251. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1

JCSM-563-62

SUBJECT

  • Chemical Crop Destruction, South Vietnam (S)

REFERENCES

  • a. Saigon to State message #21, dated 7 July 19622
  • b. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DTG 130343Z July 19623
1.
By references a and b, Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins have recommended and CINCPAC has concurred in a proposal for the Vietnamese to conduct a trial program of chemical crop destruction in eight target areas totaling 2,500 acres in South Vietnam. This program would be conducted in conjunction with the Hai Yen II operation to pacify Phu Yen Province. There is considerable Viet Cong (VC) strength in this area.
2.
The proposed operation would be carried out entirely by Vietnamese personnel using their own helicopters. US personnel would not participate directly and their aid would be limited to technical advice and assistance. Target determination has been based on best intelligence available and would be reconfirmed by joint US/GVN assessment prior to the attack.
3.
Air and ground cover by the Vietnamese armed forces will be required for the operation. In the target areas which are controlled and occupied by the Viet Cong the cover operations may result in the bonus effect of improved possibilities of engagement of Viet Cong by Government of Vietnam forces.
4.
On the basis of extensive briefing (including one on 25 June 1962 with President Diem)4 and their evaluation of the technical factors and GVN preparations, Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins are convinced that crop destruction can result in a substantial military advantage and that the material and herbicides to be employed are technically effective. They are further convinced that the GVN methods of determining targets, based on best available ground and air intelligence, take into account all necessary factors. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, staff is in a position to render adequate technical advice.
5.
In order to determine the capability of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam to launch and sustain on its own a crop destruction program on an operational basis, a trial operation such as proposed herein should be conducted to determine the feasibility of further operations.
6.
The Montagnards, who have been threatened, attacked, raped, and murdered by the VC, are leaving their tribal areas because of VC levies upon them for food, forced labor, and other support. They are fleeing to the security of the Government of Vietnam controlled areas. Their crops, abandoned to the VC or taken over by them, must be destroyed in order to deprive the VC of this capability of living off the land.
7.
An interesting side effect in such an operation as crop destruction is that because of the superstitious nature of the rural peasant in Vietnam, the ability of the GVN to kill large areas of vegetation “magically” makes a deep impression on him. During the Delta Mangrove defoliation operation one hundred and twelve VC surrendered when it was publicly announced that additional defoliation operations would be conducted.
8.
An additional factor favoring this proposal is that it would be the first trial of the strategic hamlet concept with complemental food denial operations. President Diem has consistently supported the use of herbicides, particularly for crop destruction.
9.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve the proposal contained in reference a. Authority for its implementation is requested.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 380-385. Secret. Copies were also sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
  2. Document 236.
  3. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 380-385)
  4. The report on this meeting is not printed.