Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

173. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs (Heavner) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)¹

Saigon, April 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Observations in Five Provinces

I recently spent two days in Dinh Tuong Province, three days in Kien Tuong Province, and one day each in Long An, Kien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces. Most of the time was spent in the Province capitals talking with officials and assorted folk, but I was also able to visit five strategic hamlets and travel by road across the Plaine des Joncs from My Tho to Moc Hoa (Kien Tuong).

Based on these visits, my estimate is that the war effort in the provinces is often confused, but that the energy now being applied by ourselves and the GVN can result in substantial improvement in the security situation within a year or two. Success will depend in large measure on continued emphasis on the strategic hamlet concept. If the steam goes out of this effort after a few months, much momentum will be lost and I doubt that a better concept can be developed in any event.

Success also depends on the DRVʼs reaction. If they step up infiltration sharply to meet the strategic hamlet program, progress may be much slower. Fortunately there is a limit to which they can reinforce the VC without opening themselves up to conventional attacks. Their great advantage now is the guerrilla character of the war, and this would likely be changed by an infusion of large numbers of infiltrators

1. Vietnamese-American Relations

American advisors have not been accepted with open arms by all provincial officials by any means. In particular the sector advisors (advisors to the Chiefs of Province) have been met with considerable reserve. In only one of the provinces visited did the sector advisor have his office physically located in the same building with the Chief of Province. The Chief of Dinh Tuong Province refused such an arrangement by telling his advisor that the President would not want him to have an American physically in his office building.

This reserve, which in some cases seems to amount to pretty deep suspicion, is not unnatural. Rather large groups of MAAG officers—usually at least two or three and often nine or ten—have suddenly appeared in all the province capitals. According to the Chief of Kien Hoa Province, many if not most provincial officials feel insecure in their jobs and cannot help fearing that the American advisor will in some fashion or other cause them to be replaced. Judging from some reporting I am aware of (which is also known to the Vietnamese authorities), this is not always an unreasonable fear.

This problem was expressed most frankly by Nguyen Thien Ke, the Surete Chief in Dinh Tuong Province. Ke told me that suspicion of our motives extends from the top down. According to Ke, the GVN at all levels believes we may decide at any time to unseat Diem, and many Province Chiefs are afraid of removal as a result of American pressures.

. . . . . . .

Ke went on to say that suspicion is not limited to the Americans. He painted a rather grim picture of the in-fighting which he alleged goes on within the GVN bureaucracy. He summed it up by two gestures, the traditional kowtow with palms pressed together and head bent, and a motion as if firing a submachine gun at the VC. “I spend more time doing this”, he said, making the kowtow gesture, “than this”,—he fired the invisible gun—“and so do all officials who want to keep their jobs”.

Ke also noted that the Director of Economics for Dinh Tuong had called him to tell him I was coming, and he had of course then felt obliged to call the Chief of Province for advice on how to handle me. The Chief of Province told him to be polite but reticent.

Colonel Thao expressed the same problem rather differently. According to Thao, it is impossible for the United States to help Viet-Nam without interfering in Vietnamese internal affairs. He insisted that our policy must necessarily be one of support for the Free World and the Vietnamese people, not support for any individual leader. Thao said coolly that if the time should come when it is clear that Diem is not the best leader available, then of course the U.S. will act to remove him, as we did in Korea. The result is natural and unavoidable suspicion of us by the GVN.

I replied simply that the U.S. is convinced Diem is the only leader who can save Viet-Nam, and that I could not conceive of the situation being altered so radically that we would feel another leader necessary. I added that we must remember who we are; if we adopt a policy of authoritarian interference that amounts to colonialism, we are little better than the Communists—in which case why fight them? Our true interest is always the genuine independence of our allies, not only vis-à-vis the Communists but vis-à-vis the U.S. itself. We cannot use puppet regimes to defend freedom. If the leadership of the GVN is changed, it must be changed by the Vietnamese people themselves.

In response to a question as to whether it would be useful to have a USOM advisor-contact in the province to expedite U.S. aid for the strategic hamlet program, the Assistant Chief of Kien Hoa Province was enthusiastically affirmative. But Thao said simply that the GVN would not permit it. It would be too direct an interference in Vietnamese affairs to be tolerated at this time, according to Thao. He added that the situation is not sufficiently desperate for such measures.

I believe time and patience will dissipate much of this suspicion. As the MAAGs settle in, they will find ways of approaching Vietnamese officials and gaining their confidence. And the Vietnamese will get used to them. I would recommend the following to minimize suspicion now and in the future:

(a) Issue a general directive that all officers and men and all civilian personnel are to be informed regularly that they are not to criticize the GVN in front of Vietnamese at any time, particularly in terms of the familiar charges of dictatorship and family rule. I am convinced that many people are talking too loosely on these topics—other officers in the Embassy have also heard this—and this feeds GVN suspicions. All of our people must know that our effort here is weakened by such talk, that it is in short subversive.

(b) Make a greater effort to brief Americans headed for the Provinces on the importance of our stake here and on Vietnamese history and character. Ignorance of these things can and has hurt our effort. Our people must be motivated by the understanding that we are here to defend the U.S. They must be equipped to deal with the Vietnamese with at least a little knowledge of this strange land.

(c) Choose sector advisors with great care. I have met some very good ones who have the necessary diplomatic virtues as well as military competence. But their excellence is not universal.

(d) In the future make every effort to train people destined for duty in the Provinces in the Vietnamese language. (In the Provinces, French is of very little value, hardly better than English.) Real competence in Vietnamese comes only after a year of full-time study and some months of practice in the country, but some level of usefulness can be achieved in less time. If there is any doubt of the importance of this qualification, I suggest that the field be queried. I am sure that the response will be unanimously and forcefully in favor of language training. Time and again both Vietnamese and MAAG officers expressed frustration to me because they often could not communicate adequately with one another.

2. Self Defense Corps

The SDC is in many respects the key to the whole problem because the defense of the strategic hamlets and most of the posts in the countryside is in their hands. In the past they have been ill equipped, ill trained and ill paid. The MAAGs in each Province are rapidly doing something about the first two ills, and I think we may look for a good return on this investment.

Virtually all provincial officials and most MAAG officers seem to agree on the crucial importance and the needs of the SDC. Working together on this program is therefore perhaps a little easier than is the case in other areas. The chief complaint on the Vietnamese side seems to be that the program is not moving fast enough. While this may have been the case at one time, the program now seems very much on the rails. Large classes are now in training (up to several hundred in some Provinces). While MAAG officers on the spot are not always entirely happy with the quality of the training, there seems to be no doubt that this program will greatly improve the performance of the SDC.

(a) SDC Pay

The matter of SDC pay continues to worry Provincial officials. The Assistant Chief of Kien Hoa Province went so far as to point out that one of the reasons the SDC are not more successful against the Communists is that their low pay leads them to engage in petty theft—a chicken here, a pig there—and the population is thus estranged from their defenders.

This view was expressed differently but with equal force by the Chief of the Civil Guard for the 32nd Tactical Zone, a Captain Quan. Quan observed that the SDC get 30 piasters a day while a day laborer can make 60. Quan went on to say that although the SDC are theoretically only part-time soldiers and can thus supplement their income, the fact is that in a wartime, indeed a siege situation, the SDC is perforce a full-time occupation. Thus it isn’t surprising according to Quan that it is not always possible to recruit good men for the SDC.

A missionary in My Tho with nineteen churches in a half-dozen provinces which he visits regularly by road in spite of the security situation remarked that the ARVN is beginning to behave itself pretty well vis-à-vis the local population (this was not always true), and that the big problem now will be to keep the SDC in hand. He agreed that an increase in pay might help. Officials in other provinces expressed similar views.

SDC fringe benefits are even less attractive than the pay. I was told that there are no survivor benefits, no disability benefits, and no retirement provisions. Perhaps more serious is the almost total lack of medical care for the wounded. One MAAG advisor told of visiting an isolated SDC post where he found a man who had been shot in a fire fight six months earlier. The wound had healed, but the slug was still in the man and was causing him considerable pain. The post had not been supplied for more than a month when the MAAG advisor visited it and no attempt had ever been made to treat the injured man.

I understand that ARVN medical facilities are open to the SDC only on a pay basis. Civilian facilities obviously cannot reach these isolated posts—at least as they are now organized—and the upshot is that the SDC are not getting much medical care. (These isolated posts are not rare. MAAG advisors tell me there are a great many small posts which are supplied by armed convoy once every month or so. The VC keep them in a constant state of sedge, usually making no attempt to storm the post, but simply seeking to wear down the SDC inside by steady harassment. Sometimes, but not often, all things considered, the SDC surrender their weapons and run away.)

Perhaps there is not much we can do about SDC pay, given the piaster shortage. But I think a hard look at priorities may be in order on the question. The SDC are pretty important by all accounts in the Provinces.

As for medical care, it looks as though something could be done to alleviate if not solve the problem. A “fire brigade” medical team or two might be organized from ARVN or civilian resources to fly to the scene of SDC actions, and ARVN medical facilities are probably not so overworked that they cannot handle some of the SDC casualties. And our own military might be able to run in some medical units for the purpose if all else fails.

(c) [sic] Use of SDC

There seems to be general agreement that the SDC should garrison the strategic hamlets, where they will serve as the backbone of the defense forces. Perhaps because of the rush to get on with the strategic hamlet program, the SDC seems often to be spread dangerously thin. The Civil Guard Chief for the 32nd Tactical Zone told me plans call for only six to twenty SDC in most of the strategic hamlets planned for the five provinces in his jurisdiction. Some of the so-called strategic hamlets I visited had only six to ten SDC to cover very large perimeters and populations ranging up to 3,000. These SDC were generally not yet supported by youth groups, and in any case I was told the youth groups are not going to be armed. If adequate Civil Guard or ARVN forces are within call, perhaps such small garrisons would be adequate, but this is not always the case by any means.

In the other direction, I understand that the famous Colonel Thao (who has and wants no ARVN in his Province—but does sometimes call for ARVN assistance) is in the habit of forming SDC into large units for province-wide operations. And in Long An, as a matter of policy, the SDC are often used in areas other than those in which they were recruited. (According to the Chief of Province,VC often volunteer for SDC duty. By shifting them to other areas the authorities prevent these VC volunteers from using their established contacts and so they are “neutralized”. The loyal SDC are of course also deprived of their local contacts, and their special knowledge of their home area and its people is lost.)

No doubt it is good to be flexible, but perhaps that is expecting too much for the SDC when the other, more elite fighting forces, are having some difficulty in adjusting to both conventional and guerrilla styles. If the SDCʼs role were defined very narrowly in terms of defense of the strategic hamlets from within, it might simplify training and improve performance. This would mean leaving ambushes, sweeps, night patrols outside the perimeter, population control and other more sophisticated actions to forces such as the Civil Guard, the Surete and the ARVN. And some rule-of-thumb for the number of SDC required to defend a given size perimeter against anticipated numbers of VC might also be useful to provincial officials.

3. Strategic Hamlet Program

This effort occupies the center of the provincial stage, and if it continues to be pursued energetically by both the GVN and us for a long period, I am convinced it will pay off. At the moment, there are a great many problems and misconceptions, and the short-range picture is not too rosy. But we are moving in the right direction.

(a) Chronic Shortages

The program suffers from shortages of all kinds. There are not enough SDC, not enough barbed wire, not enough cement, not enough weapons, not enough administrators, not enough cadre, not enough piasters. Some of these shortfalls we can and should remedy. I can think of no good reason why we cannot provide barbed wire, cement, water pumps, simple medicaments, generators, bulldozers and the like in adequate quantities if we decide that this program really must have top priority in our aid effort. (I think it should. Long-range economic development will be useless if our short-range effort fails.)

Of the strategic hamlets I visited, only one—Ben Tuong in Binh Duong Province—seemed to have plenty of material resources. Ben Tuong is dearly intended to be a model strategic hamlet, and resources there have been used lavishly. The perimeter was constructed by bulldozers, there is a good double barbed wire fence with metal posts, there are two Civil Guard companies inside the perimeter and two ARVN companies outside plus a Psy War company. The GVN has provided 18 tons of rice, 33 cadres from Saigon and the Binh Duong province seat, a medical team including a doctor, supplies of clothing and cloth, and reams of propaganda materials.

More typical perhaps is Binh Hoa, a village of some 60 families a few kilometers downstream from the Dinh Tuong provincial capital on the Vaico River. Unlike the folk in Ben Tuong, most of whom were moved from their old homes, the Binh Hoa villagers are staying right where they have always been. Behind their homes facing the desolate plains country, they are building a perimeter by hand labor. There will be no barrier on the river side; evidently the VC are not expected from that direction. They are short of barbed wire and they have only six SDC. All the labor and virtually all of the resources used are coming from the village itself. Binh Hoa is not going to be a model strategic hamlet.

The burden on the local populations is heavy. Every family in one area of Dinh Tuong is required to make two kilos—about two hundred—spike traps for their perimeter. This involves buying the nails required. In Kien Hoa, the Surete Chief informed me that the new plastic identity cards cost each citizen 50 piasters-ten piasters for the card and forty for the strategic hamlet program (this in spite of the fact that Colonel Thao is going slow, perhaps even dragging his feet on the program). I believe the villages are generally buying their own barbed wire. (I was told that in the 32nd Tactical Zone, all perimeter building is accomplished by Community Development, which judging from my previous experience I take to mean that all labor and all resources are provided by the villages involved.) In all the villages I visited, local taxes support local officials. The new hamlet administrators will be paid by hamlet taxes.

Even in model Ben Tuong, the economic problem is serious for the people. Several cadre working there told me that the most serious obstacle to the success of the hamlet is the shortage of rice land that can be cultivated with reasonable safety. So much of the arable land is subject to VC harassment that they fear the village cannot support itself. This was echoed by a peasant who had come to Ben Tuong voluntarily (a considerable number did not), who said he was afraid his family would be hungry after the GVN subsidy stopped. (It is only fair to add that the Chief of Province told me he expects to clear more land close to the hamlet for cultivation, and that in any event the people can support themselves by working on the nearby rubber plantation. These assurances have evidently not been conveyed to the GVN cadres in the hamlet.)

(b) Sector Economic Advisors

One of the keys to the success of the refugee resettlement program in this country was the use of American representatives of COMIGAL at province and even village level. These men knew the situation first hand, worked closely with local officials, and had authority to call for and dispense aid items such as cloth, roofing and rice (I have read some of their old records which the Consulate at Hue inherited at my request).

Later we got into the position of being able to dispense aid only through appropriate ministries, and USOM pulled all of its “field representatives” out of the provinces. Vietnamese officials at the province level have been complaining of the slowness—and sometimes the inappropriateness—of U.S. aid ever since. They mentioned it frequently to me on this trip when I asked what we could do to help.

It seems to me that if we mean business on the strategic hamlets, we should reestablish the old system of direct contact and direct aid as much as possible. If the GVN will not formally accept Sector Economic Advisors—and I think it is certainly worth a pitch in spite of what Thao says—perhaps we could somehow put an economic advisor on the provincial MAAG staffs. (One of the very best MAAG senior advisors complained because there is no such person on his staff or in his area.)

To be useful, a Sector Economic Advisor would have to have considerable discretion in the use of funds and American supplied equipment. He would have to be able to make sure that the strategic hamlets get the barbed wire, water pumps, generators, etc., that they need in time. The VC are reacting vigorously to the program (the Long An Province Chief told me he has “lost” three strategic hamlets already, Ben Tuong is being harassed continually according to officials there, and in Dinh Tuong the VC reportedly went so far as to dig a three kilometer long tunnel in an attempt to get through the perimeter defenses of a strategic hamlet there). I think there is real danger that too many strategic hamlets will be knocked over by the VC and the whole concept discredited in the eyes of the people and the GVN administrators because of a failure to provide adequate resources rapidly.

(c) Understanding of the Concept in the Provinces

As I noted in my previous memo, the Thompson concept of the strategic hamlet is often not completely understood in the provinces. The provincial effort now puts less stress on patrols outside the perimeter and communications with reserve forces than I would hope for. The provincial concept in fact often is really only an extension of the static defense approach which has dotted the countryside with Beau Geste towers. I think MAAG can do a lot to set this straight as time goes on.

In talks with provincial officials I stressed what I conceive to be the four major requirements for a strategic hamlet: (1) a perimeter and an SDC force adequate to meet the usual VC threat in that area; (2) communications with provincial and ARVN reserve forces in case of attack; (3) constant Civil Guard or ARVN patrols, particularly at night, outside the perimeters; (4) an adequate economic and social base for the village in terms of safe rice growing areas, social services such as schools and medicines, and better administration.

A rather notable heretic is Colonel Thao. He talks in terms of bases among the people, insists that perimeters are not only unnecessary but make the people feel they are in prison. He observed that Saigon has accused him of not implementing the program, but he claims this is not true; he is only going slow and sure. Judging from what he said and what his people showed me, he is mostly going Thao. In spite of his great abilities and his theory that the basic solution is GVN respect for the people, I think he is out in left field on this one. And it is a pretty crucial issue.

(d) Salaries

One of the thornier problems facing us is how to pay strategic hamlet officials and youth defenders. I noted above the problem with regard to the SDC. It applies with equal force to the new strategic hamlet administrations.

According to the Chief of Dinh Tuong Province, pay for hamlet chiefs will be the same as that for the SDC—900 piasters a month. His Civic Action Chief said, however, that most of the hamlets have no money to pay their officials, and consequently they have gone unpaid to date. He was more modest in his estimate of what they should get, feeling that 500 or 600 piasters per month would suffice. (According to this source, strategic hamlet administration will consist of a hamlet chief and a four-man council, including council members specifically charged with responsibility for youth, Surete, and finance. In Long An, the Civic Action Chief stated that the pattern now is to set up a temporary “building committee” composed of elders and other prestigeful types to lend their authority to the actual construction of the strategic hamlet. After the hamlet is set up, the people will select a hamlet chief and a hamlet council.)

The problem does not even stop with SDC and hamlet officials. Asked about his problems, the Chief of Binh Hiep village in Kien Tuong Province observed that it is difficult to motivate youth defenders for the strategic hamlets (not to be confused with the SDC, which is expected to lead the hamlet youth in case of attack). He suggested that pay of 400 or 500 piasters per month would create a much better situation. (He himself gets 1,500 piasters per month from the village budget.) His thought, of course, was that U.S. aid might provide this money. I did what I could to explain the complexities of piaster generation, but I donʼt have much confidence that he understood why it is so difficult for us to meet piaster costs.

One of the more difficult salary problems is that of village health workers. The head of the Dinh Tuong health service observed that he had trained 138 village health workers for six months in his hospital, but very few of them went to the villages when they finished their training. They went to work for private physicians, set up “practices” of their own or found unrelated work in the towns and cities because the villages could not offer them a decent living.

He believes these workers should get 1,500 piasters a month, but they are very lucky to get 900. He is now training health workers for the strategic hamlets; in order to commit them to serve in the villages, he will not give them a certificate until they set up shop in a strategic hamlet or a village in the countryside. (In Long An, the health service is training strategic hamlet health workers for fifteen days in the local hospital. I doubt that they are very useful.)

(e) Cadre to Set Up the Hamlets

One of the brighter aspects of the program at the moment appears to be the remarkable effort to send good cadre into the hamlets to get the program into motion. In Ben Tuong strategic hamlet there were 33 men, many of them from Saigon, all wearing black peasant garb, all evidently quite intelligent and well motivated, and all committed to living a peasant existence for an indefinite period. The fact that they had received no pay from Saigon for some time did not seem to dampen their enthusiasm. Even making allowances for the fact that Ben Tuong is frequently visited by Americans and is obviously a model strategic hamlet, this is pretty wonderful.

In Kien Tuong province, I attended the graduation ceremony for eighty cadre who took a six week course to prepare them for working in the strategic hamlets. These appeared to be Republican youths. I talked to several of them afterward and was again impressed by the dedication of these people. There is really a great deal of human material to work with in the provinces if these groups are any example. (I might also add in this connection the story of one man in an isolated post, three quarters of which was overrun by the VC, who determined that he would not be taken by the VC. He rallied the other men in the post and fought off the VC from midnight to dawn. His wife took over the weapon of one of the dead defenders and fought by his side in best frontier style. They killed 32 VC. He showed me the decoration which the Chief of Province gave him for this exploit.)

Virtually all of the Civic Action employees in the provinces are of course up to their ears in the program. All Civic Action Chiefs visited said they had organized courses for setting up strategic hamlets. (With the combined staffs of the youth, information and old civic action services, they command the largest group of cadre in the province, often more than 100 personnel.) Several of them are also putting out very commendable weekly and even daily provincial newspapers with circulations of several thousand.

The picture here is not entirely rosy, of course. In a strategic hamlet in Long An, I ran into a “delegation” of several cadre out of Saigon “inspecting” the hamlet. They were all more or less drunk and patronizing the villagers in a rather unhappy fashion. But I think this behavior is exceptional.

4. Problems With ARVN

On this trip as on the last one, MAAG advisors told me that ARVN troops sometimes show little enthusiasm for engaging the VC. This is often connected with the use of helicopters; the ARVN forces climb out of the helicopters and instead of immediately moving forward to engage the fleeing VC, wait for all units to arrive so that they can form themselves into battalions. The MAAG advisors are doing all they can to overcome these problems and feel they are making some headway, but the going is slow.

The Rangers are the bright spot here. They are always ready and more than willing to fight VC. One MAAG advisor suggested that Ranger and helicopter companies ought to be “married” so that they could get the helicopters quickly when they need them without the delay of Saigon red tape. (I was told Province Chiefs cannot use helicopters for their operations, so the Rangers do not often get helicopters. This is evidently a Vietnamese decision and reflects the continuing problem of coordination and jealousy between the regular military and the Province Chiefs with their direct lines to Diem.)

As I noted in the previous memo,² I think the senior MAAG advisors should be of equal rank with their counterparts. MAAG advisors in the field agreed with me.

5. Provincial Councils

In several of the provinces visited on this trip, provincial Councils have now been set up. In fact, that in Dinh Tuong was opened a few days before my arrival there. All concerned seem to think they are a good idea, but their function is rather vague. I was unable to talk to any Council members, but would suggest that political officers on field trips try to do so in the future.

6. Temper of the People

Here in Saigon, as far as I can make out, morale has definitely improved as a direct result of our efforts. In the provinces, officials at least are bullish, feeling that the people are not only getting fed up with Red terror but see an “out” in the strategic hamlets. An American missionary in My Tho gave considerable support to this reading of popular feelings, added that the improved SDC, our helicopters, and greater delegation of authority to field commanders have pushed the VC out of many areas where they formerly worked openly. He now travels on many roads that were closed in December, and feels we are on the crest of a small wave that could grow rapidly if the strategic hamlet program is pushed hard and consistently for another year or two.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, TF(j), Taylor Program, Provincial Surveys, 1962. Secret; Limited Distribution. Sent to Nolting through Mendenhall and Trueheart.
2. Not further identified.