At the risk of blitzing you with paper, I attach some think-pieces on the
Viet-Nam problem, by myself and Harry
Rowen’s staff..2 The key paper, however, is the first
one on possible outcomes. It is a first cut. Paul Nitze agrees with it.
[Attachment
1]
Draft Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs (Bundy)4
Washington, November 7,
1961.
Reflections on the Possible
Outcomes of US Intervention in South Vietnam
The range of possible outcomes:
“Good” Scenarios
- Scenario A: Diem takes heart and also takes the measures
needed to improve efficiency, with only the 8000 man force and
US specialist help. Hanoi heeds our warning and lays low, so
that control is reasserted in South Vietnam. (Laos is a big
question mark here and in other Scenarios.)
- Scenario B: The struggle continues to go against Diem, and his
own efforts at improvement are feeble. Thus, the US moves into
the driver’s seat and eventually brings the situation under
control, using forces on the scale of 25,000-75,000. Hanoi and
Peiping do not intervene directly, and we do not attack
Hanoi.
- Scenario C: As the struggle becomes prolonged, the US strikes
at Hanoi (or Hanoi and Peiping intervene overtly). The US wins
the resulting conflict, i.e., obtains at least a restoration of
the status quo, after inflicting such punishment on Hanoi and/or
Peiping that further aggressive moves are forestalled for a long
time to come.
“Bad” Scenarios
- Scenario X: The US decides not to put in the 8000 men, or
later forces, and Diem is gradually overcome.
- Scenario Y: The US puts in the 8000 men, but when Diem fails
to improve his performance pulls out and lets him be
overcome.
- Scenario Z: Moscow comes to the aid of Hanoi and Peiping,
supplying all necessary equipment (including a limited supply of
air-deliverable nuclear weapons to retaliate in kind against US
use) so [Page 554] that the
outcome is a stalemate in which great destruction is wreaked on
the whole area.
Of these, only A is truly a good outcome from all long-term
standpoints-it stiffens us generally vis-à-vis the Bloc, holds the
area (save perhaps Laos), does not discomfit us unduly in the
neutral world, excellent for domestic US will and drive. Only
trouble is-it’s unlikely! However, it is still so much better than
any other that it is worth accepting some added degree of difficulty
in achieving B and C to give A every chance to happen.
The choice between B and C is a hard
one. Despite all our warnings and Jorden Report, our case of
aggression against Hanoi will not convince neutrals of its accuracy
and justice, or major allies of its wisdom and practicality. On the
other hand, B is a road that has
almost no end in sight. The US is poorly cast as a permanent
protecting power, but the local capabilities would be so low at the
end of such a struggle that we would almost have to assume that
role. There is a very considerable chance that under continuing US
protection, South Viet-Nam and the area as a whole would become a
wasting asset and an eyesore that would greatly hamper all our
relations worldwide. On the whole, the short-term onus attached to C
may be preferable. However, as we play the hand toward C (especially
if we use Moscow as the channel to Hanoi) we may well raise the
chances of Moscow acting to bring on Z.
On the “bad” side, X and Z are clearly
nightmares. Though X means loss of the area for a long time to come,
it is probably better in the long run than Z. The chances of the Soviets acting to bring about
Z do not appear great in the short
run, but we must certainly try to keep those chances low (e.g., by
making our dealings with Moscow private).
Y is also a nightmare. It loses the area. Moreover, vis-a-vis the
Bloc it would be worse than X, since they would take it as an almost
final proof that we would not stand up. It might have some
compensating gains in the neutral world, at least in the short run.
But on the whole it seems the worst possible outcome.
The basic strategic issues are:
- a.
- How long to give A a
chance?
- b.
- Whether B is preferable to
the weighted odds of C vs. Z?
Note on the Scale of US
Intervention in South Vietnam
In deciding on the appropriate level of a possible US Intervention in
Vietnam, it is important to consider the objective of preserving
Vietnamese prestige. The preferred US outcome is for the Vietnamese,
and Diem, to get credit for the defeat of the Communists with the
help of the US. The next best outcome, a defeat of [Page 555] the Communists as a consequence of
large scale intervention on the part of the US is a distinctly
inferior outcome to the former. Diem would very probably be
discredited and progress toward the formation of a cohesive nation
slowed.
The problem of a US take-over of the conflict hardly arises at the
6-8000 US troop level-especially if these troops are mostly
engineers. It would seem to arise only if the scale of intervention
is of the order of several divisions. (Even then the outcome of the
war would be very largely dependent on the Vietnamese effort.) The
introduction of a large US force may turn out to be necessary in any
case. This would be so if Hanoi and Peiping intervened openly or if
sizeable forces are needed in Laos. Short of such clear and urgent
demands for a large US force on the scene we should restrict our
effort to a level that leaves the burden primarily on the
Vietnamese. The US role would be (1) to assist South Viet-Nam more
actively in a variety of ways, and (2) to bail out the Vietnamese if
things go badly.
