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  4. Document 224

224. Memorandum From Lieutenant Commander Worth H. Bagley to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)1

Washington, November 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Secretary McNamara’s Memorandum for the President on the subject of South VietNam2
1.

My comments on Secretary McNamara’s memorandum are as set forth below:

a. The basic issue framed by your report is not the decision for commitment to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism. Rather, your report responds to a lesser scale objective, which can be altered up or down by later choice. There is advantage, however, in exploring the President’s view now on an ultimate objective toward SEA as long as it can be done without detriment to the subtle actions you have recommended, which in fact permit a delayed decision.

2.
The following comments are numbered the same as related paragraphs in the basic paper:
(1)
A statement regarding Communist control of Southeast Asia should be expanded for the benefit of the President to include a clear statement as to the strategic implications of a neutral SEA as it will affect the US position worldwide.
(2)

The suggestion that US forces be employed on a substantial scale indicates the purposes of your recommendations, as an entity, are not understood. The basic reason for introduction of US forces at this time is to remove all doubt as to the extent the US is committed to the defense of SVN and, further, to offset sagging morale in that area. It is not intended to accomplish any positive military task other than that of self-defense.

The US military presence will provide sustenance to encourage Diem to respond to the other measures you have recommended. The combination of these military and non-military measures, which in the context of the report are inseparable, if fully realized will increase confidence and Diem will in fact be set on the way to winning his own fight. The prospect is that US assistance will then diminish rather than increase. In this context, Secretary McNamara’s interpretation of your judgment as to the potential of your recommendations is erroneous.

(3)

In order to implement your recommendations, it is necessary to violate the 1954 Geneva Accords, and to acknowledge such violation. Present thinking as to the use of the Jorden report envisages publication of a White paper, tabled at the United Nations, which will be publicly used as the excuse for such violation. We are thus announcing to the world a radical increase in our assistance to SVN including placement there of a small American force. This will be a dramatic indication of our recognition of the vital interest SVN represents to our own national security, and should be just as convincing to the “other side” whether we commit 8,000 men or 80,000 men.

It should be noted, however, that renunciation of the Accords (though we do so on the basis of the US reservation attached thereto) is a double-edged sword. The Communists are then free to invade. It is here that our commitment must be clear as a defense for SVN.

We do not envisage US units having a positive military objective, so it is difficult to see how our forces can become mired down in an inconclusive struggle. If their presence, in conjunction with other measures, increases SVN capabilities to fight, the Viet-Cong will become less able to engage them. If this anticipated result does not occur, a new US decision will be required.

(4)
A public commitment to a maximum objective in SVN seems unnecessary for the same basic reasoning as outlined above. If such an announcement were made it would decrease our flexibility and initiative. It is ironic that we continue to point with envy to the flexible and fluid tactics which Mao adherents follow and at the same time eliminate any possibility that we can retain similar advantages. The lack of such public announcement of our objectives does not, however, prevent the possibility of transmitting an appropriate [Page 557] diplomatic warning to Hanoi that their continued support of the Viet-Cong will lead to expanded action on our part.
(5)
Recognition now that an expanded US participation in SVN could conceivably result in an enlarged conflict will add to the flexibility of the Taylor Program. If we recognize the requirements and provide for them, but do not publicly announce such an appreciation, our flexibility is enhanced because there is then no limit to the scale of action to which we can resort.
(6)
When we publicly announce our violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords, and the reasons therefore based on the Jorden paper, it will be appropriate to advise the American people of our increased commitments in SVN. For the same reasoning as in subparagraph 3 above, this should be sufficient to explain any action that may subsequently be required even though our initial commitment of forces may be limited.
WHB3
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69. Top Secret.↩
  2. Bagley was apparently referring to the draft memorandum described in footnote 2, Document 227, which was a later draft of Document 214.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩