Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

172. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington , April 27, 1962 .

SUBJECT

• Third Country Military Assistance to Viet-Nam

1. On April 3 you requested me to “take a new hard look and come up with recommendations” on how we might obtain military assistance to Viet-Nam from other governments.²

2. Since April 3 I have submitted this problem to the Task Force/Viet-Nam, visited Viet-Nam with General LeMay, consulted with Admiral Felt, Chargé d’Affaires Trueheart, and Secretary of State Thuan. I have also discussed the problem in very general terms with R.G.K. Thompson and First Secretary Denson of the British Embassy. Following is my report:

General Considerations

1. As Dr. Rostow has said, psychologically it would be of benefit in our international relations if other nations in the area were cooperating with us militarily in Viet-Nam as a visible demonstration of solidarity against Communist attack.

2. Secretary of State Thuan said he favored the idea if it were worked out on a “token” basis (Diemʼs approval would be needed at some point).

3. It should be anticipated that:

a) The ICC would probably be most unhappy. The Canadians and Indians would probably complain to us. The ICC would probably cite the GVN.

b) Those nations favoring a “Geneva type” conference or UN cognizance of the problem would be likely to clamor that the war was broadening, getting out of hand, and should be settled immediately by conference.

c) As an initial reaction, the British would very likely disapprove broadening the participation. They would require a “hard sell”. They believe Viet-Nam should fight its war with the minimum necessary outside help supplied as unobtrusively as possible to avoid “foreign flavor”. This eases their problem as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Accords.)

d) Certain problems would be created for USMACV in integrating foreign training units or specialists into the present military effort.

e) There is an outside chance that this “token” concept might later be broadened to involve larger third country military contributions but probably not to the extent of any substantial substitution of U.S. personnel support.

f) There is no present planning that I am aware of to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nam. The course of the fight will probably be the determining factor.

g) The disadvantages of having “foreigners” scattered through the Viet-Nam forces at all fevers, plus the attendant risks of direct confrontation with the Viet Cong are balanced by the demonstrated military advantages of producing strikingly more efficient and effective results from the RVNAF in all branches.

Possible Military Contributions

• Pakistan—Unlikely.
• India—Very unlikely since India is Chairman of ICC.
• Burma—Very unlikely because of Burmaʼs neutral political stance.
• Thailand—Very possible that Sarit could be induced to make a good public statement and send a token group of specialists. Educating the Thais should be a worthwhile by-product.
• Malaya—The Prime Minister has stated his willingness to make another visit to Viet-Nam, statement of support, train Vietnamese and supply any requested material even if he has to go out and buy it. However, he is unlikely to send men since it may create an internal political problem. Could be requested to supply a group. May or may not agree. Considers “Thompson Mission” a Malayan contribution.
• Indonesia—Very unlikely.
• Australia—Almost certain to be willing to send experienced “jungle bashers” to help train border patrol rangers or any other desirable personnel
• New Zealand—Possible that we could induce them to join the Australians since they both fought in Malaya in the Commonwealth Brigade. New Zealand would be heavily influenced by British opinion of the general idea.
• Philippines—Would likely be willing provided the US picks up the tab, even for a token group. Experience with the Huks, resettlement, and Navy coastal anti-smuggling are likely talents.
• China—Would be delighted. Now eager to expand their present small covert contribution. I believe they should be limited to non-military and covert military contributions to avoid waving red flag at ChiComs, even though a small ChiNat overt presence in a large grouping of other nations might not be quite so objectionable.
• Japan—No chance. The Japanese have even boggled at supplying certain economic aid which is closely related to the counterinsurgency effort.
• Korea—Already talking to the GVN about military assistance. Certain to agree.
• Britain—As Co-Chairman of Geneva Accords, very circumspect about supplying military aid. Not good prospects for reasons stated above.
• France—No interest in military assistance.
• Other nations—I recommend we confine our explorations to the prospects listed above. Later, if successful, we could explore the interest of other countries.³

Recommendations

If it is determined, despite the anticipated disadvantages, to go forward and seek a broad third country military participation, I recommend we do it in the following sequence:

1. Consult the British, and possibly the French. A “hard sell” is likely to be needed at a high level.

2. Have Ambassador Nolting discuss the concept with President Diem and obtain concurrence.

3. After a meeting of the minds with the British and French, or a determination to go forward anyway, then DOD/JCS could be directed to ascertain (through CINCPAC and COMACV to dovetail the outside participation with the least inconvenience) what local indigenous military units or military specialists from each prospective country could best be employed. A half dozen should be the minimum.

4. After receipt of the JCS survey, the Department of State could then instruct each Embassy to make the appropriate exploration, seeking not only a military contingent but also a strong political statement as well.

5. After informal agreement, the GVN would make a formal request of each government for indicated support. The replies could be widely advertised to the world, as in the case of the Diem-Kennedy letters.⁴

6. The above recommendations in no way detract from the present extensive efforts now in progress to obtain third country economic, and social aid, and civilian technical assistance.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 2-B.4, GVN 1962. Secret.
2. See Document 138.
3. At the end of this list of countries was written “Turkey?”
4. Next to this sentence were written the words: “They make public offer first & Diem accepts?”