Office of the Historian

177. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Johnson) to the Director (Rostow)1

Washington, May 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Third Country Military Assistance to Vietnam

I have just read Cottrellʼs report to Governor Harriman on the possibility of obtaining military assistance from other countries in Vietnam.2 I must say that the report is giving me some serious second thoughts about the concept.

What is the objective that we seek to achieve? Three can be identified: (a) a reduced need for U.S. forces in Vietnam; (b) a useful political effect in the U.S. through creation of an impression that we are not “fighting the war alone”; and (c) an increased awareness and understanding on the part of other countries in the area of the situation in Vietnam. I have never been sanguine about the possibility that we could really reduce the requirements for American forces. The Cottrell report confirms my doubts.

With respect to the third objective, the Cottrell report makes clear what was probably already evident-that we can expect help only from some of our SEATO allies plus Korea and Nationalist China. These countries are already convinced on the subject of Vietnam. Their participation will add little or nothing to their understanding and may even be somewhat discouraging as they come into contact with the defects of Diemʼs method of operation.

This leaves us with the second objective. It is possible that third country participation will have some useful political effects in the U.S. and I understand that this may be the principal reason why Governor Harriman is interested in pursuing the matter further.

This advantage must, however, be weighed against the international political disadvantages of third country participation. If such participation would, as the Cottrell paper suggests, really make the ICC more likely to cite the GVN for violation of the Geneva accords or if it significantly increased pressures for a Geneva-type conference on Vietnam, it would seem to me that the disadvantages would outweigh the advantage.

I have suggested to Cottrell that the U.S. political purpose might not be almost as well served and the international political disadvantages reduced if we sought military personnel exclusively for “constructive non-belligerent” functions. For example, we might make a [Page 369] request for military medical personnel. We also might seek military officers and non-commissioned officers who could assist in the organization of engineering projects and rural public works. Cottrell seemed to think well of this idea.

  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, R. Johnson Chron. Secret.↩
  2. Document 172.↩