Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

259. Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)¹

Washington, August 7, 1962.

Dear Fritz: I have just lunched with Mike Forrestal who, as you know, is assuming much of the responsibility as the Presidentʼs liaison man on the Far East. He regretted that he could not come to Viet-Nam after the Laos Conference and hopes to do so soon.

I will catalogue briefly the most interesting matters which we discussed, saving the most important item for the last:

1) He will smoke out Bill Trueheartʼs papers which have been moldering in the White House for some time.

2) Papers asking the Presidentʼs decision on mangrove destruction are now in the White House and the President has promised to read them today. A controlled approval is anticipated.

3) Crop destruction was shot down in State and the prospects are not good. However, I hope to get a paper to the White House which, while giving Stateʼs disapproval, will at least contain the pros and cons of this project. The matter will reach the White House since Defense is submitting a separate memorandum favoring the project.² The objections are centered around the Governorʼs general feeling that destroying crops by helicopters, even though flown by Vietnamese, will be a dramatic and frightening demonstration of white manʼs weapons used against Asian food. And secondly, how can we be sure that we are destroying food for Viet Cong use only, at a time when it is important to not only bring the Montagnards over to our side but also to send them back to their homes or at least to areas where their patrols can be useful. I enclose a copy of the memorandum on crop destruction which has been disapproved by Messrs. Johnson and Harriman. I am going to slip a copy to Des FitzGerald this afternoon with a request that the CIA prepare a memorandum for the White House in terms of its effect on the Montagnards, having in mind their extensive programs with these people.

4) The Secretary is lunching with eleven NEA and FE Ambassadors next week and you will be glad to know that Governor Harriman feels very strongly that the Secretary should emphasize that the conference on Laos was in no sense a model for Viet-Nam. Forrestal thinks our best argument is that this is a Vietnamese war and we cannot presume to drag them to the peace table when they are fighting for their independence. This leads to the final topic.

5) There is here a general feeling from the President down that we must continue our effort to support Viet-Nam. This is coupled at the top levels with a sense that there is lacking evaluations as to how the war is going. In view of the number of reports which Task Force Saigon is sending in this seems hard to believe, but it was accurately reflected by Secretary McNamara at Honolulu. McNamaraʼs feeling is shared by the President, Rostow,³ McGeorge Bundy, U.A. Johnson, and Governor Harriman. There is also a growing feeling that possibly in October when the rains stop in Viet-Nam and Congress stops in the United States, the President should make a strong speech explaining our position in Viet-Nam to the American public and seeking to rally support behind our policy. Mike completely recognized the full and detailed reporting from Saigon. However, the large number of place names, statistics, and casualty figures, while invaluable to the experts and therefore necessary in Washington, appear to be somewhat confusing to the top level reader who only has a relatively short time to keep up with Viet-Nam. May I therefore most humbly suggest that you send in a telegram giving your own personal judgement on how the war is going, say once a month. This would ignore the reporting requirements of the various action programs. Mike is certain that if you, as a wise and experienced Ambassador, write such a Letter From Viet-Nam it will be most helpful to the President and the members of the Cabinet most immediately concerned. Among other things it would help him in thinking over the type of speech which he may be willing to give later on Viet-Nam.

I am going to try and take two other steps (on which more later) that may be of some use in meeting this problem:

a) Bring in Tom Ainsworth, an FSO who knows Viet-Nam but is not immediately connected with this Task Force and will therefore not be suspected of being too ardently pro-Vietnamese. I hope he can spend ten days in our files and write up a paper based on material in them in order to give a stop-gap evaluation of the situation in Viet-Nam and incidentally to demonstrate that we do get a lot of reporting from Saigon.

b) If it is possible, we will try to arrange to send Bill Jorden and Ted Heavner to Viet-Nam for a month and, if you have no objection, it might be useful if they could cover as many provinces as possible and write a report for your approval on how the war is going in the provinces. I get the feeling that American officials in the field know an awful lot but donʼt have time to report it. They might also work out with you and Mel⁴ whether it would be possible to send another man to the Political Section in Viet-Nam in the hope that we could get two officers to travel continuously in the provinces and report back to you.

Excuse the long screed and please forgive if I appear presumptuous which is certainly not my intention.

In haste and with all best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Chalmers B. Wood⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1-C-1, Off-Inf Lets,GVN 1961. Secret; Official-Informal. Sent as an enclosure to this paper but not found, was a draft memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, entitled “Viet-Nam: Project for Crop Destruction”.
2. Document 262.
3. See my letter of August 2 to Bill Trueheart. Rostow has since relaxed on the idea of a “political quantum jump”. [Footnote in the source text. The August 2 letter has not been found.]
4. Melvin F. Manfull, Counselor of Embassy in Saigon for Political Affairs.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.