “live and let live” objective.
Thuan said he agreed with this and President Diem did too, although he could not take a public position in favor of a divided Vietnam. He added that he frequently told his GVN colleagues that they had no reason to fear shift in US position provided GVN stuck to task at hand and made progress in pacification and development of country.
On subject of war-weariness as factor in VC success, I suggested to Thuan that we may be approaching time when a definite shift in GVN psychological line should be made. By end this year, GVN security forces in all categories will be developed and strengthened very greatly (two new divisions, trained and equipped CG and SDC, mobility, striking power, intelligence, etc.); clear and hold operations, coupled with strategic hamlets, would be well underway; Montagnard training for self-defense and/or resettlement well along. Perhaps GVN should begin to point to light at end of tunnel, which may be not far away. This line can be made credible and I suggested that he and President Diem should think seriously about fixing eyes of South Vietnamese people on achievement of peace and fruits thereof within relatively near future. Thuan agreed that President Diem should move in this direction and that we should work together to inject this note of hope into his public speeches.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-1662. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hong Kong, New Delhi, London, and Paris.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Roger Lalouette, French Ambassador in the Republic of Vietnam.↩
- Not found.↩
- During the ANZUS Council meeting at Canberra, May 8-9, Rusk told Foreign Minister Barwick that the United States would welcome Australian military personnel to work alongside U.S. forces in Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2105)↩